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Cache language model
A cache language model is a type of statistical language model. These occur in the natural language processing subfield of computer science and assign probabilities to given sequences of words by means of a probability distribution. Statistical language models are key components of speech recognition systems and of many machine translation systems: they tell such systems which possible output word sequences are probable and which are improbable. The particular characteristic of a cache language model is that it contains a cache component and assigns relatively high probabilities to words or word sequences that occur elsewhere in a given text. The primary, but by no means sole, use of cache language models is in speech recognition systems. To understand why it is a good idea for a statistical language model to contain a cache component one might consider someone who is dictating a letter about elephants to a speech recognition system. Standard (non-cache) N-gram language models will assign a very low probability to the word "elephant" because it is a very rare word in English. If the speech recognition system does not contain a cache component, the person dictating the letter may be annoyed: each time the word "elephant" is spoken another sequence of words with a higher probability according to the N-gram language model may be recognized (e.g., "tell a plan"). These erroneous sequences will have to be deleted manually and replaced in the text by "elephant" each time "elephant" is spoken. If the system has a cache language model, "elephant" will still probably be misrecognized the first time it is spoken and will have to be entered into the text manually; however, from this point on the system is aware that "elephant" is likely to occur again – the estimated probability of occurrence of "elephant" has been increased, making it more likely that if it is spoken it will be recognized correctly. Once "elephant" has occurred several times, the system is likely to recognize it correctly every time it is spoken until the letter has been completely dictated. This increase in the probability assigned to the occurrence of "elephant" is an example of a consequence of machine learning and more specifically of pattern recognition. There exist variants of the cache language model in which not only single words but also multi-word sequences that have occurred previously are assigned higher probabilities (e.g., if "San Francisco" occurred near the beginning of the text subsequent instances of it would be assigned a higher probability). The cache language model was first proposed in a paper published in 1990, after which the IBM speech-recognition group experimented with the concept. The group found that implementation of a form of cache language model yielded a 24% drop in word-error rates once the first few hundred words of a document had been dictated. A detailed survey of language modeling techniques concluded that the cache language model was one of the few new language modeling techniques that yielded improvements over the standard N-gram approach: "Our caching results show that caching is by far the most useful technique for perplexity reduction at small and medium training data sizes". The development of the cache language model has generated considerable interest among those concerned with computational linguistics in general and statistical natural language processing in particular: recently, there has been interest in applying the cache language model in the field of statistical machine translation. The success of the cache language model in improving word prediction rests on the human tendency to use words in a "bursty" fashion: when one is discussing a certain topic in a certain context, the frequency with which one uses certain words will be quite different from their frequencies when one is discussing other topics in other contexts. The traditional N-gram language models, which rely entirely on information from a very small number (four, three, or two) of words preceding the word to which a probability is to be assigned, do not adequately model this "burstiness". Recently, the cache language model concept – originally conceived for the N-gram statistical language model paradigm – has been adapted for use in the neural paradigm. For instance, recent work on continuous cache language models in the recurrent neural network (RNN) setting has applied the cache concept to much larger contexts than before, yielding significant reductions in perplexity. Another recent line of research involves incorporating a cache component in a feed-forward neural language model (FN-LM) to achieve rapid domain adaptation.
Control break
In computer programming, a control break is a change in the value of one of the keys on which a file is sorted, which requires some extra processing. For example, with an input file sorted by post code, the number of items found in each postal district might need to be printed on a report, and a heading shown for the next district. Quite often there is a hierarchy of nested control breaks in a program, such as streets within districts within areas, with the need for a grand total at the end. Structured programming techniques have been developed to ensure correct processing of control breaks in languages such as COBOL and to ensure that conditions such as empty input files and sequence errors are handled properly. With fourth-generation languages such as SQL, the programming language should handle most of the details of control breaks automatically.
Locally recoverable code
Locally recoverable codes are a family of error correction codes that were introduced first by D. S. Papailiopoulos and A. G. Dimakis and have been widely studied in information theory due to their applications related to distributive and cloud storage systems. An [ n , k , d , r ] q {\displaystyle [n,k,d,r]_{q}} LRC is an [ n , k , d ] q {\displaystyle [n,k,d]_{q}} linear code such that there is a function f i {\displaystyle f_{i}} that takes as input i {\displaystyle i} and a set of r {\displaystyle r} other coordinates of a codeword c = ( c 1 , … , c n ) ∈ C {\displaystyle c=(c_{1},\ldots ,c_{n})\in C} different from c i {\displaystyle c_{i}} , and outputs c i {\displaystyle c_{i}} . == Overview == Erasure-correcting codes, or simply erasure codes, for distributed and cloud storage systems, are becoming more and more popular as a result of the present spike in demand for cloud computing and storage services. This has inspired researchers in the fields of information and coding theory to investigate new facets of codes that are specifically suited for use with storage systems. It is well-known that LRC is a code that needs only a limited set of other symbols to be accessed in order to restore every symbol in a codeword. This idea is very important for distributed and cloud storage systems since the most common error case is when one storage node fails (erasure). The main objective is to recover as much data as possible from the fewest additional storage nodes in order to restore the node. Hence, Locally Recoverable Codes are crucial for such systems. The following definition of the LRC follows from the description above: an [ n , k , r ] {\displaystyle [n,k,r]} -Locally Recoverable Code (LRC) of length n {\displaystyle n} is a code that produces an n {\displaystyle n} -symbol codeword from k {\displaystyle k} information symbols, and for any symbol of the codeword, there exist at most r {\displaystyle r} other symbols such that the value of the symbol can be recovered from them. The locality parameter satisfies 1 ≤ r ≤ k {\displaystyle 1\leq r\leq k} because the entire codeword can be found by accessing k {\displaystyle k} symbols other than the erased symbol. Furthermore, Locally Recoverable Codes, having the minimum distance d {\displaystyle d} , can recover d − 1 {\displaystyle d-1} erasures. == Definition == Let C {\displaystyle C} be a [ n , k , d ] q {\displaystyle [n,k,d]_{q}} linear code. For i ∈ { 1 , … , n } {\displaystyle i\in \{1,\ldots ,n\}} , let us denote by r i {\displaystyle r_{i}} the minimum number of other coordinates we have to look at to recover an erasure in coordinate i {\displaystyle i} . The number r i {\displaystyle r_{i}} is said to be the locality of the i {\displaystyle i} -th coordinate of the code. The locality of the code is defined as An [ n , k , d , r ] q {\displaystyle [n,k,d,r]_{q}} locally recoverable code (LRC) is an [ n , k , d ] q {\displaystyle [n,k,d]_{q}} linear code C ∈ F q n {\displaystyle C\in \mathbb {F} _{q}^{n}} with locality r {\displaystyle r} . Let C {\displaystyle C} be an [ n , k , d ] q {\displaystyle [n,k,d]_{q}} -locally recoverable code. Then an erased component can be recovered linearly, i.e. for every i ∈ { 1 , … , n } {\displaystyle i\in \{1,\ldots ,n\}} , the space of linear equations of the code contains elements of the form x i = f ( x i 1 , … , x i r ) {\displaystyle x_{i}=f(x_{i_{1}},\ldots ,x_{i_{r}})} , where i j ≠ i {\displaystyle i_{j}\neq i} . == Optimal locally recoverable codes == Theorem Let n = ( r + 1 ) s {\displaystyle n=(r+1)s} and let C {\displaystyle C} be an [ n , k , d ] q {\displaystyle [n,k,d]_{q}} -locally recoverable code having s {\displaystyle s} disjoint locality sets of size r + 1 {\displaystyle r+1} . Then An [ n , k , d , r ] q {\displaystyle [n,k,d,r]_{q}} -LRC C {\displaystyle C} is said to be optimal if the minimum distance of C {\displaystyle C} satisfies == Tamo–Barg codes == Let f ∈ F q [ x ] {\displaystyle f\in \mathbb {F} _{q}[x]} be a polynomial and let ℓ {\displaystyle \ell } be a positive integer. Then f {\displaystyle f} is said to be ( r {\displaystyle r} , ℓ {\displaystyle \ell } )-good if • f {\displaystyle f} has degree r + 1 {\displaystyle r+1} , • there exist distinct subsets A 1 , … , A ℓ {\displaystyle A_{1},\ldots ,A_{\ell }} of F q {\displaystyle \mathbb {F} _{q}} such that – for any i ∈ { 1 , … , ℓ } {\displaystyle i\in \{1,\ldots ,\ell \}} , f ( A i ) = { t i } {\displaystyle f(A_{i})=\{t_{i}\}} for some t i ∈ F q {\displaystyle t_{i}\in \mathbb {F} _{q}} , i.e., f {\displaystyle f} is constant on A i {\displaystyle A_{i}} , – # A i = r + 1 {\displaystyle \#A_{i}=r+1} , – A i ∩ A j = ∅ {\displaystyle A_{i}\cap A_{j}=\varnothing } for any i ≠ j {\displaystyle i\neq j} . We say that { A 1 , … , A ℓ {\displaystyle A_{1},\ldots ,A_{\ell }} } is a splitting covering for f {\displaystyle f} . === Tamo–Barg construction === The Tamo–Barg construction utilizes good polynomials. • Suppose that a ( r , ℓ ) {\displaystyle (r,\ell )} -good polynomial f ( x ) {\displaystyle f(x)} over F q {\displaystyle \mathbb {F} _{q}} is given with splitting covering i ∈ { 1 , … , ℓ } {\displaystyle i\in \{1,\ldots ,\ell \}} . • Let s ≤ ℓ − 1 {\displaystyle s\leq \ell -1} be a positive integer. • Consider the following F q {\displaystyle \mathbb {F} _{q}} -vector space of polynomials V = { ∑ i = 0 s g i ( x ) f ( x ) i : deg ( g i ( x ) ) ≤ deg ( f ( x ) ) − 2 } . {\displaystyle V=\left\{\sum _{i=0}^{s}g_{i}(x)f(x)^{i}:\deg(g_{i}(x))\leq \deg(f(x))-2\right\}.} • Let T = ⋃ i = 1 ℓ A i {\textstyle T=\bigcup _{i=1}^{\ell }A_{i}} . • The code { ev T ( g ) : g ∈ V } {\displaystyle \{\operatorname {ev} _{T}(g):g\in V\}} is an ( ( r + 1 ) ℓ , ( s + 1 ) r , d , r ) {\displaystyle ((r+1)\ell ,(s+1)r,d,r)} -optimal locally coverable code, where ev T {\displaystyle \operatorname {ev} _{T}} denotes evaluation of g {\displaystyle g} at all points in the set T {\displaystyle T} . === Parameters of Tamo–Barg codes === • Length. The length is the number of evaluation points. Because the sets A i {\displaystyle A_{i}} are disjoint for i ∈ { 1 , … , ℓ } {\displaystyle i\in \{1,\ldots ,\ell \}} , the length of the code is | T | = ( r + 1 ) ℓ {\displaystyle |T|=(r+1)\ell } . • Dimension. The dimension of the code is ( s + 1 ) r {\displaystyle (s+1)r} , for s {\displaystyle s} ≤ ℓ − 1 {\displaystyle \ell -1} , as each g i {\displaystyle g_{i}} has degree at most deg ( f ( x ) ) − 2 {\displaystyle \deg(f(x))-2} , covering a vector space of dimension deg ( f ( x ) ) − 1 = r {\displaystyle \deg(f(x))-1=r} , and by the construction of V {\displaystyle V} , there are s + 1 {\displaystyle s+1} distinct g i {\displaystyle g_{i}} . • Distance. The distance is given by the fact that V ⊆ F q [ x ] ≤ k {\displaystyle V\subseteq \mathbb {F} _{q}[x]_{\leq k}} , where k = r + 1 − 2 + s ( r + 1 ) {\displaystyle k=r+1-2+s(r+1)} , and the obtained code is the Reed-Solomon code of degree at most k {\displaystyle k} , so the minimum distance equals ( r + 1 ) ℓ − ( ( r + 1 ) − 2 + s ( r + 1 ) ) {\displaystyle (r+1)\ell -((r+1)-2+s(r+1))} . • Locality. After the erasure of the single component, the evaluation at a i ∈ A i {\displaystyle a_{i}\in A_{i}} , where | A i | = r + 1 {\displaystyle |A_{i}|=r+1} , is unknown, but the evaluations for all other a ∈ A i {\displaystyle a\in A_{i}} are known, so at most r {\displaystyle r} evaluations are needed to uniquely determine the erased component, which gives us the locality of r {\displaystyle r} . To see this, g {\displaystyle g} restricted to A j {\displaystyle A_{j}} can be described by a polynomial h {\displaystyle h} of degree at most deg ( f ( x ) ) − 2 = r + 1 − 2 = r − 1 {\displaystyle \deg(f(x))-2=r+1-2=r-1} thanks to the form of the elements in V {\displaystyle V} (i.e., thanks to the fact that f {\displaystyle f} is constant on A j {\displaystyle A_{j}} , and the g i {\displaystyle g_{i}} 's have degree at most deg ( f ( x ) ) − 2 {\displaystyle \deg(f(x))-2} ). On the other hand | A j ∖ { a j } | = r {\displaystyle |A_{j}\backslash \{a_{j}\}|=r} , and r {\displaystyle r} evaluations uniquely determine a polynomial of degree r − 1 {\displaystyle r-1} . Therefore h {\displaystyle h} can be constructed and evaluated at a j {\displaystyle a_{j}} to recover g ( a j ) {\displaystyle g(a_{j})} . === Example of Tamo–Barg construction === We will use x 5 ∈ F 41 [ x ] {\displaystyle x^{5}\in \mathbb {F} _{41}[x]} to construct [ 15 , 8 , 6 , 4 ] {\displaystyle [15,8,6,4]} -LRC. Notice that the degree of this polynomial is 5, and it is constant on A i {\displaystyle A_{i}} for i ∈ { 1 , … , 8 } {\displaystyle i\in \{1,\ldots ,8\}} , where A 1 = { 1 , 10 , 16 , 18 , 37 } {\displaystyle A_{1}=\{1,10,16,18,37\}} , A 2 = 2 A 1 {\displaystyle A_{2}=2A_{1}} , A 3 = 3 A 1 {\displaystyle A_{3}=3A_{1}} , A 4 = 4 A 1 {\displaystyle A_{4}=4A_{1}} , A 5 = 5 A 1 {\displaystyle A_{5}=5A_{1}} , A 6 = 6 A 1 {\displaystyle A_{6}=6A_{1}}
Stegomalware
Stegomalware is a form of malicious software that leverages steganography techniques to conceal its code, configuration data, or command-and-control (C&C) communications within seemingly benign digital media such as images, audio files, videos, documents, or network traffic. It typically embeds encrypted or obfuscated payloads into digital media and only extracts and executes them at runtime, which makes traditional signature-based and sandbox-based detection significantly more difficult. Stegomalware has been observed in attacks ranging from advanced persistent threats (APTs) to financially motivated cybercrime, and is now the subject of dedicated academic surveys, research projects, and international law-enforcement initiatives. The key distinction between stegomalware and traditional obfuscated malware lies in the encoding location. After obfuscation, malicious code remains present within the executable and can theoretically be discovered through static analysis. In contrast, stegomalware hides the payload entirely within a cover medium (image, audio, etc.), remaining invisible until the malware dynamically extracts and executes it at runtime. == History == The term stegomalware was formally introduced by researchers Águila, Laskov, and others in the context of mobile malware and presented at the Inscrypt (Information Security and Cryptology) conference in 2014. This marked the first academic formalization of the concept, though earlier work had already identified that botnets and mobile malware could use steganography and covert channels for command-and-control communication over probabilistically unobservable channels. Since its introduction, stegomalware has evolved from a theoretical concern to a documented threat. In 2011, the APT operation known as "Operation Shady RAT" became one of the first documented cases of stegomalware in the wild, using digital images to hide Internet Protocol addresses and command-and-control server addresses. The same year, the Duqu malware (targeting industrial manufacturers) embedded victim data into JPEG image files before exfiltration, making the data transfer virtually undetectable to network-level security tools. From 2014 onwards, stegomalware became more prevalent in organized cybercrime and advanced persistent threat campaigns. Notable examples include Zeus/Zbot, which masked configuration data in images; Gatak/Stegoloader, which hid shellcode in PNG files; TeslaCrypt, which embedded C&C commands in JPEGs; and Cerber, which concealed ransomware payloads within images. By the 2010s, stegomalware had become established as a preferred evasion technique for espionage, financial theft, and ransomware distribution campaigns. Recent surveys (2020–2025) document that stegomalware has increasingly been exploited by adversaries targeting banks, enterprises, government agencies, educational institutions, and internet users via malvertising campaigns. The technique is now considered a sophisticated method of attack worthy of dedicated international law-enforcement attention. == Technical Characteristics and Definitions == Stegomalware operates through a three-component architecture: Stegotext (R): An innocent-looking digital asset (image, audio file, etc.) into which the malicious payload is embedded. Secret key (sk): A key used by the embedding and extraction algorithms, typically hardcoded into the malware. Payload (p): The actual malicious code, configuration data, or C&C commands hidden within the stegotext. The malware extracts the payload at runtime using the secret key and either executes it directly or uses it to download additional stages of the attack. Stegomalware can be classified into several types based on deployment method: Type 0 (Autonomous): Both the stegotext and extraction algorithm are embedded within the malware application itself. The malicious payload is extracted and executed locally without external communication. Type I (Update): The stegotext and secret key are downloaded from a remote server at runtime; only the extraction algorithm is included in the malware. This variant is more flexible, allowing attackers to push updated payloads. Type II (External Algorithm): Neither the stegotext nor the extraction algorithm are distributed with the malware; both are fetched from an attacker-controlled infrastructure, providing maximum flexibility and evasion. == Steganography techniques == === Spatial domain methods === Stegomalware predominantly uses steganographic methods designed for images, as images are the most common cover medium in the wild. The most basic spatial domain technique is Least Significant Bit (LSB) substitution, which replaces the least significant bits of pixel color values with payload bits. While simple and easy to implement, LSB is also relatively easy to detect through statistical analysis. More sophisticated spatial domain techniques include: HUGO (High Undetectable steGO) (2010): Minimizes detectable distortion by distributing the payload across multiple pixels, achieving embedding capacity with reduced statistical footprint. WOW (Wavelet Obtained Weights) (2012): Embeds data preferentially in textured regions of images where modifications are less perceptually noticeable. UNIWARD (Universal Wavelet Relative Distortion) (2014): Uses a universal distortion function applicable to multiple image formats, balancing payload capacity with undetectability. HILL (2014): Applies high-pass and low-pass filters to identify robust embedding regions. MiPOD (Minimizing the Power of Optimal Detector) (2016): Designed to minimize the power of theoretical optimal steganalysis detectors. === Transform domain methods === Transform domain techniques convert images into the frequency domain (e.g., using DCT or DWT) before embedding, allowing for more robust hiding in JPEG and other compressed formats: Embedding in DCT coefficients (used in JPEG compression) Embedding in DWT coefficients (used in lossless formats) Spread spectrum techniques, which distribute the payload across many frequency components Transform domain methods are generally more resistant to noise, compression, and image transformations than spatial methods. === Generative adversarial network (GAN) methods === Recent advances in machine learning have introduced GAN-based steganography, where a generative model produces stego images that minimize detectable artifacts: SGAN (Steganographic GAN) (2017): First GAN applied to steganography, using a generator, discriminator, and steganalysis network. ASDL-GAN (2017): Performs automatic steganographic distortion learning at the pixel level. SteganoGAN (2019): Improves upon earlier GAN models, achieving higher embedding capacity and robustness. HiGAN (Hiding Images GAN) (2020): Enables hiding one image within another while maintaining visual plausibility. GAN-based approaches are more resilient to standard steganalysis attacks but remain an emerging threat requiring further research. == Notable malware campaigns == Stegomalware has been documented in numerous high-profile cyber attacks and campaigns. Notable examples include: Operation Shady RAT (2011): Used digital images to hide command-and-control server addresses in targeted espionage. Duqu (2011): Embedded victim data into JPEG files to exfiltrate industrial control system information. Zeus/Zbot (2014): Masked banking configuration data inside JPEG files exploited via malvertising. Gatak/Stegoloader (2015): Hid shellcode in PNG files for software licensing attacks and bot command execution. TeslaCrypt (2015): Embedded C&C commands and ransomware keys in JPEG images. Cerber (2016): Concealed executable ransomware code in JPEG files distributed via phishing. DNSChanger (2016): Embedded malicious code in PNG files for DNS hijacking campaigns. Sundown Exploit Kit (2017): Distributed exploit code in PNG files via malvertising. AdGholas (2017): Used JPEG steganography to distribute ransomware via malvertising. Synccrypt (2017): Hidden ransomware components in JPEG-steganographic encrypted archives. ZeroT/PlugX (2017): Hid Remote Access Trojan payloads in BMP files for espionage. Loki Bot (2018): Concealed malware installers in JPEG and video files. Waterbug (APT28) (2019): Injected malicious DLLs into WAV audio files. Shlayer (macOS adware) (2019): Hid malicious URLs in JPEG files via malvertising. === Attack vectors === The most common attack vectors for stegomalware include: Phishing emails with malicious attachments or links Malvertising campaigns using malicious banner advertisements Exploit kits through compromised or malicious websites Legitimate application vulnerabilities (e.g., watering-hole attacks) Fake software distribution (cracked software, keygen tools) === Exploitation stages === Stegomalware typically serves one or more roles in attack lifecycles: Payload delivery: Stego images contain full executable code or shellcode. C&C communication: Hidden data contains server addresses or command instructio
Social software engineering
Social software engineering (SSE) is a branch of software engineering that is concerned with the social aspects of software development and the developed software. SSE focuses on the socialness of both software engineering and developed software. On the one hand, the consideration of social factors in software engineering activities, processes and CASE tools is deemed to be useful to improve the quality of both development process and produced software. Examples include the role of situational awareness and multi-cultural factors in collaborative software development. On the other hand, the dynamicity of the social contexts in which software could operate (e.g., in a cloud environment) calls for engineering social adaptability as a runtime iterative activity. Examples include approaches which enable software to gather users' quality feedback and use it to adapt autonomously or semi-autonomously. SSE studies and builds socially-oriented tools to support collaboration and knowledge sharing in software engineering. SSE also investigates the adaptability of software to the dynamic social contexts in which it could operate and the involvement of clients and end-users in shaping software adaptation decisions at runtime. Social context includes norms, culture, roles and responsibilities, stakeholder's goals and interdependencies, end-users perception of the quality and appropriateness of each software behaviour, etc. The participants of the 1st International Workshop on Social Software Engineering and Applications (SoSEA 2008) proposed the following characterization: Community-centered: Software is produced and consumed by and/or for a community rather than focusing on individuals Collaboration/collectiveness: Exploiting the collaborative and collective capacity of human beings Companionship/relationship: Making explicit the various associations among people Human/social activities: Software is designed consciously to support human activities and to address social problems Social inclusion: Software should enable social inclusion enforcing links and trust in communities Thus, SSE can be defined as "the application of processes, methods, and tools to enable community-driven creation, management, deployment, and use of software in online environments". One of the main observations in the field of SSE is that the concepts, principles, and technologies made for social software applications are applicable to software development itself as software engineering is inherently a social activity. SSE is not limited to specific activities of software development. Accordingly, tools have been proposed supporting different parts of SSE, for instance, social system design or social requirements engineering. Consequently vertical market software, such as software development tools, engineering tools, marketing tools or software that helps users in a decision-making process can profit from social components. Such vertical social software differentiates strongly in its user-base from traditional social software such as Yammer.
Atomicity (database systems)
In database systems, atomicity (; from Ancient Greek: ἄτομος, romanized: átomos, lit. 'undividable') is the property of a database transaction consisting of an indivisible and irreducible series of database operations such that either all occur, or none occur. It is one of the ACID transaction properties: Atomicity, Consistency, Isolation, Durability. A guarantee of atomicity prevents partial database updates from occurring, because they can cause greater problems than rejecting the whole series outright. As a consequence, an atomic transaction cannot be observed to be in progress by another database client: at one moment in time, it has not yet happened, and at the next it has already occurred in whole (or nothing happened if the transaction was cancelled in progress). An example of transaction atomicity could be a digital monetary transfer from bank account A to account B. It consists of two operations, debiting the money from account A and crediting it to account B. Performing both of these operations inside of an atomic transaction ensures that the database remains in a consistent state, if either operation fails there will not be any unaccountable credits or debits affecting either account. The same term is also used in the definition of First normal form in database systems, where it instead refers to the concept that the values for fields may not consist of multiple smaller values to be decomposed, such as a string into which multiple names, numbers, dates, or other types may be packed. == Orthogonality == Atomicity does not behave completely orthogonally with regard to the other ACID properties of transactions. For example, isolation relies on atomicity to roll back the enclosing transaction in the event of an isolation violation such as a deadlock; consistency also relies on atomicity to roll back the enclosing transaction in the event of a consistency violation by an illegal transaction. As a result of this, a failure to detect a violation and roll back the enclosing transaction may cause an isolation or consistency failure. == Implementation == Typically, systems implement Atomicity by providing some mechanism to indicate which transactions have started and which finished; or by keeping a copy of the data before any changes occurred (Read-copy-update). Several filesystems have developed methods for avoiding the need to keep multiple copies of data, using journaling (see journaling file system). Databases usually implement this using some form of logging/journaling to track changes. The system synchronizes the logs (often the metadata) as necessary after changes have successfully taken place. Afterwards, crash recovery ignores incomplete entries. Although implementations vary depending on factors such as concurrency issues, the principle of atomicity – i.e. complete success or complete failure – remain. Ultimately, any application-level implementation relies on operating-system functionality. At the file-system level, POSIX-compliant systems provide system calls such as open(2) and flock(2) that allow applications to atomically open or lock a file. At the process level, POSIX Threads provide adequate synchronization primitives. The hardware level requires atomic operations such as Test-and-set, Fetch-and-add, Compare-and-swap, or Load-Link/Store-Conditional, together with memory barriers. Portable operating systems cannot simply block interrupts to implement synchronization, since hardware that lacks concurrent execution such as hyper-threading or multi-processing is now extremely rare. In distributed and sharded databases, atomicity is complicated by network latency and the potential for partial failures. While traditional distributed systems often employ locking protocols (like 2PC) to ensure cross-shard atomicity, these can introduce performance bottlenecks. Recent research into distributed ledger consensus suggests alternative models, such as "braided synchronization". This technique, utilized in protocols like Cerberus, intertwines the consensus phases of multiple shards to enforce atomic guarantees without a global ordering of all transactions.