WebCrow

WebCrow

The WebCrow is a research project carried out at the Information Engineering Department of the University of Siena with the purpose of automatically solving crosswords. == The Project == The scientific relevance of the project can be understood considering that cracking crosswords requires human-level knowledge. Unlike chess and related games and there is no closed world configuration space. A first nucleus of technology, such as search engines, information retrieval, and machine learning techniques enable computers to enfold with semantics real-life concepts. The project is based on a software system whose major assumption is to attack crosswords making use of the Web as its primary source of knowledge. WebCrow is very fast and often thrashes human challengers in competitions, especially on multi language crossword schemes. A distinct feature of the WebCrow software system is to combine properly natural language processing (NLP) techniques, the Google web search engine, and constraint satisfaction algorithms from artificial intelligence to acquire knowledge and to fill the schema. The most important component of WebCrow is the Web Search Module (WSM), which implements a domain specific web based question answering algorithm. The way WebCrow approaches crosswords solving is quite different with respect to humans: Whereas we tend to first answer clues we are sure of and then proceed filling the schema by exploiting the already answered clues as hints, WebCrow uses two clearly distinct stages. In the first one, it processes all the clues and tries to answer them all: For each clue it finds many possible candidates and sorts them according to complex ranking models mainly based on a probability criteria. In the second stage, WebCrow uses constraint satisfaction algorithms to fill the grid with the overall most likely combination of clue answers. In order to interact with Google, first of all, WebCrow needs to compose queries on the basis of the given clues. This is done by query expansion, whose purpose is to convert the clue into a query expressed by a simplified and more appropriate language for Google. The retrieved documents are parsed so as to extract a list of word candidates that are congruent with the crossword length constraints. Crosswords can hardly be faced by using encyclopedic knowledge only, since many clues are wordplays or are otherwise purposefully very ambiguous. This enigmatic component of crosswords is faced by a massive use of database of solved crosswords, and by automatic reasoning on a properly organized knowledge base of wired rules. Last but not the least, the final constraint satisfaction step is very effective to fill the correct candidate, even though, unlike humans, the system can not rely on very high confidence on the correctness of the answer. == Competitions == WebCrow speed and effectiveness has been tested many times in man-machine competitions on Italian, English and multi-language crosswords The outcome of the tests is that WebCrow can successfully compete with average human players on single language schemes and reaches expert level performance in multi-language crosswords. However, WebCrow has not reached expert level in single-language crosswords, yet. === ECAI-06 Competition === On August 30, 2006, at the European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI2006), 25 conference attendees and 53 internet connected crosswords lovers, competed with WebCrow in an official challenge organized within the conference program. The challenge consisted in 5 different crosswords (2 in Italian, 2 in English and one multi-language in Italian and English) and 15 minutes were assigned for each crossword. WebCrow ranked 21 out of 74 participants in the Italian competition, and won both the bilingual and English competitions. === Other Competitions === Several competitions have been held in Florence, Italy within the Creativity Festival in December 2006, and another official conference competition took place in Hyderabad, India in January 2007, within the International Conference of Artificial Intelligence, where it ranked second out of 25 participants.

Gooch shading

Gooch shading is a non-photorealistic rendering technique for shading objects. It is also known as "cool to warm" shading, and is widely used in technical illustration. == History == Gooch shading was developed by Amy Gooch et al. at the University of Utah School of Computing and first presented at the 1998 SIGGRAPH conference. It has since been implemented in shader libraries, software, and games released by Autodesk, Nvidia, and Valve. == Process == Gooch shading defines an additional two colors in conjunction with the original model color: a warm color (such as yellow) and a cool color (such as blue). The warm color indicates surfaces that are facing toward the light source while the cool color indicates surfaces facing away. This allows shading to occur only in mid-tones so that edge lines and highlights remain visually prominent. The Gooch shader is typically implemented in two passes: all objects in the scene are first drawn with the "cool to warm" shading, and in the second pass the object's edges are rendered in black.

Catalog server

A catalog server provides a single point of access that allows users to centrally search for information across a distributed network. In other words, it indexes databases, files and information across large network and allows keywords, Boolean and other searches. If you need to provide a comprehensive searching service for your intranet, extranet or even the Internet, a catalog server is a standard solution.

SCADA Strangelove

SCADA Strangelove is an independent group of information security researchers founded in 2012, focused on security assessment of industrial control systems (ICS) and SCADA. == Activities == Main fields of research include: Discovery of 0-day vulnerabilities in cyber physical systems and coordinated vulnerability disclosure; Security assessment of ICS protocols and development suites; Identification of publicly Internet-connected ICS components and secure it with help of proper authorities; Development of security hardening guides for ICS software; Mapping cybersecurity on to functional safety; Awareness control and delivery of information regarding the actual security state of ICS systems. SCADA Strangelove's interests expand further than classic ICS components and covers various embedded systems, however, and encompass smart home components, solar panels, wind turbines, SmartGrid as well as other areas. == Projects == Group members have and continue to develop and publish numerous open source tools for scanning, fingerprinting, security evaluation and password bruteforcing for ICS devices. These devices work over industrial protocols such as modbus, Siemens S7, MMS, ISO EC 60870, ProfiNet. In 2014 Shodan used some of the published tools for building a map of ICS devices which is publicly available on the Internet. Open source security assessment frameworks, such as THC Hydra, Metasploit, and DigitalBond Redpoint have used Shodan-developed tools and techniques. The group has published security-hardening guidelines for industrial solutions based on Siemens SIMATIC WinCC and WinCC Flexible. The guidelines contain detailed security configuration walk-throughs, descriptions of internal security features and appropriate best practices. Among the group’s more noticeable projects is Choo Choo PWN (CCP) also named the Critical Infrastructure Attack (CIA). This is an interactive laboratory built upon ICS software and hardware used in real world. Every system is connected to a toy city infrastructure, which includes factories, railroads and other facilities. The laboratory has been demonstrated at various conferences including PHDays, Power of Community, and 30C3. Primarily the laboratory is used for the discovery of new vulnerabilities and for evaluation of security mechanisms, however it is also used for workshops and other educational activities. At Positive Hack Days IV, contestants found several 0-day vulnerabilities in Indusoft Web Studio 7.1 by Schneider Electric, and in specific ICS hardware RTU PET-7000 during the ICS vulnerability discovery challenge. The group supports Secure Open SmartGrid (SCADASOS) project to find and fix vulnerabilities in intellectual power grid components such as photovoltaic power station, wind turbine, power inverter. More than 80 000 industrial devices were discovered and isolated from the Internet in 2015. == Appearances == Group members are frequently seen presenting at conferences like CCC, SCADA Security Scientific Symposium, Positive Hack Days. Most notable talks are: === 29C3 === An overview of vulnerabilities discovered in the widely distributed Siemens SIMATIC WinCC software and tools that are implemented for searching ICS on the Internet. === PHDays === This talk consisted of an overview of vulnerabilities discovered in various systems produced by ABB, Emerson, Honeywell and Siemens and was presented at PHDays III and PHDays IV. === Confidence 2014 === Implications of security research aimed at realization of various industrial network protocols Profinet, Modbus, DNP3, IEC 61850-8-1 (MMS), IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission) 61870-5-101/104, FTE (Fault Tolerant Ethernet), Siemens S7. === PacSec 2014 === Presentations of security research showing the impact of radio and 3G/4G networks on the security of mobile devices as well as on industrial equipment. === 31C3 === Analysis of security architecture and implementation of the most wide spread platforms for wind and solar energy generation which produce many gigawatts of it. === 32C3 === Cybersecurity assessment of railway signaling systems such as Automatic Train Control (ATC), Computer-based interlocking (CBI) and European Train Control System (ETCS). === China Internet Security Conference 2016 === In "Greater China Cyber Threat Landscape" keynote by Sergey Gordeychik an overview of vulnerabilities, attacks and cyber-security incidents in Greater China region was presented. === Recon 2017 === In talk "Hopeless: Relay Protection for Substation Automation" by Kirill Nesterov and Alexander Tlyapov security analysis results of key Digital Substation component - Relay Protection Terminals was presented. Vulnerabilities, including remote code execution in Siemens SIPROTEC, General Electric Line Distance Relay, NARI and ABB protective relays was presented. == Philosophy == All names, catchwords and graphical elements refer to Stanley Kubrick’s film, Dr. Strangelove. In their talks, group members often refer to Cold War events such as the Caribbean Crisis, and draw parallels between nuclear arms race and the current escalation of cyberwar. Group members follow the approach of “responsible disclosure” and “ready to wait for years, while vendor is patching the vulnerability”. Public exploits for discovered vulnerabilities are not published. This is on account of the longevity of ICS and by implication the long process of patching ICS. However, conflicts still happen, notably in 2012 when the talk at DEF CON was called off due to a dispute of persistent weaknesses in Siemens industrial software.

Collateral freedom

Collateral freedom is an anti-censorship strategy that attempts to make it economically prohibitive for censors to block content on the Internet. This is achieved by hosting content on cloud services that are considered by censors to be "too important to block", and then using encryption to prevent censors from identifying requests for censored information that is hosted among other content, forcing censors to either allow access to the censored information or take down entire services.

GamePigeon

GamePigeon is a mobile app for iOS devices, developed by Vitalii Zlotskii and released on September 13, 2016. The game takes advantage of the iOS 10 update, which expanded how users could interact with Apple's Messages app. GamePigeon is only available through the Messages app, which allows players to start and respond to different party games in conversations. == Release == The app was first released on September 13, 2016, coinciding with the launch of iOS 10. The app was released for free, although it includes in-app purchases to unlock additional items, such as cosmetic skins, avatar items, new game modes, and an option to remove ads. == Games in the app == The following is a list of games that users can play within GamePigeon: Sources: Poker was one of the games included in GamePigeon at launch, although it has since been removed and is no longer listed on the game's App Store description. == Reception == GamePigeon has enjoyed commercial success, with VentureBeat noting that GamePigeon was ranked number-one in the "Top Free" category of the iMessage App Store, six months after its release. Critically, GamePigeon has been generally well received, being highlighted by online media publications early on shortly after the iOS 10 launch. It has since been included on many "best iMessage apps" lists. Based on over 162,000 ratings, the game holds a 4.0 out of 5 rating on the App Store. Julian Chokkattu of Digital Trends wrote "GamePigeon should be like the pre-installed versions of Solitaire and Minesweeper that used to come with older iterations of Windows." On its launch day, Boy Genius Report included it on a list of "10 of the best iMessage apps, games and stickers for iOS 10 on launch day." The Daily Dot wrote, "GamePigeon is easily the best current gaming option within iMessages." 8-ball and cup pong have been particularly well received by media outlets. The Daily Dot had specific praise for the app's billiards game: "8-Ball controls shockingly smoothly with your fingers, and there’s nothing quite like destroying a dear friend in poker." During his 2020 U.S. presidential campaign, Cory Booker was cited as playing the game with his family. In 2017, CNBC cited one teenager who expressed that GamePigeon was one of just a few reasons that those in her age range use the iMessage app. The game has received particular positive reception for allowing introverted individuals to exercise a form social activity; similarly, the game was highlighted as a way to maintain social distancing guidelines during the COVID-19 pandemic. As an April Fools' Day joke in 2020, The Chronicle, a Duke University newspaper, published that Duke's athletic program adopted GamePigeon's Cup Pong as an official varsity sport.

Zero-day vulnerability

A zero-day (also known as a 0-day) is a vulnerability or security hole in a computer system unknown to its developers or anyone capable of mitigating it. Until the vulnerability is remedied, threat actors can exploit it in a zero-day exploit, or zero-day attack. The term "zero-day" originally referred to the number of days since a new piece of software was released to the public, so "zero-day software" was obtained by hacking into a developer's computer before release. Eventually the term was applied to the vulnerabilities that allowed this hacking, and to the number of days that the vendor has had to fix them. Vendors who discover the vulnerability may create patches or advise workarounds to mitigate it, though users need to deploy that mitigation to eliminate the vulnerability in their systems. Zero-day attacks are severe threats. == Definition == Despite developers' goal of delivering a product that works entirely as intended, virtually all products contain software and hardware bugs. If a bug creates a security risk, it is called a vulnerability. Vulnerabilities vary in their ability to be exploited by malicious actors. Some are not usable at all, while others can be used to disrupt the device with a denial of service attack. The most dangerous allow the attacker to inject and run their own code, without the user being aware of it. Although the term "zero-day" initially referred to the time since the vendor had become aware of the vulnerability, zero-day vulnerabilities can also be defined as the subset of vulnerabilities for which no patch or other fix is available. A zero-day exploit is any exploit that takes advantage of such a vulnerability. == Exploits == An exploit is the delivery mechanism that takes advantage of the vulnerability to penetrate the target's systems, for such purposes as disrupting operations, installing malware, or exfiltrating data. Researchers Lillian Ablon and Andy Bogart write that "little is known about the true extent, use, benefit, and harm of zero-day exploits". Exploits based on zero-day vulnerabilities are considered more dangerous than those that take advantage of a known vulnerability. However, it is likely that most cyberattacks use known vulnerabilities, not zero-days. Governments of states are the primary users of zero-day exploits, not only because of the high cost of finding or buying vulnerabilities, but also the significant cost of writing the attack software. Nevertheless, anyone can use a vulnerability, and according to research by the RAND Corporation, "any serious attacker can always get an affordable zero-day for almost any target". Many targeted attacks and most advanced persistent threats rely on zero-day vulnerabilities. In 2017, the average time to develop an exploit from a zero-day vulnerability was estimated at 22 days. The difficulty of developing exploits has been increasing over time due to increased anti-exploitation features in popular software. === Window of vulnerability === Zero-day vulnerabilities are often classified as alive—meaning that there is no public knowledge of the vulnerability—and dead—the vulnerability has been disclosed, but not patched. If the software's maintainers are actively searching for vulnerabilities, it is a living vulnerability; such vulnerabilities in unmaintained software are called immortal. Zombie vulnerabilities can be exploited in older versions of the software but have been patched in newer versions. Even publicly known and zombie vulnerabilities are often exploitable for an extended period. Security patches can take months to develop, or may never be developed. A patch can have negative effects on the functionality of software and users may need to test the patch to confirm functionality and compatibility. Larger organizations may fail to identify and patch all dependencies, while smaller enterprises and personal users may not install patches. Research suggests that risk of cyberattack increases if the vulnerability is made publicly known or a patch is released. Cybercriminals can reverse engineer the patch to find the underlying vulnerability and develop exploits, often faster than users install the patch. According to research by RAND Corporation published in 2017, zero-day exploits remain usable for 6.9 years on average, although those purchased from a third party only remain usable for 1.4 years on average. The researchers were unable to determine if any particular platform or software (such as open-source software) had any relationship to the life expectancy of a zero-day vulnerability. Although the RAND researchers found that 5.7 percent of a stockpile of secret zero-day vulnerabilities will have been discovered by someone else within a year, another study found a higher overlap rate, as high as 10.8 percent to 21.9 percent per year. == Countermeasures == Because, by definition, there is no patch that can block a zero-day exploit, all systems employing the software or hardware with the vulnerability are at risk. This includes secure systems such as banks and governments that have all patches up to date. Security systems are designed around known vulnerabilities, and repeated exploitations of a zero-day exploit could continue undetected for an extended period of time. Although there have been many proposals for a system that is effective at detecting zero-day exploits, this remains an active area of research in 2023. Many organizations have adopted defense-in-depth tactics so that attacks are likely to require breaching multiple levels of security, which makes it more difficult to achieve. Conventional cybersecurity measures such as training and access control — including multi-factor authentication, least-privilege access, and air-gapping makes it harder to compromise systems with a zero-day exploit. Since writing perfectly secure software is impossible, some researchers argue that driving up the cost of exploits is considered a good strategy to reduce the burden of cyberattacks. == Market == Zero-day exploits can fetch millions of dollars. There are three main types of buyers: White: the vendor, or to third parties such as the Zero Day Initiative that disclose to the vendor. Often such disclosure is in exchange for a bug bounty. Not all companies respond positively to disclosures, as they can cause legal liability and operational overhead. It is not uncommon to receive cease-and-desist letters from software vendors after disclosing a vulnerability for free. Gray: the largest and most lucrative. Government or intelligence agencies buy zero-days and may use it in an attack, stockpile the vulnerability, or notify the vendor. The United States federal government is one of the largest buyers. As of 2013, the Five Eyes (United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) captured the plurality of the market and other significant purchasers included Russia, India, Brazil, Malaysia, Singapore, North Korea, and Iran. Middle Eastern countries were poised to become the biggest spenders. Black: organized crime, which typically prefers exploit software rather than just knowledge of a vulnerability. These users are more likely to employ "half-days" where a patch is already available. In 2015, the markets for government and crime were estimated at least ten times larger than the white market. Sellers are often hacker groups that seek out vulnerabilities in widely used software for financial reward. Some will only sell to certain buyers, while others will sell to anyone. White market sellers are more likely to be motivated by non pecuniary rewards such as recognition and intellectual challenge. Selling zero-day exploits is legal. Despite calls for more regulation, law professor Mailyn Fidler says there is little chance of an international agreement because key players such as Russia and Israel are not interested. The sellers and buyers that trade in zero-days tend to be secretive, relying on non-disclosure agreements and classified information laws to keep the exploits secret. If the vulnerability becomes known, it can be patched and its value consequently crashes. Because the market lacks transparency, it can be hard for parties to find a fair price. Sellers might not be paid if the vulnerability was disclosed before it was verified, or if the buyer declined to purchase it but used it anyway. With the proliferation of middlemen, sellers could never know to what use the exploits could be put. Buyers could not guarantee that the exploit was not sold to another party. Both buyers and sellers advertise on the dark web. Research published in 2022 based on maximum prices paid as quoted by a single exploit broker found a 44 percent annualized inflation rate in exploit pricing. Remote zero-click exploits could fetch the highest price, while those that require local access to the device are much cheaper. Vulnerabilities in widely used software are also more expensive. They estimated that around 400 to 1,500 people sold exploits to th