The following tables compare general and technical information for a number of online analytical processing (OLAP) servers. Please see the individual products articles for further information. == General information == == Data storage modes == == APIs and query languages == APIs and query languages OLAP servers support. == OLAP distinctive features == A list of OLAP features that are not supported by all vendors. All vendors support features such as parent-child, multilevel hierarchy, drilldown. == System limits == == Security == == Operating systems == The OLAP servers can run on the following operating systems: Note (1):The server availability depends on Java Virtual Machine not on the operating system == Support information ==
TSheets
TSheets was a web-based and mobile time tracking and employee scheduling app. The service was accessed via a web browser or a mobile app. TSheets was an alternative to a paper timesheet or punch cards. == History == Based in Eagle, Idaho, TSheets was co-founded in 2006 by CEO Matt Rissell and CTO Brandon Zehm. In 2008, TSheets released a native employee time tracking app for the iPhone. In 2012, TSheets released an integration with accounting and payroll software QuickBooks. In 2015, TSheets accepted $15 million in growth equity funding from Summit Partners, bought a building in Eagle, Idaho, and opened a second location in Sydney, Australia. On 5 December 2017, Intuit announced an agreement to acquire TSheets. The transaction was valued at approximately $340 million of cash and other consideration and closed on 11 January 2018. After the transaction closed, Time Capture became a new business unit within Intuit's Small Business and Self-Employed Group with Matt Rissell assuming the leader role reporting to Alex Chriss. TSheets's Eagle, Idaho site became an Intuit location.
Neuro-symbolic AI
Neuro-symbolic AI is a subfield of artificial intelligence that integrates neural methods (e.g., neural networks and deep learning) with symbolic methods (e.g., formal logic, knowledge representation, and automated reasoning). The goal is to combine the strengths of both approaches, resulting in AI systems that can be trained from raw data and demonstrate robustness against outliers or errors in the base data, while preserving explainability, explicit use of expert knowledge, and explicit cognitive reasoning. As argued by Leslie Valiant and others, the effective construction of rich computational cognitive models demands the combination of symbolic reasoning and efficient machine learning. Gary Marcus argued, "We cannot construct rich cognitive models in an adequate, automated way without the triumvirate of hybrid architecture, rich prior knowledge, and sophisticated techniques for reasoning." Further, "To build a robust, knowledge-driven approach to AI we must have the machinery of symbol manipulation in our toolkit. Too much of useful knowledge is abstract to make do without tools that represent and manipulate abstraction, and to date, the only known machinery that can manipulate such abstract knowledge reliably is the apparatus of symbol manipulation." Angelo Dalli, Henry Kautz, Francesca Rossi, and Bart Selman also argued for such a synthesis. Their arguments attempt to address the two kinds of thinking, as discussed in Daniel Kahneman's book Thinking, Fast and Slow. It describes cognition as encompassing two components: System 1 is fast, reflexive, intuitive, and unconscious. System 2 is slower, step-by-step, and explicit. System 1 is used for pattern recognition. System 2 handles planning, deduction, and deliberative thinking. In this view, deep learning best handles the first kind of cognition, while symbolic reasoning best handles the second kind. Both are necessary for the development of a robust and reliable AI system capable of learning, reasoning, and interacting with humans to accept advice and answer questions. Since the 1990s, dual-process models with explicit references to the two contrasting systems have been the focus of research in both the fields of AI and cognitive science by numerous researchers. In 2025, the adoption of neurosymbolic AI, an approach that integrates neural networks with symbolic reasoning, increased in response to the need to address hallucination issues in large language models. For example, Amazon implemented Neurosymbolic AI in its Vulcan warehouse robots and Rufus shopping assistant to enhance accuracy and decision-making. == Approaches == Approaches for integration are diverse. Henry Kautz's taxonomy of neuro-symbolic architectures follows, along with some examples: Symbolic Neural symbolic is the current approach of many neural models in natural language processing, where words or subword tokens are the ultimate input and output of large language models. Examples include BERT, RoBERTa, and GPT-3. Symbolic[Neural] is exemplified by AlphaGo, where symbolic techniques are used to invoke neural techniques. In this case, the symbolic approach is Monte Carlo tree search and the neural techniques learn how to evaluate game positions. Neural | Symbolic uses a neural architecture to interpret perceptual data as symbols and relationships that are reasoned about symbolically. Neural-Concept Learner is an example. Neural: Symbolic → Neural relies on symbolic reasoning to generate or label training data that is subsequently learned by a deep learning model, e.g., to train a neural model for symbolic computation by using a Macsyma-like symbolic mathematics system to create or label examples. NeuralSymbolic uses a neural net that is generated from symbolic rules. An example is the Neural Theorem Prover, which constructs a neural network from an AND-OR proof tree generated from knowledge base rules and terms. Logic Tensor Networks also fall into this category. Neural[Symbolic] according to Kautz, this approach embeds true symbolic reasoning inside a neural network. These are tightly-coupled neural-symbolic systems, in which the logical inference rules are internal to the neural network. This way, the neural network internally computes the inference from the premises and learns to reason based on logical inference systems. Early work on connectionist modal and temporal logics by Garcez, Lamb, and Gabbay is aligned with this approach. These categories are not exhaustive, as they do not consider multi-agent systems. In 2005, Bader and Hitzler presented a more fine-grained categorization that took into account, e.g., whether the use of symbols included logic and, if so, whether the logic was propositional or first-order logic. The 2005 categorization and Kautz's taxonomy above are compared and contrasted in a 2021 article. Sepp Hochreiter argued that Graph Neural Networks "...are the predominant models of neural-symbolic computing" since "[t]hey describe the properties of molecules, simulate social networks, or predict future states in physical and engineering applications with particle-particle interactions." == Artificial general intelligence == Gary Marcus argues that "...hybrid architectures that combine learning and symbol manipulation are necessary for robust intelligence, but not sufficient", and that there are ...four cognitive prerequisites for building robust artificial intelligence: hybrid architectures that combine large-scale learning with the representational and computational powers of symbol manipulation, large-scale knowledge bases—likely leveraging innate frameworks—that incorporate symbolic knowledge along with other forms of knowledge, reasoning mechanisms capable of leveraging those knowledge bases in tractable ways, and rich cognitive models that work together with those mechanisms and knowledge bases. This echoes earlier calls for hybrid models as early as the 1990s. == History == Garcez and Lamb described research in this area as ongoing, at least since the 1990s. During that period, the terms symbolic and sub-symbolic AI were popular. A series of workshops on neuro-symbolic AI has been held annually since 2005 Neuro-Symbolic Artificial Intelligence. In the early 1990s, an initial set of workshops on this topic were organized. == Research == Key research questions remain, such as: What is the best way to integrate neural and symbolic architectures? How should symbolic structures be represented within neural networks and extracted from them? How should common-sense knowledge be learned and reasoned about? How can abstract knowledge that is hard to encode logically be handled? == Implementations == Implementations of neuro-symbolic approaches include: AllegroGraph: an integrated Knowledge Graph based platform for neuro-symbolic application development. Scallop: a language based on Datalog that supports differentiable logical and relational reasoning. Scallop can be integrated in Python and with a PyTorch learning module. Logic Tensor Networks: encode logical formulas as neural networks and simultaneously learn term encodings, term weights, and formula weights. DeepProbLog: combines neural networks with the probabilistic reasoning of ProbLog. Abductive Learning: integrates machine learning and logical reasoning in a balanced-loop via abductive reasoning, enabling them to work together in a mutually beneficial way. SymbolicAI: a compositional differentiable programming library.
Action model learning
Action model learning (sometimes abbreviated action learning) is an area of machine learning concerned with the creation and modification of a software agent's knowledge about the effects and preconditions of the actions that can be executed within its environment. This knowledge is usually represented in a logic-based action description language and used as input for automated planners. Learning action models is important when goals change. When an agent acted for a while, it can use its accumulated knowledge about actions in the domain to make better decisions. Thus, learning action models differs from reinforcement learning. It enables reasoning about actions instead of expensive trials in the world. Action model learning is a form of inductive reasoning, where new knowledge is generated based on the agent's observations. The usual motivation for action model learning is the fact that manual specification of action models for planners is often a difficult, time-consuming, and error-prone task (especially in complex environments). == Action models == Given a training set E {\displaystyle E} consisting of examples e = ( s , a , s ′ ) {\displaystyle e=(s,a,s')} , where s , s ′ {\displaystyle s,s'} are observations of a world state from two consecutive time steps t , t ′ {\displaystyle t,t'} and a {\displaystyle a} is an action instance observed in time step t {\displaystyle t} , the goal of action model learning in general is to construct an action model ⟨ D , P ⟩ {\displaystyle \langle D,P\rangle } , where D {\displaystyle D} is a description of domain dynamics in action description formalism like STRIPS, ADL or PDDL and P {\displaystyle P} is a probability function defined over the elements of D {\displaystyle D} . However, many state of the art action learning methods assume determinism and do not induce P {\displaystyle P} . In addition to determinism, individual methods differ in how they deal with other attributes of domain (e.g. partial observability or sensoric noise). == Action learning methods == === State of the art === Recent action learning methods take various approaches and employ a wide variety of tools from different areas of artificial intelligence and computational logic. As an example of a method based on propositional logic, we can mention SLAF (Simultaneous Learning and Filtering) algorithm, which uses agent's observations to construct a long propositional formula over time and subsequently interprets it using a satisfiability (SAT) solver. Another technique, in which learning is converted into a satisfiability problem (weighted MAX-SAT in this case) and SAT solvers are used, is implemented in ARMS (Action-Relation Modeling System). Two mutually similar, fully declarative approaches to action learning were based on logic programming paradigm Answer Set Programming (ASP) and its extension, Reactive ASP. In another example, bottom-up inductive logic programming approach was employed. Several different solutions are not directly logic-based. For example, the action model learning using a perceptron algorithm or the multi level greedy search over the space of possible action models. In the older paper from 1992, the action model learning was studied as an extension of reinforcement learning. Nonetheless, further algorithms can be found that operate under different assumptions: FAMA can work even when some observations are missing, and it produces a general (lifted) planning model. It treats learning an action model like a planning problem, making sure the learned model matches the observations given. NOLAM can learn general action models even from noisy or imperfect data. LOCM focuses only on the order of actions in the data, ignoring any details about the states between those actions. The family of safe action model (SAM) learning methods create models that guarantee any plans made with them will actually work in the real world. There's also an extension called N-SAM that can learn action models with numeric conditions and effects. Additionally, numeric action models like N-SAM can be used to improve reinforcement learning (RL) performance through the RAMP algorithm. === Literature === Most action learning research papers are published in journals and conferences focused on artificial intelligence in general (e.g. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR), Artificial Intelligence, Applied Artificial Intelligence (AAI) or AAAI conferences). Despite mutual relevance of the topics, action model learning is usually not addressed in planning conferences like the International Conference on Automated Planning and Scheduling (ICAPS).
Zeuthen strategy
The Zeuthen strategy in cognitive science is a negotiation strategy used by some artificial agents. Its purpose is to measure the willingness to risk conflict. An agent will be more willing to risk conflict if it does not have much to lose in case that the negotiation fails. In contrast, an agent is less willing to risk conflict when it has more to lose. The value of a deal is expressed in its utility. An agent has much to lose when the difference between the utility of its current proposal and the conflict deal is high. When both agents use the monotonic concession protocol, the Zeuthen strategy leads them to agree upon a deal in the negotiation set. This set consists of all conflict free deals, which are individually rational and Pareto optimal, and the conflict deal, which maximizes the Nash product. The strategy was introduced in 1930 by the Danish economist Frederik Zeuthen. == Three key questions == The Zeuthen strategy answers three open questions that arise when using the monotonic concession protocol, namely: Which deal should be proposed at first? On any given round, who should concede? In case of a concession, how much should the agent concede? The answer to the first question is that any agent should start with its most preferred deal, because that deal has the highest utility for that agent. The second answer is that the agent with the smallest value of Risk(i,t) concedes, because the agent with the lowest utility for the conflict deal profits most from avoiding conflict. To the third question, the Zeuthen strategy suggests that the conceding agent should concede just enough raise its value of Risk(i,t) just above that of the other agent. This prevents the conceding agent to have to concede again in the next round. == Risk == Risk ( i , t ) = { 1 U i ( δ ( i , t ) ) = 0 U i ( δ ( i , t ) ) − U i ( δ ( j , t ) ) U i ( δ ( i , t ) ) otherwise {\displaystyle {\text{Risk}}(i,t)={\begin{cases}1&U_{i}(\delta (i,t))=0\\{\frac {U_{i}(\delta (i,t))-U_{i}(\delta (j,t))}{U_{i}(\delta (i,t))}}&{\text{otherwise}}\end{cases}}} Risk(i,t) is a measurement of agent i's willingness to risk conflict. The risk function formalizes the notion that an agent's willingness to risk conflict is the ratio of the utility that agent would lose by accepting the other agent's proposal to the utility that agent would lose by causing a conflict. Agent i is said to be using a rational negotiation strategy if at any step t + 1 that agent i sticks to his last proposal, Risk(i,t) > Risk(j,t). == Sufficient concession == If agent i makes a sufficient concession in the next step, then, assuming that agent j is using a rational negotiation strategy, if agent j does not concede in the next step, he must do so in the step after that. The set of all sufficient concessions of agent i at step t is denoted SC(i, t). == Minimal sufficient concession == δ ′ = arg max δ ∈ S C ( A , t ) { U A ( δ ) } {\displaystyle \delta '=\arg \max _{\delta \in {SC(A,t)}}\{U_{A}(\delta )\}} is the minimal sufficient concession of agent A in step t. Agent A begins the negotiation by proposing δ ( A , 0 ) = arg max δ ∈ N S U A ( δ ) {\displaystyle \delta (A,0)=\arg \max _{\delta \in {NS}}U_{A}(\delta )} and will make the minimal sufficient concession in step t + 1 if and only if Risk(A,t) ≤ Risk(B,t). Theorem If both agents are using Zeuthen strategies, then they will agree on δ = arg max δ ′ ∈ N S { π ( δ ′ ) } , {\displaystyle \delta =\arg \max _{\delta '\in {NS}}\{\pi (\delta ')\},} that is, the deal which maximizes the Nash product. Proof Let δA = δ(A,t). Let δB = δ(B,t). According to the Zeuthen strategy, agent A will concede at step t {\displaystyle t} if and only if R i s k ( A , t ) ≤ R i s k ( B , t ) . {\displaystyle Risk(A,t)\leq Risk(B,t).} That is, if and only if U A ( δ A ) − U A ( δ B ) U A ( δ A ) ≤ U B ( δ B ) − U B ( δ A ) U B ( δ B ) {\displaystyle {\frac {U_{A}(\delta _{A})-U_{A}(\delta _{B})}{U_{A}(\delta _{A})}}\leq {\frac {U_{B}(\delta _{B})-U_{B}(\delta _{A})}{U_{B}(\delta _{B})}}} U B ( δ B ) ( U A ( δ A ) − U A ( δ B ) ) ≤ U A ( δ A ) ( U B ( δ B ) − U B ( δ A ) ) {\displaystyle U_{B}(\delta _{B})(U_{A}(\delta _{A})-U_{A}(\delta _{B}))\leq U_{A}(\delta _{A})(U_{B}(\delta _{B})-U_{B}(\delta _{A}))} U A ( δ A ) U B ( δ B ) − U A ( δ B ) U B ( δ B ) ≤ U A ( δ A ) U B ( δ B ) − U A ( δ A ) U B ( δ A ) {\displaystyle U_{A}(\delta _{A})U_{B}(\delta _{B})-U_{A}(\delta _{B})U_{B}(\delta _{B})\leq U_{A}(\delta _{A})U_{B}(\delta _{B})-U_{A}(\delta _{A})U_{B}(\delta _{A})} − U A ( δ B ) U B ( δ B ) ≤ − U A ( δ A ) U B ( δ A ) {\displaystyle -U_{A}(\delta _{B})U_{B}(\delta _{B})\leq -U_{A}(\delta _{A})U_{B}(\delta _{A})} U A ( δ A ) U B ( δ A ) ≤ U A ( δ B ) U B ( δ B ) {\displaystyle U_{A}(\delta _{A})U_{B}(\delta _{A})\leq U_{A}(\delta _{B})U_{B}(\delta _{B})} π ( δ A ) ≤ π ( δ B ) {\displaystyle \pi (\delta _{A})\leq \pi (\delta _{B})} Thus, Agent A will concede if and only if δ A {\displaystyle \delta _{A}} does not yield the larger product of utilities. Therefore, the Zeuthen strategy guarantees a final agreement that maximizes the Nash Product.
Transparency in the software supply chain
Transparency in the software supply chain is a condition in which participants involved in the development, procurement, operation, auditing, or regulation of software can determine which components, dependencies, build stages, identifiers, and relationships within the supply chain make up the delivered product. The disclosure of information about software components, their interrelationships, origins, and development methods—for the purposes of risk management, vulnerability detection, and compliance—takes place throughout the software lifecycle. Transparency is one of the key security attributes of the software supply chain, as a deeper understanding of the chain enables participants to identify vulnerabilities and mitigate threats. Problems in the software supply chain can cause billions in losses and create operational challenges for government and commercial entities, as demonstrated by incidents involving SolarWinds, Bybit, 3CX, Jaguar Land Rover, GitHub, and NotPetya. Modern software is often assembled from third-party libraries and open-source components. According to research by the Linux Foundation and Synopsys, 96% of the commercial codebases analyzed contained open-source software, and 70–90% of a typical codebase may consist of open-source components. Without transparency, any software component can become a threat. As a result, companies may spend billions of dollars building robust external defenses, but this will not protect against vulnerabilities in legitimate software inside the perimeter. At the same time, supply chain attacks also erode trust between customers and their IT providers, as malicious code is often embedded in official updates with certificates and digital signatures. One of the primary ways to ensure transparency is through a software bill of materials, which documents the components used to create the software and the relationships within the supply chain. == Concept == The software supply chain is the collection of systems, devices, people, artifacts, and processes involved in the creation of the final software product. Attacks on the software supply chain differ from conventional attacks in that they follow a four-stage pattern: compromise, modification, distribution, and subsequent exploitation of the compromised or modified component. A defining feature of a supply chain attack is the introduction or manipulation of a change at an upstream stage, which is subsequently exploited at a downstream stage. Transparency refers to the availability of knowledge about the chain, while validity concerns the integrity of operations and artifacts and the authentication of participants, and separation involves reducing unnecessary trust relationships and the radius of impact through compartmentalization. In this framework, transparency primarily helps during the pre-compromise and detection phases, as a clearer understanding of participants, operations, and artifacts makes it easier to identify weak links before attackers exploit them. Current major attack vectors include dependencies and containers, build infrastructure, and human participants, such as maintainers or developers. == History == Software supply-chain transparency developed from earlier efforts to document software components, long before the term came into widespread use in the cybersecurity field. Early component-documentation formats included SPDX, first published in 2011, and CycloneDX, first published in 2017. Initially, these formats were created to support license compliance, package identification, and tool compatibility. Their development helped shape a broader concept of software supply chain transparency, encompassing component documentation, disclosure practices, risk management, security analysis, and regulatory compliance. In 2018, the U.S. National Telecommunications and Information Administration launched a multistakeholder process on promoting software component transparency. This process helped move work on SBOMs from a specialized technical practice into the realm of policy and procurement to identify components used in software products. The 2020 compromise of the SolarWinds Orion platform made software supply chain security a central issue in government cybersecurity policy. An analysis of the “Sunburst” campaign prepared by the Atlantic Council noted that the vulnerability of the software supply chain had become a realized risk for national-security agencies. In May 2021, U.S. President Joe Biden issued Executive Order 14028, which directed federal agencies to improve cybersecurity and increase transparency in the software supply chain, including requirements related to SBOMs. Reuters reported that the executive order required software developers selling their products to the federal government to provide greater visibility into their software and make security data available. In July 2021, the NTIA published the document “The Minimum Elements for a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM)”, defining the basic data fields and practices for creating SBOMs. Between 2021 and 2025, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency updated its guidance on “Framing Software Component Transparency”, expanding the set of SBOM attributes, metadata requirements, and operational recommendations for the creation, exchange, and use of SBOMs. Major incidents that occurred following the SolarWinds attack have underscored the importance of transparency in vulnerability management and supply chain security. The Log4Shell vulnerability in the Log4j library, disclosed in December 2021, demonstrated how difficult it can be for organizations to identify a vulnerable component deeply embedded within applications and services. In 2024, an attempt to plant a backdoor in XZ Utils showed how attackers could exploit trust in open-source maintenance processes to introduce malicious code into widely used infrastructure software. By the mid-2020s, software supply chain transparency had become part of international cybersecurity coordination and regulation. On September 3, 2025, Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and the National Cybersecurity Office, in collaboration with cybersecurity agencies from 15 countries, released the document “A Shared Vision of Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for Cybersecurity.” In the European Union, the Cyber Resilience Act required manufacturers of products with digital elements to create, maintain, and retain SBOMs as part of the technical documentation for software placed on the EU market. == Transparency mechanisms == The primary mechanism for ensuring transparency is the software bill of materials (SBOM). An SBOM is a structured list of components, libraries, and tools used to build and distribute a software product, and it records dependencies in a way that helps organizations understand and assess their software supply chains. It can also be described as a formal record of components and their interdependencies, which gives users insight into their actual exposure to risks and threats. Five key areas of SBOM application in software supply chain security have been identified: vulnerability management, ensuring transparency, component evaluation, risk assessment, and ensuring supply chain integrity. In software supply chains, an SBOM documents all components, both open-source and proprietary. Under Executive Order 14028, U.S. federal agencies require software suppliers to provide SBOMs for government-procured software. The list of minimum required SBOM elements defined by NTIA includes three main categories: required data fields for describing each component (name, version, identifiers), automation support (machine-readable format, generation tools), and recommendations for creating SBOMs during development and purchasing. The post-2021 push for SBOMs was intended to provide visibility into the components used within software and to expose parts of an application that would otherwise remain hidden. This information can be used to prioritize patches, manage vulnerabilities, and support compliance work. Transparency also supports software traceability, which is becoming a standard feature of developer platforms. Traceability has become important because organizations are increasingly required to demonstrate how software was created, rather than simply listing its components. Higher levels of assurance require signed, tamper-proof traceability and more isolated, verifiable build environments. A related mechanism is build reproducibility. Reproducible builds are defined as build processes that make the compilation process deterministic, ensuring that the same source code always produces the same binary file. These builds are considered a foundational element for distributed verification, transparency-log maintenance, supply-chain workflow integration, and the creation of keyless signatures based on verifiable logs. Although reproducibility does not replace inventory or attestation, it gives external par
Human-in-the-loop
Human-in-the-loop (HITL) is used in multiple contexts. It can be defined as a model requiring human interaction. HITL is associated with modeling and simulation (M&S) in the live, virtual, and constructive taxonomy. HITL, along with the related human-on-the-loop, are also used in relation to lethal autonomous weapons. Further, HITL is used in the context of machine learning.It is also used in conversational AI to manage complex interactions that require human empathy. == Machine learning == In machine learning, HITL is used in the sense of humans aiding the computer in making the correct decisions in building a model. HITL improves machine learning over random sampling by selecting the most critical data needed to refine the model. == Simulation == In simulation, HITL models may conform to human factors requirements as in the case of a mockup. In this type of simulation, a human is always part of the simulation and consequently influences the outcome in such a way that is difficult if not impossible to reproduce exactly. HITL also readily allows for the identification of problems and requirements that may not be easily identified by other means of simulation. HITL is often referred to as an interactive simulation, which is a special kind of physical simulation in which physical simulations include human operators, such as in a flight or a driving simulator. === Benefits === Human-in-the-loop allows the user to change the outcome of an event or process. The immersion effectively contributes to a positive transfer of acquired skills into the real world. This can be demonstrated by trainees utilizing flight simulators in preparation to become pilots. HITL also allows for the acquisition of knowledge regarding how a new process may affect a particular event. Utilizing HITL allows participants to interact with realistic models and attempt to perform as they would in an actual scenario. HITL simulations bring to the surface issues that would not otherwise be apparent until after a new process has been deployed. A real-world example of HITL simulation as an evaluation tool is its usage by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to allow air traffic controllers to test new automation procedures by directing the activities of simulated air traffic while monitoring the effect of the newly implemented procedures. As with most processes, there is always the possibility of human error, which can only be reproduced using HITL simulation. Although much can be done to automate systems, humans typically still need to take the information provided by a system to determine the next course of action based on their judgment and experience. Intelligent systems can only go so far in certain circumstances to automate a process; only humans in the simulation can accurately judge the final design. Tabletop simulation may be useful in the very early stages of project development for the purpose of collecting data to set broad parameters, but the important decisions require human-in-the-loop simulation. HITL reflects scenarios where human input remains essential despite advances in automation. === Within the virtual simulation taxonomy === Virtual simulations inject HITL in a central role by exercising motor control skills (e.g. flying an airplane), decision making skills (e.g. committing fire control resources to action), or communication skills (e.g. as members of a C4I team). === Examples === Flight simulators Driving simulators Marine simulators Video games Supply chain management simulators Digital puppetry === Misconceptions === Although human-in-the-loop simulation can include a computer simulation in the form of a synthetic environment, computer simulation is not necessarily a form of human-in-the-loop simulation, and is often considered as human-out-of-the loop simulation. In this particular case, a computer model’s behavior is modified according to a set of initial parameters. The results of the model differ from the results stemming from a true human-in-the-loop simulation because the results can easily be replicated time and time again, by simply providing identical parameters. == Weapons == === Taxonomy === Three classifications of the degree of human control of autonomous weapon systems were laid out by Bonnie Docherty in a 2012 Human Rights Watch report. human-in-the-loop: a human must instigate the action of the weapon (in other words not fully autonomous) human-on-the-loop: a human may abort an action human-out-of-the-loop: no human action is involved === Positive human action === In discussions of autonomous weapons and nuclear command and control, the phrase positive human action has been used alongside "human-in-the-loop" to emphasize that a human operator must affirmatively authorize the use of force. Descriptions of the United States Navy's Aegis Combat System have used the phrase in characterizing a requirement for affirmative human action to initiate live firing. A survey of autonomous weapons systems described the Aegis "Auto SM" mode as one in which "the system fully develops the engagement process however engagement requires positive human action". The phrase entered United States federal law in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025, which stipulates that artificial intelligence systems not compromise "the principle of requiring positive human actions in execution of decisions by the President with respect to the employment of nuclear weapons".