In computer science, computational intelligence (CI) refers to concepts, paradigms, algorithms and implementations of systems that are designed to show "intelligent" behavior in complex and changing environments. These systems are aimed at mastering complex tasks in a wide variety of technical or commercial areas and offer solutions that recognize and interpret patterns, control processes, support decision-making or autonomously manoeuvre vehicles or robots in unknown environments, among other things. These concepts and paradigms are characterized by the ability to learn or adapt to new situations, to generalize, to abstract, to discover and associate. Nature-analog or nature-inspired methods play a key role in this. CI approaches primarily address those complex real-world problems for which traditional or mathematical modeling is not appropriate for various reasons: the processes cannot be described exactly with complete knowledge, the processes are too complex for mathematical reasoning, they contain some uncertainties during the process, such as unforeseen changes in the environment or in the process itself, or the processes are simply stochastic in nature. Thus, CI techniques are properly aimed at processes that are ill-defined, complex, nonlinear, time-varying and/or stochastic. A recent definition of the IEEE Computational Intelligence Societey describes CI as the theory, design, application and development of biologically and linguistically motivated computational paradigms. Traditionally the three main pillars of CI have been Neural Networks, Fuzzy Systems and Evolutionary Computation. ... CI is an evolving field and at present in addition to the three main constituents, it encompasses computing paradigms like ambient intelligence, artificial life, cultural learning, artificial endocrine networks, social reasoning, and artificial hormone networks. ... Over the last few years there has been an explosion of research on Deep Learning, in particular deep convolutional neural networks. Nowadays, deep learning has become the core method for artificial intelligence. In fact, some of the most successful AI systems are based on CI. However, as CI is an emerging and developing field there is no final definition of CI, especially in terms of the list of concepts and paradigms that belong to it. The general requirements for the development of an “intelligent system” are ultimately always the same, namely the simulation of intelligent thinking and action in a specific area of application. To do this, the knowledge about this area must be represented in a model so that it can be processed. The quality of the resulting system depends largely on how well the model was chosen in the development process. Sometimes data-driven methods are suitable for finding a good model and sometimes logic-based knowledge representations deliver better results. Hybrid models are usually used in real applications. According to actual textbooks, the following methods and paradigms, which largely complement each other, can be regarded as parts of CI: Fuzzy systems Neural networks and, in particular, convolutional neural networks Evolutionary computation and, in particular, multi-objective evolutionary optimization Swarm intelligence Bayesian networks Artificial immune systems Learning theory Probabilistic methods == Relationship between hard and soft computing and artificial and computational intelligence == Artificial intelligence (AI) is used in the media, but also by some of the scientists involved, as a kind of umbrella term for the various techniques associated with it or with CI. Craenen and Eiben state that attempts to define or at least describe CI can usually be assigned to one or more of the following groups: "Relative definition” comparing CI to AI Conceptual treatment of key notions and their roles in CI Listing of the (established) areas that belong to it The relationship between CI and AI has been a frequently discussed topic during the development of CI. While the above list implies that they are synonyms, the vast majority of AI/CI researchers working on the subject consider them to be distinct fields, where either CI is an alternative to AI AI includes CI CI includes AI The view of the first of the above three points goes back to Zadeh, the founder of the fuzzy set theory, who differentiated machine intelligence into hard and soft computing techniques, which are used in artificial intelligence on the one hand and computational intelligence on the other. In hard computing (HC) and traditional AI (e.g. expert systems), inaccuracy and uncertainty are undesirable characteristics of a system, while soft computing (SC) and thus CI focus on dealing with these characteristics. The adjacent figure illustrates this view and lists the most important CI techniques. Another frequently mentioned distinguishing feature is the representation of information in symbolic form in AI and in sub-symbolic form in CI techniques. Hard computing is a conventional computing method based on the principles of certainty and accuracy and it is deterministic. It requires a precisely stated analytical model of the task to be processed and a prewritten program, i.e. a fixed set of instructions. The models used are based on Boolean logic (also called crisp logic), where e.g. an element can be either a member of a set or not and there is nothing in between. When applied to real-world tasks, systems based on HC result in specific control actions defined by a mathematical model or algorithm. If an unforeseen situation occurs that is not included in the model or algorithm used, the action will most likely fail. Soft computing, on the other hand, is based on the fact that the human mind is capable of storing information and processing it in a goal-oriented way, even if it is imprecise and lacks certainty. SC is based on the model of the human brain with probabilistic thinking, fuzzy logic and multi-valued logic. Soft computing can process a wealth of data and perform a large number of computations, which may not be exact, in parallel. For hard problems for which no satisfying exact solutions based on HC are available, SC methods can be applied successfully. SC methods are usually stochastic in nature i.e., they are a randomly defined processes that can be analyzed statistically but not with precision. Up to now, the results of some CI methods, such as deep learning, cannot be verified and it is also not clear what they are based on. This problem represents an important scientific issue for the future. AI and CI are catchy terms, but they are also so similar that they can be confused. The meaning of both terms has developed and changed over a long period of time, with AI being used first. Bezdek describes this impressively and concludes that such buzzwords are frequently used and hyped by the scientific community, science management and (science) journalism. Not least because AI and biological intelligence are emotionally charged terms and it is still difficult to find a generally accepted definition for the basic term intelligence. == History == In 1950, Alan Turing, one of the founding fathers of computer science, developed a test for computer intelligence known as the Turing test. In this test, a person can ask questions via a keyboard and a monitor without knowing whether his counterpart is a human or a computer. A computer is considered intelligent if the interrogator cannot distinguish the computer from a human. This illustrates the discussion about intelligent computers at the beginning of the computer age. The term Computational Intelligence was first used as the title of the journal of the same name in 1985 and later by the IEEE Neural Networks Council (NNC), which was founded 1989 by a group of researchers interested in the development of biological and artificial neural networks. On November 21, 2001, the NNC became the IEEE Neural Networks Society, to become the IEEE Computational Intelligence Society two years later by including new areas of interest such as fuzzy systems and evolutionary computation. The NNC helped organize the first IEEE World Congress on Computational Intelligence in Orlando, Florida in 1994. On this conference the first clear definition of Computational Intelligence was introduced by Bezdek: A system is computationally intelligent when it: deals with only numerical (low-level) data, has pattern-recognition components, does not use knowledge in the AI sense; and additionally when it (begins to) exhibit (1) computational adaptivity; (2) computational fault tolerance; (3) speed approaching human-like turnaround and (4) error rates that approximate human performance. Today, with machine learning and deep learning in particular utilizing a breadth of supervised, unsupervised, and reinforcement learning approaches, the CI landscape has been greatly enhanced, with novell intelligent approaches. == The main algorithmic approaches of CI and their applicati
Compute (machine learning)
In machine learning and deep learning, compute is the amount of computing power or computational resources required to train machine learning models and large language models. More broadly, compute is the computational power or resources necessary for a computer or computer program to function. == Definition == Compute is commonly defined as the amount of computing power or computational resources required to train machine learning and large language models. The term "compute" has also been more broadly applied to cloud computing, referencing processing power, memory, networking, storage, and other resources required for the computation of any program. Compute is measured in petaflop/s-days and is used to document AI training. A petaflop/s-day (pfs-day) consists of performing 1015 neural net operations per second for one day, or a total of about 1020 operations. The compute-time product serves as a mental convenience, similar to kilowatt-hour for energy. An amount of compute is meant to give an idea of the number of actual operations performed. == History == In a 2018 analysis titled "AI and compute", artificial intelligence company OpenAI introduced the concept of compute. OpenAI identified two eras of training AI systems in terms of compute-usage. From 1959 to 2012, compute roughly followed Moore’s law. Between 2012 and 2018, the amount of compute used in the largest AI training runs increased exponentially, growing by more than 300,000 times — roughly doubling every 3.4 months. By comparison, Moore’s Law doubled every two years over the same period. One of the largest models, released in 2020, used 600,000 times more computing power than the 2012 model. After 2020, compute growth began to slow down, with the compute needed for the largest AI models continuing to slow down in 2023. The notion of compute has become increasingly used from the mid-2020s onwards. == Compute growth and AI progress == Larger AI models trained on more data and using more computational resources, tend to perform better. This happens even if the algorithms themselves remain unchanged. As early as 2018, OpenAI noted the exponential increase in compute to be have a key role in AI progress. OpenAI considers three factors drive the advance of AI: algorithmic innovation, data, and the amount of compute available for training. AI models with more compute not only improve in the tasks they were trained on but can develop emergent abilities. Incremental improvements can lead to more abrupt leaps in capabilities. AI provider SpaceXAI said in 2026 that their AI progress is driven by compute and used it a key metric in the AI training of its supercomputer Colossus, the which contains 1 million GPUs. Anthropic has a contract of $1.25 billion per month with SpaceXAI to buy all the compute capacity at Colossus 1 data center. === Criticism and policy === Increasing, promoting or constraining progress in artificial intelligence has often be done via controlling the amount of compute. Policymarkers have enacted policies and provided support to make compute resources more accessible to domestic AI researchers. In a January 2022 report, the Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) suggested to institutions that increasingly powerful and generalizable AI (AGI) will likely require other strategies than maximizing compute. Some AI researchers are also concerned that government might exclusively focus on scaling compute instead of other strategies. The CSET has reported on the various bottlenecks which could explain why deep learning needs for compute have slow down: training is expensive and training extremely large models generates traffic jams across many processors that are difficult to manage. there is a limited supply of AI chips (see AI chip memory shortage). CSET advances that the main resource is human capital, specifically talented researchers — according to a 2023 published survey of more than 400 AI researchers, academic and private sector workers. The survey found that AI researchers are not primarily or exclusively constrained by compute access. However, both academic and industry AI researchers equally report concerns that insufficient compute could prevent them from contributing meaningfully to AI research in the future. High compute users are more concerned about compute access. When asked about which resource provided by the government would be the most useful to them, some AI researchers select compute, other prefer grant funding. For this goal, CSET advised policymakers to ensure that even researchers with smaller budgets could effectively contribute to AI research. Other proposed strategies include using contemporary AI algorithms, managing modern AI infrastructure or focusing on interdisciplinary work between the AI field and other fields of computer science. A 2024 study on compute access found that academic-only AI research teams often have less compute intensive research topics, especially foundation models, compared to industry AI labs. As a consequence, academia is likely to play a smaller role in advancing such techniques. The researchers suggest nationally-sponsored computing infrastructure as well as open science initiatives to boost academic compute access. === Data === A 2022 study found that current large language models are significantly under-trained, a consequence of focusing on scaling language models whilst keeping the amount of training data constant. By training over 400 language models of various parameter and token size, they found that "for compute-optimal training", the model size and the number of training tokens should ideally be scaled equally: for every doubling of model size the number of training tokens should also be doubled.
Safe and Secure Innovation for Frontier Artificial Intelligence Models Act
The Safe and Secure Innovation for Frontier Artificial Intelligence Models Act, or SB 1047, was a failed 2024 California bill intended to "mitigate the risk of catastrophic harms from AI models so advanced that they are not yet known to exist". Specifically, the bill would have applied to models which cost more than $100 million to train and were trained using a quantity of computing power greater than 1026 integer or floating-point operations. SB 1047 would have applied to all AI companies doing business in California—the location of the company would not matter. The bill would have created protections for whistleblowers and required developers to perform risk assessments of their models prior to release, with guidance from the Government Operations Agency. It would also have established CalCompute, a University of California public cloud computing cluster for startups, researchers and community groups. == Background == The rapid increase in capabilities of AI systems in the 2020s, including the release of ChatGPT in November 2022, caused some researchers and members of the public to become concerned about the existential risks associated with increasingly powerful AI systems. Hundreds of tech executives and AI researchers, including two of the so-called "Godfathers of AI", Geoffrey Hinton and Yoshua Bengio, signed a statement in May 2023 calling for the mitigation of the "risk of extinction from AI" to be a global priority alongside "pandemics and nuclear war". However, the plausibility of these risks is still widely debated. Strong regulation of AI has been criticized for purportedly causing regulatory capture by large AI companies like OpenAI, a phenomenon in which regulation advances the interest of larger companies at the expense of smaller competition and the public in general, although OpenAI ended up opposing the bill. Other advocates of AI regulation aim to prevent bias and privacy violations, rather than existential risks. For example, some experts who view existential concerns as overblown and unrealistic view them as a distraction from near-term harms of AI like discriminatory automated decision making. In the face of existential concerns, technology companies have made voluntary commitments to conduct safety testing, for example at the AI Safety Summit and AI Seoul Summit. In 2023, not long before the bill was proposed, Governor Newsom of California and President Biden issued executive orders on artificial intelligence. State Senator Wiener said SB 1047 draws heavily on the Biden executive order, and is motivated by the absence of unified federal legislation on AI safety. Historically, California has passed regulation on several tech issues itself, including consumer privacy and net neutrality, in the absence of action by Congress. == History == === Proposal and voting === The bill was authored by State Senator Scott Wiener. Wiener first proposed AI legislation for California through an intent bill called SB 294, the Safety in Artificial Intelligence Act, in September 2023. On February 7, 2024, Wiener introduced SB 1047. On May 21, SB 1047 passed the Senate 32–1. The bill was significantly amended by Wiener on August 15, 2024, in response to industry advice. Amendments included adding clarifications, and removing the creation of a "Frontier Model Division" and the penalty of perjury. On August 28, the bill passed the State Assembly 48–16. Then, due to the amendments, the bill was once again voted on by the Senate, passing 30–9. === Veto by governor === On September 29, Governor Gavin Newsom vetoed the bill. The deadline for California lawmakers to overrule Newsom's veto was November 30, 2024. Newsom cited concerns over the bill's regulatory framework targeting only large AI models based on their computational size, while not taking into account whether the models are deployed in high-risk environments. Newsom emphasized that this approach could create a false sense of security, overlooking smaller models that might present equally significant risks. He acknowledged the need for AI safety protocols but stressed the importance of adaptability in regulation as AI technology continues to evolve rapidly. Governor Newsom also committed to working with technology experts, federal partners, and research institutions, including the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, led by former California Supreme Court Justice Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar; and Stanford University's Human-Centered AI (HAI) Institute, led by Dr. Fei-Fei Li. He announced plans to collaborate with these entities to advance responsible AI development, aiming to protect the public while fostering innovation. == Provisions == SB 1047 would have covered AI models with training compute over 1026 integer or floating-point operations and a cost of over $100 million. If a covered model is fine-tuned using more than $10 million, the resulting model would also have been covered. The bill would have defined critical harms with respect to four categories: Creation or use of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapon Cyberattacks on critical infrastructure causing mass casualties or at least $500 million of damage Autonomous crimes causing mass casualties or at least $500 million of damage Other harms of comparable severity Developers would have needed to create a "safety and security protocol" before training covered models. Before deployment, they would have submitted a statement of compliance, confirming they took reasonable care to take measures to prevent covered models that pose an unreasonable risk of critical harms. The statement would have included risk assessments and descriptions of their compliance process. These rules would have applied to both covered models and their derivatives, including post-training modifications, with annual third-party audits required starting in 2026. Safeguards to reduce risk included the ability to shut down the model, which has been variously described as a "kill switch" and "circuit breaker". Whistleblowing provisions would have protected employees who report safety problems and incidents. Additionally, SB 1047 would have created a public cloud computing cluster called CalCompute, associated with the University of California, to support startups, researchers, and community groups that lack large-scale computing resources. === Compliance and supervision === SB 1047 would have required developers, beginning January 1, 2026, to annually retain a third-party auditor to perform an independent audit of compliance with the requirements of the bill, as provided. The Government Operations Agency would have reviewed the results of safety tests and incidents, and issue guidance, standards, and best practices. The bill would have created a Board of Frontier Models to supervise the application of the bill by the Government Operations Agency. It is would be composed of 9 members. == Reception == === Subjects of debate === Proponents of the bill described its provisions as simple and narrowly focused, with Sen. Scott Weiner describing it as a "light-touch, basic safety bill". This was disputed by critics of the bill, who described the bill's language as vague and criticized it as consolidating power in the largest AI companies at the expense of smaller ones. Proponents, in turn, argued that the bill only applies to models trained using more than 1026 FLOPS and with over $100 million, or fine-tuned with more than $10 million, and that the threshold could be increased if needed. The penalty of perjury was also a subject of debate, and was eventually removed through an amendment. The scope of the "kill switch" requirement was also reduced, following concerns from open-source developers. The use of the term "reasonable assurance" in the bill was also controversial, and it was eventually amended to "reasonable care". Critics then argued that "reasonable care" imposed an excessive burden by requiring confidence that models could not be used to cause catastrophic harm; proponents claimed that the standard did not require certainty and that it already applied to AI developers under existing law. === Support and opposition === Individual supporters of the bill included Turing Award recipients Yoshua Bengio and Geoffrey Hinton, Elon Musk, Bill de Blasio, Kevin Esvelt, Dan Hendrycks, Vitalik Buterin, OpenAI whistleblowers Daniel Kokotajlo and William Saunders, Lawrence Lessig, Sneha Revanur, Stuart Russell, Jan Leike, actors Mark Ruffalo, Sean Astin, and Rosie Perez, Scott Aaronson, and Max Tegmark. Over 120 Hollywood celebrities, including Mark Hamill, Jane Fonda, and J. J. Abrams, also signed a statement in support of the bill. Max Tegmark likened the bill's focus on holding companies responsible for the harms caused by their models to the FDA requiring clinical trials before a company can release a drug to the market. Organizations sponsoring the bill included the Center for AI Safety, Economic Security California and Encode. The la
Writesonic
Writesonic is an AI visibility and generative engine optimization (GEO) platform used by enterprises, digital agencies, direct-to-consumer (D2C) companies, and fast-growing brands to understand and improve how they are represented in AI-generated search and answer systems. The platform analyzes how brands appear in AI answers, compares their visibility and citations against competitors, and provides tools to create and optimize on-site content and secure mentions across third-party sources, discussion forums, and user-generated platforms that influence AI outputs. == History == Writesonic was founded by Samanyou Garg in October 2020 in San Francisco, California. The company initially operated as Magicflow before adopting its current name. In its seed round, the company raised $2.5 million from investors including Y-Combinator, HOF Capital, and Soma Capital. The company began with AI-powered content generation tools. In 2023, it expanded into AI-enhanced search engine optimization. In 2024, the company launched an AI agent specifically designed for SEO tasks, with integrations to platforms including Ahrefs, Google Keyword Planner, Keywords Everywhere, and Google Search Console. This was among the first specialized AI agents developed for SEO automation. Around the same time, Writesonic expanded its product line into Generative engine optimization (GEO), developing tools to analyze and improve how brands are represented in AI-generated search and answer environments. However, it is currently being challenged in the market with competitors such as Profound (known for their dashboards) and Meridian (known for their execution). == Technology and features == In 2024, the company introduced an artificial intelligence agent designed to automate search engine optimization (SEO) tasks. The agent integrates with platforms such as Ahrefs, Google Keyword Planner, Keywords Everywhere, and Google Search Console to conduct technical audits, perform keyword research, carry out competitive analysis, and assist in strategy development. It is capable of identifying content gaps, suggesting optimization measures, and generating SEO strategies using real-time data from the integrated platforms. The platform also includes features for content strategy, optimization, and management. It makes use of large language models such as GPT-5, Claude Opus 4.1, and Claude Sonnet 4.5, in combination with proprietary workflows for fact-checking, internal linking, and content structure optimization.
Artificial intelligence in Wikimedia projects
Some editors of Wikimedia projects use artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning programs to edit existing articles or create new ones. Some applications of artificial intelligence, like using large language models (LLMs) to create new articles from scratch, have been more controversial than others for the Wikipedia community. In August 2025, English Wikipedia adopted a policy that allowed editors to nominate suspected LLM-generated articles for speedy deletion. This was followed by a March 2026 decision to prohibit the use of LLMs to generate or rewrite article content, with exceptions for copyediting one's own writing and machine translation from another language's Wikipedia. Wikipedia has also been a significant source of training data for some of the earliest artificial intelligence projects. This has received mixed reactions including concern about companies not citing Wikipedia when relying on it to answer a question as well as Wikipedia's increased costs from data scraping. == AI usage == === Earliest use of automated tools, machine learning and AI === Since 2002, bots have been allowed to run on Wikipedia but must be approved and supervised by a human. A bot created in 2002, rambot, transformed census data into short new articles about towns in the United States; the vast majority of town, city, and county articles were started by it. Fighting vandalism has been a major focus of machine learning and AI bots and tools. The 2007 ClueBot relied on simple heuristics to identify likely vandalism, while its 2010 successor, ClueBot NG, uses machine learning through an artificial neural network. Machine translation software has also been used by Wikimedia contributors for a number of years. Aaron Halfaker's Objective Revision Evaluation Service (ORES) project was launched in late 2015 as an artificial intelligence service for grading the quality of Wikipedia edits. === Generative AI and LLMs === In 2022, the public release of ChatGPT inspired more experimentation with AI and writing Wikipedia articles. A debate was sparked about whether and to what extent such large language models are suitable for such purposes in light of their tendency to generate plausible-sounding misinformation, including fake references; to generate prose that is not encyclopedic in tone; and to reproduce biases. An early experiment on December 6, 2022 by a Wikipedia contributor named Pharos occurred when he created the article "Artwork title" using ChatGPT for the initial draft. Another editor who experimented with this early version of ChatGPT said that ChatGPT's overview of "Weaponized incompetence" was decent, but that the citations were fabricated. Since 2023, work has been done to draft an English Wikipedia policy regarding ChatGPT and similar LLMs, at times recommending that users who are unfamiliar with LLMs should avoid using them due to the aforementioned risks, as well as noting the potential for libel or copyright infringement. In early 2023, the Wiki Education Foundation reported that some experienced editors found AI to be useful in starting drafts or creating new articles. It said that ChatGPT "knows" what Wikipedia articles look like and can easily generate one that is written in the style of Wikipedia, but warned that ChatGPT had a tendency to use promotional language, among other issues. In 2023, a ban on AI was deemed "too harsh" by the community given the productivity benefits it offered editors. In 2023, members of the English Wikipedia community created a WikiProject named AI Cleanup to assist in the removal of poor quality AI content from Wikipedia. Miguel García, a former Wikimedia member from Spain, said in 2024 that when ChatGPT was originally launched, the number of AI-generated articles on the site peaked. He added that the rate of AI articles has now stabilized due to the community's efforts to combat it. He said that majority of the articles that have no sources are deleted instantly or are nominated for deletion. In October 2024, a study by Princeton University found that about 5% of 3,000 newly created articles (created in August 2024) on English Wikipedia were created using AI. The study said that some of the AI articles were on innocuous topics and that AI had likely only been used to assist in writing. For some other articles, AI had been used to promote businesses or political interests. In October 2024, Ilyas Lebleu, founder of WikiProject AI Cleanup, said that they and their fellow editors noticed a pattern of unnatural writing that could be connected to ChatGPT. They added that AI is able to mass-produce content that sounds real while being completely fake, leading to the creation of hoax articles on Wikipedia that they were tasked to delete. In June 2025, the Wikimedia Foundation started testing a "Simple Article Summaries" feature which would provide AI-generated summaries of Wikipedia articles, similar to Google Search's AI Overviews. The decision was met with immediate and harsh criticism from some Wikipedia editors, who called the feature a "ghastly idea" and a "PR hype stunt." They criticized a perceived loss of trust in the site due to AI's tendency to hallucinate and questioned the necessity of the feature. The criticism led the Wikimedia Foundation to halt the rollout of Simple Article Summaries that same month while still expressing interest in integrating generative AI more into Wikipedia. The project hints at tensions within the community and with the Foundation over when to use AI.In August 2025, the English Wikipedia community created a policy that allowed users to nominate suspected AI-generated articles for speedy deletion. Editors might recognize AI-generated articles because they use citations that are not related to the subject of the article or fabricated citations or the wording has particular quirks. If an article uses language that reads like an LLM response to a user, such as "Here is your Wikipedia article on" or "Up to my last training update", the article is typically tagged for speedy deletion. Other signs of AI use include excessive use of em dashes, overuse of the word "moreover", promotional material in articles that describes something as "breathtaking" and formatting issues like using curly quotation marks instead of straight versions. During the discussion on implementing the speedy deletion policy, one user, who is an article reviewer, said that he is "flooded non-stop with horrendous drafts" created using AI. Other users said that AI articles have a large amount of "lies and fake references" and that it takes a significant amount of time to fix the issues. English Wikipedia created a guide on how to spot signs of AI-generated writing in August 2025, titled "Signs of AI writing". In January 2026, the Wiki Education Foundation continued to caution against copying and pasting outputs from generative AI into Wikipedia and to avoid it for creating new articles explaining that the text often failed verification with the sources provided. The foundation created a training module that encourages editors to use AI for identifying gaps in articles, finding access to sources and finding relevant sources. In March 2026, the English Wikipedia community prohibited the use of AI to add content to articles, with exceptions for copy editing and machine translation from another language's Wikipedia. The English Wikipedia community holds the position that LLMs often violate core content policies. == Using Wikipedia for artificial intelligence == A 2017 paper described Wikipedia as the mother lode for human-generated text available for machine learning. In the development of the Google's Perspective API that identifies toxic comments in online forums, a dataset containing hundreds of thousands of Wikipedia talk page comments with human-labelled toxicity levels was used. As of 2023, subsets of the Wikipedia corpus were considered one of the largest well-curated data sets available for AI training, used to train every LLM to-date according to Stephen Harrison. This use of Wikipedia was divisive as of 2023. The Wikimedia Foundation and many of its projects supporters worry that attribution to Wikipedia articles is missing in many large-language models like ChatGPT (as well as AI like Siri and Alexa). While Wikipedia's licensing policy lets anyone use its texts, including in modified forms, it does have the condition that credit is given, implying that using its contents in answers by AI models without clarifying the sourcing may violate its terms of use. The Foundation expressed concern that without attribution, people will not visit the site as much or be as motivated to donate to support the project if they do not know when they are benefiting from it. They also noticed an 8% decrease in visitors to Wikipedia in 2025 which they attributed both to the increased popularity of generative AI and social media. In 2025, the Wikimedia Foundation has cited absorbing increased costs associated with scra
Elowan
Elowan is a plant-robot cyborg. Using its own internal bioelectrical signals, The plant has a robotic extension that makes it move towards light sources. Electrodes are inserted into the leaves, stem, and ground to detect the faint bioelectrical signals the plant produces. Then they are amplified so the robot can read them. So when the plant "wants" to go to light, the cyborg automatically goes to the nearest light source. Future extensions of the robot could provide: Protection, growth frameworks, and nutrients. Other factors that could make the cyborg move are temperature, soil, and gravity conditions Elowan is one in a series of plant-electronic hybrid experiments.
AlphaStar (software)
AlphaStar is an artificial intelligence (AI) software developed by DeepMind for playing the video game StarCraft II. It was unveiled to the public by name in January 2019. AlphaStar attained "Grandmaster" status in August 2019, considered a milestone for AI in video games at the time. == Background == Games created for humans are considered to have external validity as benchmarks of progress in artificial intelligence. IBM's chess engine Deep Blue (1997) and DeepMind's AlphaGo (2016) were considered major milestones; some argue that StarCraft would also be a major milestone, due to the game's "real-time play, partial observability, no single dominant strategy, complex rules that make it hard to build a fast forward model, and a particularly large and varied action space." Though difficult, StarCraft may still be tractable with current technology because "its rules are known and the world is discrete with only a few types of objects". StarCraft II is a popular fast-paced online real-time strategy game developed by Blizzard Entertainment. == History == DeepMind Technologies was founded in the UK in 2010. As early as 2011, founder Demis Hassabis called StarCraft "the next step up" after games like Go. DeepMind became a subsidiary of Google in 2014, after demonstrating self-learning bots with superhuman ability at a variety of Atari 2600 games. In February 2015, computer scientist Zachary Mason predicted Deepmind's research "leads to StarCraft in five or ten years". In March 2016, following AlphaGo's victory over Lee Sedol, a world champion Go player, Hassabis publicly mulled building an AI for StarCraft, citing it as a strategic game with incomplete information where, unlike Go, much of the "board" is invisible. A formal collaboration was announced at BlizzCon in November 2016, alongside a plan to release an open development environment for bots in Q1 of 2017. By 2017, DeepMind was experimenting with feeding StarCraft data into its software. In August 2017, DeepMind and Blizzard released development tools to assist in bot development, as well as data from 65,000 historical games. At the time, computer scientist and StarCraft tournament manager David Churchill estimated it would take five years for a bot to beat a human, but made the caveat that AlphaGo had beaten expectations. In Wired, tech journalist Tom Simonite stated "No one expects the robot to win anytime soon. But when it does, it will be a far greater achievement than DeepMind's conquest of Go." In December 2018, DeepMind's bot defeated professional player Grzegorz "MaNa" Komincz, 5-0. DeepMind announced the bot, named "AlphaStar", in January 2019. A journalist at Ars Technica and others argued that AlphaStar still had unfair advantages: "AlphaStar has the ability to make its clicks with surgical precision using an API, whereas human players are constrained by the mechanical limits of computer mice". AlphaStar also had a global view rather than being limited by the in-game camera. Furthermore, while there was a cap on the number of actions over a five-second window, AlphaStar was free to allocate its action quota unevenly across the window in order to launch superhuman bursts of activity at critical moments. DeepMind quickly retrained AlphaStar under more realistic constraints, and then lost a rematch with Komincz. Starting in July 2019, the new, constrained version of AlphaStar anonymously competed against players who "opted in" on the public 1v1 European multiplayer ladder. By the end of August 2019, AlphaStar had attained Grandmaster level, ranking among the top 0.2% of human players. == Algorithms == Unlike AlphaZero, AlphaStar initially learns to imitate the moves of the best players in its database of human vs. human games; this step is necessary to solve what DeepMind's Dave Silver calls "the exploration problem": discovering new strategies would otherwise be like finding a "needle in a haystack". Agents then play each other and deploy deep reinforcement learning. These main agents also learn by playing against suboptimal "exploiter agents" whose purpose is to expose weaknesses in the main agents. == Reactions == After his 5-0 defeat in December 2018, Komincz stated "I wasn't expecting the AI to be that good". Stuart Russell assessed that AlphaStar's 2018 victory required "a fair amount of problem-specific effort" and that general-purpose methods were "not quite ready for StarCraft". An article in Wired UK judged AlphaStar's new constraints, adopted for the July 2019 matches, to be "fair" this time around. StarCraft professional Raza "RazerBlader" Sekha stated AlphaStar was "impressive" but had its quirks, succumbing in one game to an unorthodox army composition made up of only air units. The UK's top player, Joshua "RiSky" Hayward, expressed some disappointment, saying AlphaStar "often didn't make the most efficient, strategic decisions". Professional Diego "Kelazhur" Schwimer called AlphaStar's play "unimaginably unusual; it really makes you question how much of StarCraft's diverse possibilities pro players have really explored". AlphaStar's opponents often did not realize they were playing a bot. Ian Sample, of The Guardian, called AlphaStar a "landmark achievement" for the field of AI. Churchill stated that he had previously seen bots that master one or two elements of StarCraft, but that AlphaStar was the first that can handle the game in its entirety. Gary Marcus expressed his continuing skepticism about deep learning, stating: "So far the field has struggled to take techniques like this out of the laboratory and game environments and into the real world, and I don't immediately see this result as progress in that direction". AI researcher Jon Dodge was surprised by AlphaStar, stating that he did not expect such a "superhuman" performance for "another couple of years"; in contrast, Churchill states "StarCraft is nowhere near being 'solved', and AlphaStar is not yet even close to playing at a world champion level". == Legacy == DeepMind argues that insights from AlphaStar might benefit robots, self-driving cars, and virtual assistants, which need to operate with "imperfectly observed information". Silver has indicated his lab "may rest at this point", rather than try to substantially improve AlphaStar. Silver himself argues that "AlphaStar has become the first AI system to reach the top tier of human performance in any professionally played e-sport on the full unrestricted game under professionally approved conditions... Ever since computers cracked Go, chess, and poker, the game of StarCraft has emerged, essentially by consensus from the community, as the next grand challenge for AI." Computer scientist Noel Sharkey argues, disapprovingly, that "military analysts will certainly be eyeing the successful AlphaStar real-time strategies as a clear example of the advantages of AI for battlefield planning". In contrast, Silver argues: "To say that this has any kind of military use is saying no more than to say an AI for chess could be used to lead to military applications".