Data independence

Data independence

Data independence is the type of data transparency that matters for a centralized DBMS. It refers to the immunity of user applications to changes made in the definition and organization of data. Application programs should not, ideally, be exposed to details of data representation and storage. The DBMS provides an abstract view of the data that hides such details. There are two types of data independence: physical and logical data independence. The data independence and operation independence together gives the feature of data abstraction. There are two levels of data independence. == Logical data independence == The logical structure of the data is known as the 'schema definition'. In general, if a user application operates on a subset of the attributes of a relation, it should not be affected later when new attributes are added to the same relation. Logical data independence indicates that the conceptual schema can be changed without affecting the existing schemas. == Physical data independence == The physical structure of the data is referred to as "physical data description". Physical data independence deals with hiding the details of the storage structure from user applications. The application should not be involved with these issues since, conceptually, there is no difference in the operations carried out against the data. There are three types of data independence: Logical data independence: The ability to change the logical (conceptual) schema without changing the External schema (User View) is called logical data independence. For example, the addition or removal of new entities, attributes, or relationships to the conceptual schema or having to rewrite existing application programs. Physical data independence: The ability to change the physical schema without changing the logical schema is called physical data independence. For example, a change to the internal schema, such as using different file organization or storage structures, storage devices, or indexing strategy, should be possible without having to change the conceptual or external schemas. View level data independence: always independent no effect, because there doesn't exist any other level above view level. == Data independence == Data independence can be explained as follows: Each higher level of the data architecture is immune to changes of the next lower level of the architecture. The logical scheme stays unchanged even though the storage space or type of some data is changed for reasons of optimization or reorganization. In this, external schema does not change. In this, internal schema changes may be required due to some physical schema were reorganized here. Physical data independence is present in most databases and file environment in which hardware storage of encoding, exact location of data on disk, merging of records, so on this are hidden from user. == Data independence types == The ability to modify schema definition in one level without affecting schema of that definition in the next higher level is called data independence. There are two levels of data independence, they are Physical data independence and Logical data independence. Physical data independence is the ability to modify the physical schema without causing application programs to be rewritten. Modifications at the physical level are occasionally necessary to improve performance. It means we change the physical storage/level without affecting the conceptual or external view of the data. The new changes are absorbed by mapping techniques. Logical data independence is the ability to modify the logical schema without causing application programs to be rewritten. Modifications at the logical level are necessary whenever the logical structure of the database is altered (for example, when money-market accounts are added to banking system). Logical Data independence means if we add some new columns or remove some columns from table then the user view and programs should not change. For example: consider two users A & B. Both are selecting the fields "EmployeeNumber" and "EmployeeName". If user B adds a new column (e.g. salary) to his table, it will not affect the external view for user A, though the internal schema of the database has been changed for both users A & B. Logical data independence is more difficult to achieve than physical data independence, since application programs are heavily dependent on the logical structure of the data that they access.

2018 Google data breach

The 2018 Google data breach was a major data privacy scandal in which the Google+ API exposed the private data of over five hundred thousand users. Google+ managers first noticed harvesting of personal data in March 2018, during a review following the Facebook–Cambridge Analytica data scandal. The bug, despite having been fixed immediately, exposed the private data of approximately 500,000 Google+ users to the public. Google did not reveal the leak to the network's users. In November 2018, another data breach occurred following an update to the Google+ API. Although Google found no evidence of failure, approximately 52.5 million personal profiles were potentially exposed. In August 2019, Google declared a shutdown of Google+ due to low use and technological challenges. == Overview of Google+ == Google+ was launched in June 2011 as an invite-only social network, but was opened for public access later in the year. It was managed by Vic Gundotra. Similar to Facebook, Google+ also included key features Circles, Hangouts and Sparks. Circles let users personalize their social groups by sorting friends into different categories. Once allowed into a Circle, users could regulate information in their individual spaces. Hangouts included video chatting and instant messaging between users. Sparks allowed Google to track users' past searches to find news and content related to their interests. Google+ was linked to other Google services, such as YouTube, Google Drive and Gmail, giving it access to roughly 2 billion user accounts. However, less than 400 million consumers actively used Google+, with 90% of those users using it for less than five seconds. == The breaches == In March 2018, Google developers found a data breach within the Google+ People API in which external apps acquired access to Profile fields that were not marked as public. According to The Wall Street Journal, Google didn’t disclose the breach when it was first discovered in March to avoid regulatory scrutiny and reputational damage. 500,000 Google+ accounts were included in the breach, which allowed 438 external apps unauthorized access to private users' names, emails, addresses, occupations, genders and ages. This information was available between 2015 and 2018. Google found no evidence of any user's personal information being misused, nor that any third-party app developers were aware of the leak. In November 2018, a software update created another data breach within the Google+ API. The bug impacted 52.5 million users, where, similarly to the March breach, unauthorized apps were able to access Google+ profiles, including users' names, email addresses, occupations and ages. Apps could not access financial information, national identification, numbers, or passwords. Blog posts, messages and phone numbers also remained inaccessible if marked as private. Unlike the previous breach, access was only available for six days before Google+ learned of the breach. Once more, Google+ found no evidence of data being misused by third-party developers. == Responses == In October 2018, the Wall Street Journal published an article outlining the initial breach and Google's decision to not disclose it to users. At the time, there was no federal law that required Google to inform their consumers of data breaches. Google+ originally did not disclose the breach out of fears of being compared to Facebook's recent data leak and subsequent loss of consumer confidence. In response to the Wall Street Journal article, Google announced the shutdown of Google+ in August 2019. After the second data leak, the date was moved to April 2019. In response to the data breach, enterprise consumers were notified of the bug's impact and given instructions on how to save, download and delete their data prior to the Google+ shut down. Google's Privacy and Data Protection Office found no misuse of user data. Prior to the Google+ shutdown, Google set a 10-month period in which users could download and migrate their data. After the 10-month period, user content was deleted. On 4 February 2019, consumers were no longer able to create new Google+ profiles. Google shut down Google+ APIs on 7 March 2019 to ensure that developers did not continue to rely on the APIs prior to the Google+ shutdown. Google is the principal entity of its parent company, Alphabet Inc. After the data breach, Alphabet Inc. share prices fell by 1% to $1,157.06 on 9 October 2018 after an earlier drop of $1,135.40 that morning, the lowest price since 5 July 2018. After the publication of The Wall Street Journal article, share prices dropped as low as 2.1% in two days on 10 October 2018. Share prices steadily increased from this point and met the 8 October 2018 share price on 5 February 2019. Google planned to rebuild Google+ as a corporate enterprise network. Google Play will now assess which apps can ask for permission to access the user's SMS data. Only the default app for telephone distribution is able to make requests. Prior to the data breaches, apps were able to request access to all of a consumer's data simultaneously. Now, each app must request permission for each aspect of a consumer's profile.

Reverse proxy

In computer networks, a reverse proxy or surrogate server is a proxy server that appears to any client to be an ordinary web server, but in reality merely acts as an intermediary that forwards the client's requests to one or more ordinary web servers. Reverse proxies help increase scalability, performance, resilience, and security, but they also carry a number of risks. Companies that run web servers often set up reverse proxies to facilitate the communication between an Internet user's browser and the web servers. An important advantage of doing so is that the web servers can be hidden behind a firewall on a company-internal network, and only the reverse proxy needs to be directly exposed to the Internet. Reverse proxy servers are implemented in popular open-source web servers. Dedicated reverse proxy servers are used by some of the biggest websites on the Internet. A reverse proxy is capable of tracking IP addresses of requests that are relayed through it as well as reading and/or modifying any non-encrypted traffic. However, this implies that anyone who has compromised the server could do so as well. Reverse proxies differ from forward proxies, which are used when the client is restricted to a private, internal network and asks a forward proxy to retrieve resources from the public Internet. == Uses == Large websites and content delivery networks use reverse proxies, together with other techniques, to balance the load between internal servers. Reverse proxies can keep a cache of static content, which further reduces the load on these internal servers and the internal network. It is also common for reverse proxies to add features such as compression or TLS encryption to the communication channel between the client and the reverse proxy. Reverse proxies can inspect HTTP headers, which, for example, allows them to present a single IP address to the Internet while relaying requests to different internal servers based on the URL of the HTTP request. Reverse proxies can hide the existence and characteristics of origin servers. This can make it more difficult to determine the actual location of the origin server / website and, for instance, more challenging to initiate legal action such as takedowns or block access to the website, as the IP address of the website may not be immediately apparent. Additionally, the reverse proxy may be located in a different jurisdiction with different legal requirements, further complicating the takedown process. Application firewall features can protect against common web-based attacks, like a denial-of-service attack (DoS) or distributed denial-of-service attacks (DDoS). Without a reverse proxy, removing malware or initiating takedowns (while simultaneously dealing with the attack) on one's own site, for example, can be difficult. In the case of secure websites, a web server may not perform TLS encryption itself, but instead offload the task to a reverse proxy that may be equipped with TLS acceleration hardware. (See TLS termination proxy.) A reverse proxy can distribute the load from incoming requests to several servers, with each server supporting its own application area. In the case of reverse proxying web servers, the reverse proxy may have to rewrite the URL in each incoming request in order to match the relevant internal location of the requested resource. A reverse proxy can reduce load on its origin servers by caching static content and dynamic content, known as web acceleration. Proxy caches of this sort can often satisfy a considerable number of website requests, greatly reducing the load on the origin server(s). A reverse proxy can optimize content by compressing it in order to speed up loading times. In a technique named "spoon-feeding", a dynamically generated page can be produced in its entirety and served to the reverse proxy, which can feed the page to the client as the connection allows. The program that generates the page need not remain open, thus releasing server resources during the possibly extended time the client requires to complete the transfer. Reverse proxies can operate wherever multiple web-servers must be accessible via a single public IP address. The web servers listen on different ports in the same machine, with the same local IP address or, possibly, on different machines with different local IP addresses. The reverse proxy analyzes each incoming request and delivers it to the right server within the local area network. Reverse proxies can perform A/B testing and multivariate testing without requiring application code to handle the logic of which version is served to a client. A reverse proxy can add access authentication to a web server that does not have any authentication. == Risks == When the transit traffic is encrypted and the reverse proxy needs to filter/cache/compress or otherwise modify or improve the traffic, the proxy first must decrypt and re-encrypt communications. This requires the proxy to possess the TLS certificate and its corresponding private key, extending the number of systems that can have access to non-encrypted data and making it a more valuable target for attackers. The vast majority of external data breaches happen either when hackers succeed in abusing an existing reverse proxy that was intentionally deployed by an organization, or when hackers succeed in converting an existing Internet-facing server into a reverse proxy server. Compromised or converted systems allow external attackers to specify where they want their attacks proxied to, enabling their access to internal networks and systems. Applications that were developed for the internal use of a company are not typically hardened to public standards and are not necessarily designed to withstand all hacking attempts. When an organization allows external access to such internal applications via a reverse proxy, they might unintentionally increase their own attack surface and invite hackers. If a reverse proxy is not configured to filter attacks or it does not receive daily updates to keep its attack signature database up to date, a zero-day vulnerability can pass through unfiltered, enabling attackers to gain control of the system(s) that are behind the reverse proxy server. Giving the reverse proxy of a third party access to private keys (for caching or optimizing content) places the entire triad of confidentiality, integrity and availability in the hands of the third party who operates the proxy. A reverse proxy is a single point of failure for the back-end services it fronts: an outage caused by misconfiguration, a denial-of-service attack, or a software fault can make every fronted service unreachable to outside clients, even when the back-end services themselves remain healthy. For example, a 2020 outage at Cloudflare briefly took down major sites and services that relied on its reverse-proxy edge, including Discord.

Server-Gated Cryptography

Server-Gated Cryptography (SGC), also known as International Step-Up by Netscape, is a defunct mechanism that was used to step up from 40-bit or 56-bit to 128-bit cipher suites with SSL. It was created in response to United States federal legislation on the export of strong cryptography in the 1990s. The legislation had limited encryption to weak algorithms and shorter key lengths in software exported outside of the United States of America. When the legislation added an exception for financial transactions, SGC was created as an extension to SSL with the certificates being restricted to financial organisations. In 1999, this list was expanded to include online merchants, healthcare organizations, and insurance companies. This legislation changed in January 2000, resulting in vendors no longer shipping export-grade browsers and SGC certificates becoming available without restriction. Internet Explorer supported SGC starting with patched versions of Internet Explorer 3. SGC became obsolete when Internet Explorer 5.01 SP1 and Internet Explorer 5.5 started supporting strong encryption without the need for a separate high encryption pack (except on Windows 2000, which needs its own high encryption pack that was included in Service Pack 2 and later). "Export-grade" browsers are unusable on the modern Web due to many servers disabling export cipher suites. Additionally, these browsers are incapable of using SHA-2 family signature hash algorithms like SHA-256. Certification authorities are trying to phase out the new issuance of certificates with the older SHA-1 signature hash algorithm. The continuing use of SGC facilitates the use of obsolete, insecure Web browsers with HTTPS. However, while certificates that use the SHA-1 signature hash algorithm remain available, some certificate authorities continue to issue SGC certificates (often charging a premium for them) although they are obsolete. The reason certificate authorities can charge a premium for SGC certificates is that browsers only allowed a limited number of roots to support SGC. When an SSL handshake takes place, the software (e.g. a web browser) would list the ciphers that it supports. Although the weaker exported browsers would only include weaker ciphers in its initial SSL handshake, the browser also contained stronger cryptography algorithms. There are two protocols involved to activate them. Netscape Communicator 4 used International Step-Up, which used the now obsolete insecure renegotiation to change to a stronger cipher suite. Microsoft used SGC, which sends a new Client Hello message listing the stronger cipher suites on the same connection after the certificate is determined to be SGC capable, and also supported Netscape Step-Up for compatibility (though this support in the NT 4.0 SP6 and IE 5.01 version had a bug where changing MAC algorithms during Step-Up did not work properly).

Comparison of OLAP servers

The following tables compare general and technical information for a number of online analytical processing (OLAP) servers. Please see the individual products articles for further information. == General information == == Data storage modes == == APIs and query languages == APIs and query languages OLAP servers support. == OLAP distinctive features == A list of OLAP features that are not supported by all vendors. All vendors support features such as parent-child, multilevel hierarchy, drilldown. == System limits == == Security == == Operating systems == The OLAP servers can run on the following operating systems: Note (1):The server availability depends on Java Virtual Machine not on the operating system == Support information ==

Serverless computing

Serverless computing is "a cloud service category where the customer can use different cloud capability types without the customer having to provision, deploy and manage either hardware or software resources, other than providing customer application code or providing customer data. Serverless computing represents a form of virtualized computing", according to ISO/IEC 22123-2. Serverless computing is a broad ecosystem that includes the cloud provider, function as a service (FaaS), managed services, tools, frameworks, engineers, stakeholders, and other interconnected elements. == Overview == Serverless is a misnomer in the sense that servers are still used by cloud service providers to execute code for developers. The definition of serverless computing has evolved over time, leading to varied interpretations. According to Ben Kehoe, serverless represents a spectrum rather than a rigid definition. Emphasis should shift from strict definitions and specific technologies to adopting a serverless mindset, focusing on leveraging serverless solutions to address business challenges. Serverless computing does not eliminate complexity but shifts much of it from the operations team to the development team. However, this shift is not absolute, as operations teams continue to manage aspects such as identity and access management (IAM), networking, security policies, and cost optimization. Additionally, while breaking down applications into finer-grained components can increase management complexity, the relationship between granularity and management difficulty is not strictly linear. There is often an optimal level of modularization where the benefits outweigh the added management overhead. According to Yan Cui, serverless techniques should be adopted only when they help to deliver customer value faster. And while adopting, organizations should take small steps and de-risk along the way. == Challenges == Serverless applications are prone to fallacies of distributed computing. In addition, they are prone to the following fallacies: Versioning is simple Compensating transactions always work Observability is optional === Monitoring and debugging === Monitoring and debugging serverless applications can present unique challenges due to their distributed, event-driven nature and proprietary environments. Traditional tools may fall short, making it difficult to track execution flows across services. However, modern solutions such as distributed tracing tools (e.g., AWS X-Ray, Datadog), centralized logging, and cloud-agnostic observability platforms are mitigating these challenges. Emerging technologies like OpenTelemetry, AI-powered anomaly detection, and serverless-specific frameworks are further improving visibility and root cause analysis. While challenges persist, advancements in monitoring and debugging tools are steadily addressing these limitations. === Security === According to OWASP, serverless applications are vulnerable to variations of traditional attacks, insecure code, and some serverless-specific attacks (like denial of wallet). So, the risks have changed and attack prevention requires a shift in mindset. === Vendor lock-in === Serverless computing is provided as a third-party service. Applications and software that run in the serverless environment are by default locked to a specific cloud vendor. This issue is exacerbated in serverless computing, as with its increased level of abstraction, public vendors only allow customers to upload code to a FaaS platform without the authority to configure underlying environments. More importantly, when considering a more complex workflow that includes backend-as-a-service (BaaS), a BaaS offering can typically only natively trigger a FaaS offering from the same provider. This makes the workload migration in serverless computing virtually impossible. Therefore, considering how to design and deploy serverless workflows from a multi-cloud perspective could mitigate this. == High-performance computing == Serverless computing may not be ideal for certain high-performance computing (HPC) workloads due to resource limits often imposed by cloud providers, including maximum memory, CPU, and runtime restrictions. For workloads requiring sustained or predictable resource usage, bulk-provisioned servers can sometimes be more cost-effective than the pay-per-use model typical of serverless platforms. However, serverless computing is increasingly capable of supporting specific HPC workloads, particularly those that are highly parallelizable and event-driven, by leveraging its scalability and elasticity. The suitability of serverless computing for HPC continues to evolve with advancements in cloud technologies. == Anti-patterns == The grain of sand anti-pattern refers to the creation of excessively small components (e.g., functions) within a system, often resulting in increased complexity, operational overhead, and performance inefficiencies. Lambda pinball is a related anti-pattern that can occur in serverless architectures when functions (e.g., AWS Lambda, Azure functions) excessively invoke each other in fragmented chains, leading to latency, debugging and testing challenges, and reduced observability. These anti-patterns are associated with the formation of a distributed monolith. These anti-patterns are often addressed through the application of clear domain boundaries, which distinguish between public and published interfaces. Public interfaces are technically accessible interfaces, such as methods, classes, API endpoints, or triggers, but they do not come with formal stability guarantees. In contrast, published interfaces involve an explicit stability contract, including formal versioning, thorough documentation, a defined deprecation policy, and often support for backward compatibility. Published interfaces may also require maintaining multiple versions simultaneously and adhering to formal deprecation processes when breaking changes are introduced. Fragmented chains of function calls are often observed in systems where serverless components (functions) interact with other resources in complex patterns, sometimes described as spaghetti architecture or a distributed monolith. In contrast, systems exhibiting clearer boundaries typically organize serverless components into cohesive groups, where internal public interfaces manage inter-component communication, and published interfaces define communication across group boundaries. This distinction highlights differences in stability guarantees and maintenance commitments, contributing to reduced dependency complexity. Additionally, patterns associated with excessive serverless function chaining are sometimes addressed through architectural strategies that emphasize native service integrations instead of individual functions, a concept referred to as the functionless mindset. However, this approach is noted to involve a steeper learning curve, and integration limitations may vary even within the same cloud vendor ecosystem. Reporting on serverless databases presents challenges, as retrieving data for a reporting service can either break the bounded contexts, reduce the timeliness of the data, or do both. This applies regardless of whether data is pulled directly from databases, retrieved via HTTP, or collected in batches. Mark Richards refers to this as the reach-in reporting anti-pattern. A possible alternative to this approach is for databases to asynchronously push the necessary data to the reporting service instead of the reporting service pulling it. While this method requires a separate contract between services and the reporting service and can be complex to implement, it helps preserve bounded contexts while maintaining a high level of data timeliness. == Principles == Adopting DevSecOps practices can help improve the use and security of serverless technologies. In serverless applications, the distinction between infrastructure and business logic is often blurred, with applications typically distributed across multiple services. To maximize the effectiveness of testing, integration testing is emphasized for serverless applications. Additionally, to facilitate debugging and implementation, orchestration is used within the bounded context, while choreography is employed between different bounded contexts. Ephemeral resources are typically kept together to maintain high cohesion. However, shared resources with long spin-up times, such as AWS RDS clusters and landing zones, are often managed in separate repositories, deployment pipeline, and stacks.

IWARP

iWARP is a computer networking protocol that implements remote direct memory access (RDMA) for efficient data transfer over Internet Protocol networks. Contrary to some accounts, iWARP is not an acronym. Because iWARP is layered on Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)-standard congestion-aware protocols such as Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP), it makes few requirements on the network, and can be successfully deployed in a broad range of environments. == History == In 2007, the IETF published five Request for Comments (RFCs) that define iWARP: RFC 5040 A Remote Direct Memory Access Protocol Specification is layered over Direct Data Placement Protocol (DDP). It defines how RDMA Send, Read, and Write operations are encoded using DDP into headers on the network. RFC 5041 Direct Data Placement over Reliable Transports is layered over MPA/TCP or SCTP. It defines how received data can be directly placed into an upper layer protocols receive buffer without intermediate buffers. RFC 5042 Direct Data Placement Protocol (DDP) / Remote Direct Memory Access Protocol (RDMAP) Security analyzes security issues related to iWARP DDP and RDMAP protocol layers. RFC 5043 Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Direct Data Placement (DDP) Adaptation defines an adaptation layer that enables DDP over SCTP. RFC 5044 Marker PDU Aligned Framing for TCP Specification defines an adaptation layer that enables preservation of DDP-level protocol record boundaries layered over the TCP reliable connected byte stream. These RFCs are based on the RDMA Consortium's specifications for RDMA over TCP. The RDMA Consortium's specifications are influenced by earlier RDMA standards, including Virtual Interface Architecture (VIA) and InfiniBand (IB). Since 2007, the IETF has published three additional RFCs that maintain and extend iWARP: RFC 6580 IANA Registries for the Remote Direct Data Placement (RDDP) Protocols published in 2012 defines IANA registries for Remote Direct Data Placement (RDDP) error codes, operation codes, and function codes. RFC 6581 Enhanced Remote Direct Memory Access (RDMA) Connection Establishment published in 2011 fixes shortcomings with iWARP connection setup. RFC 7306 Remote Direct Memory Access (RDMA) Protocol Extensions published in 2014 extends RFC 5040 with atomic operations and RDMA Write with Immediate Data. == Protocol == The main component in the iWARP protocol is the Direct Data Placement Protocol (DDP), which permits the actual zero-copy transmission. DDP itself does not perform the transmission; the underlying protocol (TCP or SCTP) does. However, TCP does not respect message boundaries; it sends data as a sequence of bytes without regard to protocol data units (PDU). In this regard, DDP itself may be better suited for SCTP, and indeed the IETF proposed a standard RDMA over SCTP. To run DDP over TCP requires a tweak known as marker PDU aligned (MPA) framing to guarantee boundaries of messages. Furthermore, DDP is not intended to be accessed directly. Instead, a separate RDMA protocol (RDMAP) provides the services to read and write data. Therefore, the entire RDMA over TCP specification is really RDMAP over DDP over either MPA/TCP or SCTP. All of these protocols can be implemented in hardware. Unlike IB, iWARP only has reliable connected communication, as this is the only service that TCP and SCTP provide. The iWARP specification omits other features of IB, such as Send with Immediate Data operations. With RFC 7306, the IETF is working to reduce these omissions. == Implementation == Because a kernel implementation of the TCP stack can be seen as a bottleneck, the protocol is typically implemented in hardware RDMA network interface controllers (rNICs). As simple data losses are rare in tightly coupled network environments, the error-correction mechanisms of TCP may be performed by software while the more frequently performed communications are handled strictly by logic embedded on the rNIC. Similarly, connections are often established entirely by software and then handed off to the hardware. Furthermore, the handling of iWARP specific protocol details is typically isolated from the TCP implementation, allowing rNICs to be used for both as RDMA offload and TCP offload (in support of traditional sockets based TCP/IP applications). The portion of the hardware implementation used for implementing the TCP protocol is known as the TCP Offload Engine (TOE). TOE itself does not prevent copying on the reception side, and must be combined with RDMA hardware for zero-copy results. The RDMA / TCP specification is a set of different wire protocols intended to be implemented in hardware (though it seems feasible to emulate it in software for compatibility but without the performance benefits). == Interfaces == iWARP is a protocol, not an implementation, but defines protocol behavior in terms of the operations that are legal for the protocol, known as Verbs. As such, iWARP does not have any single standard programming interface. However, programming interfaces tend to very closely correspond to the Verbs. Several programmatic interfaces have been proposed, including OpenFabrics Verbs, Network Direct, uDAPL, kDAPL, IT-API, and RNICPI. Implementations of some of these interfaces are available for different platforms, including Windows and Linux. == Services available == Networking services implemented over iWARP include those offered in the OpenFabrics Enterprise Distribution (OFED) by the OpenFabrics Alliance for Linux operating systems, and by Microsoft Windows via Network Direct. NVMe over Fabrics (NVMEoF) iSCSI Extensions for RDMA (iSER) Server Message Block Direct (SMB Direct) Sockets Direct Protocol (SDP) SCSI RDMA Protocol (SRP) Network File System over RDMA (NFS over RDMA) GPUDirect