Comparing the best AI copywriting tool? An AI copywriting tool is software that uses machine learning to help you get more done — it lowers the barrier so anyone can produce professional output. Privacy matters too: check whether your data trains the model and whether a no-log or enterprise tier is available. Whether you are a beginner or a pro, the right AI copywriting tool slots into your workflow and pays for itself fast. We tested the leading options and ranked them by quality, value, and ease of use.
AI Overviews
AI Overviews is an artificial intelligence (AI) feature integrated into Google Search that produces AI-generated summaries of search results. The feature has been criticized for its inaccuracy and for reducing website traffic. == History and development == AI Overviews were first introduced as part of Google's Search Generative Experience (SGE), which was unveiled at the Google I/O conference in May 2023. In May 2024 at Google I/O 2024, the feature was rebranded as AI Overviews and launched in the United States. The introduction of AI Overviews was seen as a strategic move to compete with other generative AI advancements, including OpenAI's ChatGPT. By August 2024, AI Overviews was rolled out to several other countries, including the United Kingdom, India, Japan, Brazil, Mexico, and Indonesia, with support for multiple languages. In October 2024, Google expanded the feature globally, making it available in over 100 countries. In December 2024, Botify x Demandsphere released findings stating that when AI Overviews and featured snippets appear together on the search engine results page, they take up approximately 67.1% of the screen on desktop and 75.7% on mobile. Even if content is ranking in the #1 position, it may not be visible to consumers if other visual elements on the results page are more prominent. In March 2025, Google started testing an "AI Mode", where the search results page is AI-generated. The company was also considering adding advertisements to the AI Mode, as they already exist in AI Overviews. As of May 2025, AI Overviews are available in over 200 countries and territories and in more than 40 languages. As of March 2026, Google AI Overviews appear on more than 48% of total Google Search queries, compared to just 6.49% in the previous year (58% year-over-year growth). == Functionality == The AI Overviews feature uses large language models to generate summaries from web content. The overviews are designed to be concise, providing a snapshot of relevant information about the queried topic. Google allows users to adjust the language complexity in summaries, offering both simplified and detailed options. The overviews also include links to sources. According to a June 2025 study by Semrush, the most cited source is Quora, followed by Reddit. == Reception == The feature has faced criticism for inaccuracies, including instances where erroneous or nonsensical content was generated. Depending on what is searched for, the overview may also consist of hallucinated content, such as when searching for idioms that do not exist. In May 2024, Google temporarily restricted the AI tool after it provided suggestions that were seen as nonsensical and harmful, such as telling users to eat rocks or apply glue on pizza. Concerns were also raised by content publishers, who feared a decline in web traffic as users relied on the summaries instead of visiting source websites. A Google patent from 2026 raised the concern of webmasters that Google could entirely replace the landing page of websites by an AI optimized copy of the website in its results. There is also apprehension about the ethical implications of AI-driven content aggregation, including its impact on intellectual property rights and the visibility of smaller content providers. The European Commission announced in December 2025 that they were investigating whether AI Overviews breached European competition law. In response, Google has stated its commitment to improve content validation and refine the algorithms used to filter unreliable information. Google implemented measures to prioritize link placement within AI Overviews, aiming to balance user convenience with the needs of content creators. In January 2026, Google restricted AI Overviews on certain health-related searches following an investigation by The Guardian. == Lawsuits == On February 24, 2025, Chegg sued Alphabet over the AI Overviews feature, claiming that it was leading to students preferring "low-quality, unverified AI summaries", thus violating antitrust law. Chegg also said it was considering either a sale or a take-private transaction. In September 2025, Penske Media Corporation, the publisher of Rolling Stone and The Hollywood Reporter, sued Google, claiming that AI Overviews illegally regurgitate content from their websites and drive off potential site visitors by always appearing on top of the search results while leaving little incentive to see the linked sources. The company stated that "the future of digital media and [...] its integrity [...] is threatened by Google's current actions", alleging that 20% of searches that link to Penske-owned websites show AI Overviews and that the figure is expected to rise. Google spokesperson José Castañeda called the claims "meritless" and stated that "AI Overviews send traffic to a greater diversity of sites." In 2026, Canadian musician Ashley MacIsaac filed a lawsuit against Google claiming that the AI Overview feature had wrongly stated that MacIsaac had been convicted of numerous criminal offences and was on the sex offender registry. He claims this incorrect information led to the cancellation of a December 2025 gig organized by the Sipekne'katik First Nation.
Hyper-encryption
Hyper-encryption is a form of encryption invented by Michael O. Rabin which uses a high-bandwidth source of public random bits, together with a secret key that is shared by only the sender and recipient(s) of the message. It uses the assumptions of Ueli Maurer's bounded-storage model as the basis of its secrecy. Although everyone can see the data, decryption by adversaries without the secret key is still not feasible, because of the space limitations of storing enough data to mount an attack against the system. Unlike almost all other cryptosystems except the one-time pad, hyper-encryption can be proved to be information-theoretically secure, provided the storage bound cannot be surpassed. Moreover, if the necessary public information cannot be stored at the time of transmission, the plaintext can be shown to be impossible to recover, regardless of the computational capacity available to an adversary in the future, even if they have access to the secret key at that future time. A highly energy-efficient implementation of a hyper-encryption chip was demonstrated by Krishna Palem et al. using the Probabilistic CMOS or PCMOS technology and was shown to be ~205 times more efficient in terms of Energy-Performance-Product.
Symmetric Boolean function
In mathematics, a symmetric Boolean function is a Boolean function whose value does not depend on the order of its input bits, i.e., it depends only on the number of ones (or zeros) in the input. For this reason they are also known as Boolean counting functions. There are 2n+1 symmetric n-ary Boolean functions. Instead of the truth table, traditionally used to represent Boolean functions, one may use a more compact representation for an n-variable symmetric Boolean function: the (n + 1)-vector, whose i-th entry (i = 0, ..., n) is the value of the function on an input vector with i ones. Mathematically, the symmetric Boolean functions correspond one-to-one with the functions that map n+1 elements to two elements, f : { 0 , 1 , . . . , n } → { 0 , 1 } {\displaystyle f:\{0,1,...,n\}\rightarrow \{0,1\}} . Symmetric Boolean functions are used to classify Boolean satisfiability problems. == Special cases == A number of special cases are recognized: Majority function: their value is 1 on input vectors with more than n/2 ones Threshold functions: their value is 1 on input vectors with k or more ones for a fixed k All-equal and not-all-equal function: their values is 1 when the inputs do (not) all have the same value Exact-count functions: their value is 1 on input vectors with k ones for a fixed k One-hot or 1-in-n function: their value is 1 on input vectors with exactly one one One-cold function: their value is 1 on input vectors with exactly one zero Congruence functions: their value is 1 on input vectors with the number of ones congruent to k mod m for fixed k, m Parity function: their value is 1 if the input vector has odd number of ones The n-ary versions of AND, OR, XOR, NAND, NOR and XNOR are also symmetric Boolean functions. == Properties == In the following, f k {\displaystyle f_{k}} denotes the value of the function f : { 0 , 1 } n → { 0 , 1 } {\displaystyle f:\{0,1\}^{n}\rightarrow \{0,1\}} when applied to an input vector of weight k {\displaystyle k} . === Weight === The weight of the function can be calculated from its value vector: | f | = ∑ k = 0 n ( n k ) f k {\displaystyle |f|=\sum _{k=0}^{n}{\binom {n}{k}}f_{k}} === Algebraic normal form === The algebraic normal form either contains all monomials of certain order m {\displaystyle m} , or none of them; i.e. the Möbius transform f ^ {\displaystyle {\hat {f}}} of the function is also a symmetric function. It can thus also be described by a simple (n+1) bit vector, the ANF vector f ^ m {\displaystyle {\hat {f}}_{m}} . The ANF and value vectors are related by a Möbius relation: f ^ m = ⨁ k 2 ⊆ m 2 f k {\displaystyle {\hat {f}}_{m}=\bigoplus _{k_{2}\subseteq m_{2}}f_{k}} where k 2 ⊆ m 2 {\displaystyle k_{2}\subseteq m_{2}} denotes all the weights k whose base-2 representation is covered by the base-2 representation of m (a consequence of Lucas’ theorem). Effectively, an n-variable symmetric Boolean function corresponds to a log(n)-variable ordinary Boolean function acting on the base-2 representation of the input weight. For example, for three-variable functions: f ^ 0 = f 0 f ^ 1 = f 0 ⊕ f 1 f ^ 2 = f 0 ⊕ f 2 f ^ 3 = f 0 ⊕ f 1 ⊕ f 2 ⊕ f 3 {\displaystyle {\begin{array}{lcl}{\hat {f}}_{0}&=&f_{0}\\{\hat {f}}_{1}&=&f_{0}\oplus f_{1}\\{\hat {f}}_{2}&=&f_{0}\oplus f_{2}\\{\hat {f}}_{3}&=&f_{0}\oplus f_{1}\oplus f_{2}\oplus f_{3}\end{array}}} So the three variable majority function with value vector (0, 0, 1, 1) has ANF vector (0, 0, 1, 0), i.e.: Maj ( x , y , z ) = x y ⊕ x z ⊕ y z {\displaystyle {\text{Maj}}(x,y,z)=xy\oplus xz\oplus yz} === Unit hypercube polynomial === The coefficients of the real polynomial agreeing with the function on { 0 , 1 } n {\displaystyle \{0,1\}^{n}} are given by: f m ∗ = ∑ k = 0 m ( − 1 ) | k | + | m | ( m k ) f k {\displaystyle f_{m}^{}=\sum _{k=0}^{m}(-1)^{|k|+|m|}{\binom {m}{k}}f_{k}} For example, the three variable majority function polynomial has coefficients (0, 0, 1, -2): Maj ( x , y , z ) = ( x y + x z + y z ) − 2 ( x y z ) {\displaystyle {\text{Maj}}(x,y,z)=(xy+xz+yz)-2(xyz)} == Examples ==
White-box cryptography
In cryptography, the white-box model refers to an extreme attack scenario, in which an adversary has full unrestricted access to a cryptographic implementation, most commonly of a block cipher such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). A variety of security goals may be posed (see the section below), the most fundamental being "unbreakability", requiring that any (bounded) attacker should not be able to extract the secret key hardcoded in the implementation, while at the same time the implementation must be fully functional. In contrast, the black-box model only provides an oracle access to the analyzed cryptographic primitive (in the form of encryption and/or decryption queries). There is also a model in-between, the so-called gray-box model, which corresponds to additional information leakage from the implementation, more commonly referred to as side-channel leakage. White-box cryptography is a practice and study of techniques for designing and attacking white-box implementations. It has many applications, including digital rights management (DRM), pay television, protection of cryptographic keys in the presence of malware, mobile payments and cryptocurrency wallets. Examples of DRM systems employing white-box implementations include CSS and Widevine. White-box cryptography is closely related to the more general notions of obfuscation, in particular, to Black-box obfuscation, proven to be impossible, and to Indistinguishability obfuscation, constructed recently under well-founded assumptions but so far being infeasible to implement in practice. As of January 2023, there are no publicly known unbroken white-box designs of standard symmetric encryption schemes. On the other hand, there exist many unbroken white-box implementations of dedicated block ciphers designed specifically to achieve incompressibility (see § Security goals). == Security goals == Depending on the application, different security goals may be required from a white-box implementation. Specifically, for symmetric-key algorithms the following are distinguished: Unbreakability is the most fundamental goal requiring that a bounded attacker should not be able to recover the secret key embedded in the white-box implementation. Without this requirement, all other security goals are unreachable since a successful attacker can simply use a reference implementation of the encryption scheme together with the extracted key. One-wayness requires that a white-box implementation of an encryption scheme can not be used by a bounded attacker to decrypt ciphertexts. This requirement essentially turns a symmetric encryption scheme into a public-key encryption scheme, where the white-box implementation plays the role of the public key associated to the embedded secret key. This idea was proposed already in the famous work of Diffie and Hellman in 1976 as a potential public-key encryption candidate. Code lifting security is an informal requirement on the context, in which the white-box program is being executed. It demands that an attacker can not extract a functional copy of the program. This goal is particularly relevant in the DRM setting. Code obfuscation techniques are often used to achieve this goal. A commonly used technique is to compose the white-box implementation with so-called external encodings. These are lightweight secret encodings that modify the function computed by the white-box part of an application. It is required that their effect is canceled in other parts of the application in an obscure way, using code obfuscation techniques. Alternatively, the canceling counterparts can be applied on a remote server. Incompressibility requires that an attacker can not significantly compress a given white-box implementation. This can be seen as a way to achieve code lifting security (see above), since exfiltrating a large program from a constrained device (for example, an embedded or a mobile device) can be time-consuming and may be easy to detect by a firewall. Examples of incompressible designs include SPACE cipher, SPNbox, WhiteKey and WhiteBlock. These ciphers use large lookup tables that can be pseudorandomly generated from a secret master key. Although this makes the recovery of the master key hard, the lookup tables themselves play the role of an equivalent secret key. Thus, unbreakability is achieved only partially. Traceability (Traitor tracing) requires that each distributed white-box implementation contains a digital watermark allowing identification of the guilty user in case the white-box program is being leaked and distributed publicly. == History == The white-box model with initial attempts of white-box DES and AES implementations were first proposed by Chow, Eisen, Johnson and van Oorshot in 2003. The designs were based on representing the cipher as a network of lookup tables and obfuscating the tables by composing them with small (4- or 8-bit) random encodings. Such protection satisfied a property that each single obfuscated table individually does not contain any information about the secret key. Therefore, a potential attacker has to combine several tables in their analysis. The first two schemes were broken in 2004 by Billet, Gilbert, and Ech-Chatbi using structural cryptanalysis. The attack was subsequently called "the BGE attack". The numerous consequent design attempts (2005-2022) were quickly broken by practical dedicated attacks. In 2016, Bos, Hubain, Michiels and Teuwen showed that an adaptation of standard side-channel power analysis attacks can be used to efficiently and fully automatically break most existing white-box designs. This result created a new research direction about generic attacks (correlation-based, algebraic, fault injection) and protections against them. == Competitions == Four editions of the WhibOx contest were held in 2017, 2019, 2021 and 2024 respectively. These competitions invited white-box designers both from academia and industry to submit their implementation in the form of (possibly obfuscated) C code. At the same time, everyone could attempt to attack these programs and recover the embedded secret key. Each of these competitions lasted for about 4-5 months. WhibOx 2017 / CHES 2017 Capture the Flag Challenge targeted the standard AES block cipher. Among 94 submitted implementations, all were broken during the competition, with the strongest one staying unbroken for 28 days. WhibOx 2019 / CHES 2019 Capture the Flag Challenge again targeted the AES block cipher. Among 27 submitted implementations, 3 programs stayed unbroken throughout the competition, but were broken after 51 days since the publication. WhibOx 2021 / CHES 2021 Capture the Flag Challenge changed the target to ECDSA, a digital signature scheme based on elliptic curves. Among 97 submitted implementations, all were broken within at most 2 days. WhibOx 2024 / CHES 2024 Capture the Flag Challenge again targeted ECDSA. Among 47 submitted implementations, all were broken during the competition, with the strongest one staying unbroken for almost 5 days.
FuseBase
FuseBase (previously Nimbus Note and Nimbus Platform) is a B2B SaaS platform. It is among the first to support the Model Context Protocol (MCP), an open standard enabling seamless integration of AI agents with external tools, systems, and data sources. == History == The platform was founded in 2014 as Nimbus Note, the platform started as a cross-platform note-taking and information management tool. As it evolved into Nimbus Platform, it added project management and client portal capabilities. In 2023, the company rebranded as FuseBase, pivoting to connect and automate both internal and external collaboration through AI Agents and cutting-edge protocol adoption like MCP. At the same time, FuseBase was named Product of the Year on Product Hunt. == Technical overview == The platform integrates the Model Context Protocol (MCP), an open-source framework created by Anthropic. MCP allows AI models to securely access and interact with external data, tools, and systems. This enables FuseBase AI Agents to gather relevant context, perform actions, and provide more advanced automation.
Backdoor (computing)
A backdoor is a typically covert method of bypassing normal authentication or encryption in a computer, product, embedded device (e.g. a home router), or its embodiment (e.g. part of a cryptosystem, algorithm, chipset, or even a "homunculus computer"—a tiny computer-within-a-computer such as that found in Intel's AMT technology). Backdoors are most often used for securing remote access to a computer, or obtaining access to plaintext in cryptosystems. From there it may be used to gain access to privileged information like passwords, corrupt or delete data on hard drives, or transfer information within compromised networks. In the United States, the 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act forces internet providers to provide backdoors for government authorities. In 2024, the U.S. government realized that China had been tapping communications in the U.S. using that infrastructure for months, or perhaps longer; China recorded presidential candidate campaign office phone calls—including employees of the then-vice president of the nation, and of the candidates themselves. A backdoor may take the form of a hidden part of a program, a separate program (e.g. Back Orifice may subvert the system through a rootkit), code in the firmware of the hardware, or parts of an operating system such as Windows, for example, device drivers. Trojan horses can be used to create vulnerabilities in a device. A Trojan horse may appear to be an entirely legitimate program, but when executed, it triggers an activity that may install a backdoor. Although some are secretly installed, other backdoors are deliberate and widely known. These kinds of backdoors have "legitimate" uses such as providing the manufacturer with a way to restore user passwords. Many systems that store information within the cloud fail to create accurate security measures. If many systems are connected within the cloud, hackers can gain access to all other platforms through the most vulnerable system. Default passwords (or other default credentials) can function as backdoors if they are not changed by the user. Some debugging features can also act as backdoors if they are not removed in the release version. In 1993, the United States government attempted to deploy an encryption system, the Clipper chip, with an explicit backdoor for law enforcement and national security access. The chip was unsuccessful. Recent proposals to counter backdoors include creating a database of backdoors' triggers and then using neural networks to detect them. == Overview == The threat of backdoors surfaced when multiuser and networked operating systems became widely adopted. Petersen and Turn discussed computer subversion in a paper published in the proceedings of the 1967 AFIPS Conference. They noted a class of active infiltration attacks that use "trapdoor" entry points into the system to bypass security facilities and permit direct access to data. The use of the word trapdoor here clearly coincides with more recent definitions of a backdoor. However, since the advent of public key cryptography the term trapdoor has acquired a different meaning (see: Trapdoor function), and thus the term "backdoor" is now preferred, only after the term trapdoor went out of use. More generally, such security breaches were discussed at length in a RAND Corporation task force report published under DARPA sponsorship by J.P. Anderson and D.J. Edwards in 1970. While initially targeting the computer vision domain, backdoor attacks have expanded to encompass various other domains, including text, audio, ML-based computer-aided design, and ML-based wireless signal classification. Additionally, vulnerabilities in backdoors have been demonstrated in deep generative models, reinforcement learning (e.g., AI GO), and deep graph models. These broad-ranging potential risks have prompted concerns from national security agencies regarding their potentially disastrous consequences. A backdoor in a login system might take the form of a hard coded user and password combination which gives access to the system. An example of this sort of backdoor was used as a plot device in the 1983 film WarGames, in which the architect of the "WOPR" computer system had inserted a hardcoded password-less account which gave the user access to the system, and to undocumented parts of the system (in particular, a video game-like simulation mode and direct interaction with the artificial intelligence). Although the number of backdoors in systems using proprietary software (software whose source code is not publicly available) is not widely credited, they are nevertheless frequently exposed. Programmers have even succeeded in secretly installing large amounts of benign code as Easter eggs in programs, although such cases may involve official forbearance, if not actual permission. == Examples == === Worms === Many computer worms, such as Sobig and Mydoom, install a backdoor on the affected computer (generally a PC on broadband running Microsoft Windows and Microsoft Outlook). Such backdoors appear to be installed so that spammers can send junk e-mail from the infected machines. Others, such as the Sony/BMG rootkit, placed secretly on millions of music CDs through late 2005, are intended as DRM measures—and, in that case, as data-gathering agents, since both surreptitious programs they installed routinely contacted central servers. A sophisticated attempt to plant a backdoor in the Linux kernel, exposed in November 2003, added a small and subtle code change by subverting the revision control system. In this case, a two-line change appeared to check root access permissions of a caller to the sys_wait4 function, but because it used assignment = instead of equality checking ==, it actually granted permissions to the system. This difference is easily overlooked, and could even be interpreted as an accidental typographical error, rather than an intentional attack. In January 2014, a backdoor was discovered in certain Samsung Android products, like the Galaxy devices. The Samsung proprietary Android versions are fitted with a backdoor that provides remote access to the data stored on the device. In particular, the Samsung Android software that is in charge of handling the communications with the modem, using the Samsung IPC protocol, implements a class of requests known as remote file server (RFS) commands, that allows the backdoor operator to perform via modem remote I/O operations on the device hard disk or other storage. As the modem is running Samsung proprietary Android software, it is likely that it offers over-the-air remote control that could then be used to issue the RFS commands and thus to access the file system on the device. === Object code backdoors === Harder to detect backdoors involve modifying object code, rather than source code—object code is much harder to inspect, as it is designed to be machine-readable, not human-readable. These backdoors can be inserted either directly in the on-disk object code, or inserted at some point during compilation, assembly linking, or loading—in the latter case the backdoor never appears on disk, only in memory. Object code backdoors are difficult to detect by inspection of the object code, but are easily detected by simply checking for changes (differences), notably in length or in checksum, and in some cases can be detected or analyzed by disassembling the object code. Further, object code backdoors can be removed (assuming source code is available) by simply recompiling from source on a trusted system. Thus for such backdoors to avoid detection, all extant copies of a binary must be subverted, and any validation checksums must also be compromised, and source must be unavailable, to prevent recompilation. Alternatively, these other tools (length checks, diff, checksumming, disassemblers) can themselves be compromised to conceal the backdoor, for example detecting that the subverted binary is being checksummed and returning the expected value, not the actual value. To conceal these further subversions, the tools must also conceal the changes in themselves—for example, a subverted checksummer must also detect if it is checksumming itself (or other subverted tools) and return false values. This leads to extensive changes in the system and tools being needed to conceal a single change. As object code can be regenerated by recompiling (reassembling, relinking) the original source code, making a persistent object code backdoor (without modifying source code) requires subverting the compiler itself—so that when it detects that it is compiling the program under attack it inserts the backdoor—or alternatively the assembler, linker, or loader. As this requires subverting the compiler, this in turn can be fixed by recompiling the compiler, removing the backdoor insertion code. This defense can in turn be subverted by putting a source meta-backdoor in the compiler, so that when it detects that it is compiling itself