Weak artificial intelligence (weak AI) is artificial intelligence that implements a limited part of the mind, or, as narrow AI, artificial narrow intelligence (ANI), is focused on one narrow task. Weak AI is contrasted with strong AI, which can be interpreted in various ways: Artificial general intelligence (AGI): a machine with the ability to apply intelligence to any problem, rather than just one specific problem. Artificial superintelligence (ASI): a machine with a vastly superior intelligence to the average human being. Artificial consciousness: a machine that has consciousness, sentience and mind (John Searle uses "strong AI" in this sense). Narrow AI can be classified as being "limited to a single, narrowly defined task. Most modern AI systems would be classified in this category." Artificial general intelligence is conversely the opposite. == Applications and risks == Some examples of narrow AI are AlphaGo, self-driving cars, robot systems used in the medical field, and diagnostic doctors. Narrow AI systems are sometimes dangerous if unreliable. And the behavior that it follows can become inconsistent. It could be difficult for the AI to grasp complex patterns and get to a solution that works reliably in various environments. This "brittleness" can cause it to fail in unpredictable ways. Narrow AI failures can sometimes have significant consequences. It could for example cause disruptions in the electric grid, damage nuclear power plants, cause global economic problems, and misdirect autonomous vehicles. Medicines could be incorrectly sorted and distributed. Also, medical diagnoses can ultimately have serious and sometimes deadly consequences if the AI is faulty or biased. Simple AI programs have already worked their way into society, oftentimes unnoticed by the public. Autocorrection for typing, speech recognition for speech-to-text programs, and vast expansions in the data science fields are examples. Narrow AI has also been the subject of some controversy, including resulting in unfair prison sentences, discrimination against women in the workplace for hiring, resulting in death via autonomous driving, among other cases. Despite being "narrow" AI, recommender systems are efficient at predicting user reactions based on their posts, patterns, or trends. For instance, TikTok's "For You" algorithm can determine a user's interests or preferences in less than an hour. Some other social media AI systems are used to detect bots that may be involved in propaganda or other potentially malicious activities. == Weak AI versus strong AI == John Searle contests the possibility of strong AI (by which he means conscious AI). He further believes that the Turing test (created by Alan Turing and originally called the "imitation game", used to assess whether a machine can converse indistinguishably from a human) is not accurate or appropriate for testing whether an AI is "strong". Scholars such as Antonio Lieto have argued that the current research on both AI and cognitive modelling are perfectly aligned with the weak-AI hypothesis (that should not be confused with the "general" vs "narrow" AI distinction) and that the popular assumption that cognitively inspired AI systems espouse the strong AI hypothesis is ill-posed and problematic since "artificial models of brain and mind can be used to understand mental phenomena without pretending that that they are the real phenomena that they are modelling" (as, on the other hand, implied by the strong AI assumption).
Empirical risk minimization
In statistical learning theory, the principle of empirical risk minimization defines a family of learning algorithms based on evaluating performance over a known and fixed dataset. The core idea is based on an application of the law of large numbers; more specifically, we cannot know exactly how well a predictive algorithm will work in practice (i.e. the "true risk") because we do not know the true distribution of the data, but we can instead estimate and optimize the performance of the algorithm on a known set of training data. The performance over the known set of training data is referred to as the "empirical risk". == Background == The following situation is a general setting of many supervised learning problems. There are two spaces of objects X {\displaystyle X} and Y {\displaystyle Y} and we would like to learn a function h : X → Y {\displaystyle \ h:X\to Y} (often called hypothesis) which outputs an object y ∈ Y {\displaystyle y\in Y} , given x ∈ X {\displaystyle x\in X} . To do so, there is a training set of n {\displaystyle n} examples ( x 1 , y 1 ) , … , ( x n , y n ) {\displaystyle \ (x_{1},y_{1}),\ldots ,(x_{n},y_{n})} where x i ∈ X {\displaystyle x_{i}\in X} is an input and y i ∈ Y {\displaystyle y_{i}\in Y} is the corresponding response that is desired from h ( x i ) {\displaystyle h(x_{i})} . To put it more formally, assuming that there is a joint probability distribution P ( x , y ) {\displaystyle P(x,y)} over X {\displaystyle X} and Y {\displaystyle Y} , and that the training set consists of n {\displaystyle n} instances ( x 1 , y 1 ) , … , ( x n , y n ) {\displaystyle \ (x_{1},y_{1}),\ldots ,(x_{n},y_{n})} drawn i.i.d. from P ( x , y ) {\displaystyle P(x,y)} . The assumption of a joint probability distribution allows for the modelling of uncertainty in predictions (e.g. from noise in data) because y {\displaystyle y} is not a deterministic function of x {\displaystyle x} , but rather a random variable with conditional distribution P ( y | x ) {\displaystyle P(y|x)} for a fixed x {\displaystyle x} . It is also assumed that there is a non-negative real-valued loss function L ( y ^ , y ) {\displaystyle L({\hat {y}},y)} which measures how different the prediction y ^ {\displaystyle {\hat {y}}} of a hypothesis is from the true outcome y {\displaystyle y} . For classification tasks, these loss functions can be scoring rules. The risk associated with hypothesis h ( x ) {\displaystyle h(x)} is then defined as the expectation of the loss function: R ( h ) = E [ L ( h ( x ) , y ) ] = ∫ L ( h ( x ) , y ) d P ( x , y ) . {\displaystyle R(h)=\mathbf {E} [L(h(x),y)]=\int L(h(x),y)\,dP(x,y).} A loss function commonly used in theory is the 0-1 loss function: L ( y ^ , y ) = { 1 if y ^ ≠ y 0 if y ^ = y {\displaystyle L({\hat {y}},y)={\begin{cases}1&{\mbox{ if }}\quad {\hat {y}}\neq y\\0&{\mbox{ if }}\quad {\hat {y}}=y\end{cases}}} . The ultimate goal of a learning algorithm is to find a hypothesis h ∗ {\displaystyle h^{}} among a fixed class of functions H {\displaystyle {\mathcal {H}}} for which the risk R ( h ) {\displaystyle R(h)} is minimal: h ∗ = a r g m i n h ∈ H R ( h ) . {\displaystyle h^{}={\underset {h\in {\mathcal {H}}}{\operatorname {arg\,min} }}\,{R(h)}.} For classification problems, the Bayes classifier is defined to be the classifier minimizing the risk defined with the 0–1 loss function. == Formal definition == In general, the risk R ( h ) {\displaystyle R(h)} cannot be computed because the distribution P ( x , y ) {\displaystyle P(x,y)} is unknown to the learning algorithm. However, given a sample of iid training data points, we can compute an estimate, called the empirical risk, by computing the average of the loss function over the training set; more formally, computing the expectation with respect to the empirical measure: R emp ( h ) = 1 n ∑ i = 1 n L ( h ( x i ) , y i ) . {\displaystyle \!R_{\text{emp}}(h)={\frac {1}{n}}\sum _{i=1}^{n}L(h(x_{i}),y_{i}).} The empirical risk minimization principle states that the learning algorithm should choose a hypothesis h ^ {\displaystyle {\hat {h}}} which minimizes the empirical risk over the hypothesis class H {\displaystyle {\mathcal {H}}} : h ^ = a r g m i n h ∈ H R emp ( h ) . {\displaystyle {\hat {h}}={\underset {h\in {\mathcal {H}}}{\operatorname {arg\,min} }}\,R_{\text{emp}}(h).} Thus, the learning algorithm defined by the empirical risk minimization principle consists in solving the above optimization problem. == Properties == Guarantees for the performance of empirical risk minimization depend strongly on the function class selected as well as the distributional assumptions made. In general, distribution-free methods are too coarse, and do not lead to practical bounds. However, they are still useful in deriving asymptotic properties of learning algorithms, such as consistency. In particular, distribution-free bounds on the performance of empirical risk minimization given a fixed function class can be derived using bounds on the VC complexity of the function class. For simplicity, considering the case of binary classification tasks, it is possible to bound the probability of the selected classifier, ϕ n {\displaystyle \phi _{n}} being much worse than the best possible classifier ϕ ∗ {\displaystyle \phi ^{}} . Consider the risk L {\displaystyle L} defined over the hypothesis class C {\displaystyle {\mathcal {C}}} with growth function S ( C , n ) {\displaystyle {\mathcal {S}}({\mathcal {C}},n)} given a dataset of size n {\displaystyle n} . Then, for every ϵ > 0 {\displaystyle \epsilon >0} : P ( L ( ϕ n ) − L ( ϕ ∗ ) > ϵ ) ≤ 8 S ( C , n ) exp { − n ϵ 2 / 32 } {\displaystyle \mathbb {P} \left(L(\phi _{n})-L(\phi ^{})>\epsilon \right)\leq {\mathcal {8}}S({\mathcal {C}},n)\exp\{-n\epsilon ^{2}/32\}} Similar results hold for regression tasks. These results are often based on uniform laws of large numbers, which control the deviation of the empirical risk from the true risk, uniformly over the hypothesis class. === Impossibility results === It is also possible to show lower bounds on algorithm performance if no distributional assumptions are made. This is sometimes referred to as the No free lunch theorem. Even though a specific learning algorithm may provide the asymptotically optimal performance for any distribution, the finite sample performance is always poor for at least one data distribution. This means that no classifier can improve on the error for a given sample size for all distributions. Specifically, let ϵ > 0 {\displaystyle \epsilon >0} and consider a sample size n {\displaystyle n} and classification rule ϕ n {\displaystyle \phi _{n}} , there exists a distribution of ( X , Y ) {\displaystyle (X,Y)} with risk L ∗ = 0 {\displaystyle L^{}=0} (meaning that perfect prediction is possible) such that: E L n ≥ 1 / 2 − ϵ . {\displaystyle \mathbb {E} L_{n}\geq 1/2-\epsilon .} It is further possible to show that the convergence rate of a learning algorithm is poor for some distributions. Specifically, given a sequence of decreasing positive numbers a i {\displaystyle a_{i}} converging to zero, it is possible to find a distribution such that: E L n ≥ a i {\displaystyle \mathbb {E} L_{n}\geq a_{i}} for all n {\displaystyle n} . This result shows that universally good classification rules do not exist, in the sense that the rule must be low quality for at least one distribution. === Computational complexity === Empirical risk minimization for a classification problem with a 0-1 loss function is known to be an NP-hard problem even for a relatively simple class of functions such as linear classifiers. Nevertheless, it can be solved efficiently when the minimal empirical risk is zero, i.e., data is linearly separable. In practice, machine learning algorithms cope with this issue either by employing a convex approximation to the 0–1 loss function (like hinge loss for SVM), which is easier to optimize, or by imposing assumptions on the distribution P ( x , y ) {\displaystyle P(x,y)} (and thus stop being agnostic learning algorithms to which the above result applies). In the case of convexification, Zhang's lemma majors the excess risk of the original problem using the excess risk of the convexified problem. Minimizing the latter using convex optimization also allow to control the former. == Tilted empirical risk minimization == Tilted empirical risk minimization is a machine learning technique used to modify standard loss functions like squared error, by introducing a tilt parameter. This parameter dynamically adjusts the weight of data points during training, allowing the algorithm to focus on specific regions or characteristics of the data distribution. Tilted empirical risk minimization is particularly useful in scenarios with imbalanced data or when there is a need to emphasize errors in certain parts of the prediction space.
Intelligent automation
Intelligent automation (IA), or intelligent process automation, is a software term that refers to a combination of artificial intelligence (AI) and robotic process automation (RPA). Companies use intelligent automation to cut costs and streamline tasks by using artificial-intelligence-powered robotic software to mitigate repetitive tasks. As it accumulates data, the system learns in an effort to improve its efficiency. Intelligent automation applications consist of, but are not limited to, pattern analysis, data assembly, and classification. The term is similar to hyperautomation, a concept identified by research group Gartner as being one of the top technology trends of 2020. == Technology == Intelligent automation applies the assembly line concept of breaking tasks into repetitive steps to improve business processes. Rather than having humans perform each step, intelligent automation can replace steps with an intelligent software robot, improving efficiency. Intelligent automation integrates robotic process automation (RPA) with artificial intelligence techniques (such as machine learning, natural-language processing, and computer vision) enabling systems to interpret data, make decisions, and adapt to changing inputs. Modern platforms use a layered architecture combining workflow orchestration, low-code tools, integration middleware, and AI services to coordinate bots and data pipelines across organisational systems. == Applications == Intelligent automation is used to process unstructured content. Common real-world applications include self-driving cars, self-checkouts at grocery stores, smart home assistants, and appliances. Businesses can apply data and machine learning to build predictive analytics that react to consumer behavior changes, or to implement RPA to improve manufacturing floor operations. For example, the technology has also been used to automate the workflow behind distributing COVID-19 vaccines. Data provided by hospital systems’ electronic health records can be processed to identify and educate patients, and schedule vaccinations. Intelligent automation can provide real-time insights on profitability and efficiency. However, in an April 2022 survey by Alchemmy, despite three quarters of businesses acknowledging the importance of Artificial Intelligence to their future development, just a quarter of business leaders (25%) considered Intelligent Automation a “game changer” in understanding current performance. 42% of CTOs see “shortage of talent” as the main obstacle to implementing Intelligent Automation in their business, while 36% of CEOs see ‘upskilling and professional development of existing workforce’ as the most significant adoption barrier. IA is becoming increasingly accessible for firms of all sizes. With this in mind, it is expected to continue to grow rapidly in all industries. This technology has the potential to change the workforce. As it advances, it will be able to perform increasingly complex and difficult tasks. In addition, this may expose certain workforce issues as well as change how tasks are allocated. Tools such as Semrush's AI Visibility Toolkit and Enterprise AIO reflect these developments by analysing how entities are referenced and represented within responses produced by large-language-model-based systems. == Benefits == Streamline processes: Repetitive manual tasks can put a strain on the workforce. However, with AI agents, these tasks can be automated to allow teams to focus on more important matters that require human cognition. Intelligent automation can also be used to mitigate tasks with human error which in turn increases proficiency. This allows the opportunity for firms to scale production without the traditional negative consequences such as reduced quality or increased risk. Customer service improvement: Customer service can be significantly improved, providing the firm with a competitive advantage. IA utilizing chat features allows for instant curated responses to customers. In addition, it can give updates to customers, make appointments, manage calls, and personalize campaigns. Flexibility: Due to the wide range of applications, IA is useful across a variety of fields, technologies, projects and industries. In addition, IA can be integrated with current automated systems in place. This allows for optimized systems unique to each firm to best fit their individual needs. == Capabilities == Cognitive automation: Employs AI techniques to assist humans in decision-making and task completion Natural language processing: Allows computers to automate knowledge work Business process management: Enhances the consistency and agility of corporate operations Process mining: Applies data mining methods to discover, analyze, and improve business processes Intelligent document processing: Utilizes OCR and other advanced technologies to extract data from documents and convert it into structured, usable data Computer vision: Allows computers to extract information from digital images, videos, and other visual inputs Integration automation: Establishes a unified platform with automated workflows that integrate data, applications, and devices.
Environmental impact of AI
The environmental impact of the design, training, deployment and use of artificial intelligence includes the greenhouse gas emissions from generating electricity for data centres and computing hardware, operational and upstream water use, and material impacts from hardware manufacturing, mining and electronic waste. Estimating AI's environmental effects can be difficult because results depend on how impacts are measured, including whether accounting includes only model computation or also data-centre overhead, idle capacity, hardware manufacture, and local electricity supply. As these issues have received greater attention, governments and regulators have increasingly considered data-centre reporting requirements, energy-efficiency standards, and broader transparency measures for AI-related resource use. == Carbon footprint and energy use == AI-related energy use arises at multiple stages, including model training, fine-tuning, inference, storage, networking, and supporting infrastructure such as cooling and power conversion. === Individual level === Published estimates of energy use per AI request vary widely across models, tasks and measurement methods. A benchmark study presented at the 2024 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency found substantial differences between task types, with lower energy use for some text tasks and much higher energy use for image generation in the study's test conditions. In that benchmark, simple classification tasks consumed about 0.002–0.007 Wh per prompt on average (about 9% of a smartphone charge for 1,000 prompts), while text generation and text summarisation each used about 0.05 Wh per prompt; image generation averaged 2.91 Wh per prompt, and the least efficient image model in the study used 11.49 Wh per image (roughly equivalent to half a smartphone charge). First-party measurements in production environments have also been published. A 2025 Google study on Gemini assistant serving reported median per-prompt energy, emissions, and water-use estimates under the authors' accounting framework, while noting that different system boundaries can produce substantially different results. The study reported a median text-prompt estimate of about 0.24 Wh, which is roughly as much energy as watching nine seconds of television. The study also stated that software and infrastructure improvements reduced energy use by a factor of 33 and carbon emissions by a factor of 44 for a typical prompt over one year within the authors' framework. Researchers at the University of Michigan measured the energy consumption of various Meta Llama 3.1 models released in 2024 and found that smaller language models (8 billion parameters) use about 114 joules (0.03167 Wh) per response, while larger models (405 billion parameters) require up to 6,700 joules (1.861 Wh) per response. This corresponds to the energy needed to run a microwave oven for roughly one-tenth of a second and eight seconds, respectively. Comparisons between AI systems and human labour for specific tasks have produced mixed results and remain sensitive to assumptions about output quality, workload and system boundaries. A 2024 study in Scientific Reports reported 130 to 2900 times lower estimated carbon emissions for selected AI systems than for human writers and illustrators under its assumptions. A later Scientific Reports paper reported a counterexample for programming tasks under its assumptions, finding 5 to 19 times higher estimated emissions for the evaluated AI system than for human programmers on the benchmark used in that study. === System level === ==== Energy use and efficiency ==== AI electricity intensity depends not only on model architecture but also on hardware and facility efficiency. Data-centre operators commonly report Power usage effectiveness (PUE), which measures the ratio of total facility energy to IT equipment energy; a lower PUE indicates less overhead energy for cooling and other supporting infrastructure. Operators may also publish metrics and case studies on hardware efficiency, cooling systems and power sourcing. In its 2024 environmental report, Google stated that its 2023 total greenhouse gas emissions increased 13% year over year, primarily because of increased data-centre energy consumption and supply-chain emissions, while also reporting lower PUE than industry averages for its own facilities. The International Energy Agency has also reported that data centres remain a relatively small share of global electricity use overall, but that their local effects can be much more pronounced because demand is geographically concentrated. ==== Carbon footprint ==== At system level, AI contributes to rising electricity demand in data centres and related infrastructure. The International Energy Agency estimated that data centres used about 415 TWh of electricity in 2024, or around 1.5% of global electricity consumption, and projected that data-centre electricity use could rise to about 945 TWh by 2030, with AI identified as the main driver of that growth alongside other digital services. The carbon footprint of AI systems depends strongly on electricity sources, hardware efficiency, utilisation rates, and what stages are included in the accounting. Training large models can require substantial electricity, while total lifecycle impacts also depend on deployment scale and the amount of inference performed after training. Early analyses of frontier-model development reported rapid historical growth in training compute for selected systems, although later trends have depended on changes in model design, hardware and efficiency gains. Accounting methods that include upstream or embodied impacts, such as hardware manufacture and facilities construction, can materially affect estimates of AI-related emissions. === Decisions and strategies by individual companies === Large technology companies have reported that the expansion of AI and cloud infrastructure affects their sustainability targets, electricity demand, and resource use. Google, for example, attributed part of its emissions growth in 2023 to increased data-centre energy consumption and supply-chain emissions in its 2024 environmental report. Cloud and AI companies have also announced measures intended to reduce environmental impacts, including investment in more efficient hardware, low-carbon electricity procurement, alternative cooling systems, and water stewardship programmes. The extent, comparability, and third-party verification of such disclosures vary between firms and jurisdictions. == Water usage == Data centres can use water directly for cooling and indirectly through the water used in electricity generation, depending on the local energy mix. Public reporting on data-centre water use has often been inconsistent, making comparisons between operators and regions difficult. To standardise operational reporting, The Green Grid proposed the metric water usage effectiveness (WUE), defined as annual site water use divided by IT equipment energy use. WUE does not by itself measure local water stress, source sustainability, or all upstream water impacts. Studies of AI water use also distinguish between water withdrawal and water consumption. Research on AI-specific water use has argued that the water footprint of AI systems can be difficult to observe and may vary substantially by location, cooling design, and electricity source. A 2025 Communications of the ACM article summarised methods for estimating AI water footprints and emphasised the distinction between water withdrawal and water consumption. Li and colleagues estimated that global AI water withdrawal could reach 4.2–6.6 billion cubic metres in 2027 under the scenarios examined in their article. Using GPT-3, released by OpenAI in 2020, as an example, they estimated that training the model in Microsoft's U.S. data centres could consume about 700,000 litres of onsite water and about 5.4 million litres in total when offsite electricity-related water use was included; they also estimated that 10–50 medium-length GPT-3 responses could consume about 500 mL of water, depending on when and where the model was deployed. Published prompt-level estimates have also varied by system and accounting framework: the 2025 Google study on Gemini assistant serving reported a median text-prompt estimate of about 0.26 mL under its framework. Location can materially affect the significance of data-centre water use. Research on U.S. data centres found that one-fifth of servers' direct water footprint came from moderately to highly water-stressed watersheds, while nearly half of servers were fully or partially powered by plants located in water-stressed regions. A 2025 Reuters report, citing data from Verisk Maplecroft and NatureFinance, said that an average mid-sized data centre uses about 1.4 million litres of water per day for cooling and that Phoenix would experience a 32% increase in annual water stress if currently pl
Double descent
Double descent in statistics and machine learning is the phenomenon where a model's error rate on the test set initially decreases with the number of parameters, then peaks, then decreases again. This phenomenon has been considered surprising, as it contradicts assumptions about overfitting in classical machine learning. The increase usually occurs near the interpolation threshold, where the number of parameters is the same as the number of training data points (the model is just large enough to fit the training data). Or, more precisely, it is the maximum number of samples on which the model/training procedure achieves approximately on average 0 training error. == History == Early observations of what would later be called double descent in specific models date back to 1989. The term "double descent" was coined by Belkin et. al. in 2019, when the phenomenon gained popularity as a broader concept exhibited by many models. The latter development was prompted by a perceived contradiction between the conventional wisdom that too many parameters in the model result in a significant overfitting error (an extrapolation of the bias–variance tradeoff), and the empirical observations in the 2010s that some modern machine learning techniques tend to perform better with larger models. == Theoretical models == Double descent occurs in linear regression with isotropic Gaussian covariates and isotropic Gaussian noise. A model of double descent at the thermodynamic limit has been analyzed using the replica trick, and the result has been confirmed numerically. A number of works have suggested that double descent can be explained using the concept of effective dimension: While a network may have a large number of parameters, in practice only a subset of those parameters are relevant for generalization performance, as measured by the local Hessian curvature. This explanation is formalized through PAC-Bayes compression-based generalization bounds, which show that less complex models are expected to generalize better under a Solomonoff prior.
Best Conversational AI Platforms in 2026
Looking for the best conversational AI platform? An conversational AI platform is software that uses machine learning to help you get more done — it can save you hours every week by automating repetitive work. Most options offer a generous free tier, with paid plans unlocking higher limits, faster processing, and team features. Whether you are a beginner or a pro, the right conversational AI platform slots into your workflow and pays for itself fast. Read on for hands-on impressions, pricing tiers, and the standout features that matter.
Principle of rationality
The principle of rationality (or rationality principle) was coined by Karl R. Popper in his Harvard Lecture of 1963, and published in his book Myth of Framework. It is related to what he called the 'logic of the situation' in an Economica article of 1944/1945, published later in his book The Poverty of Historicism. According to Popper's rationality principle, agents act in the most adequate way according to the objective situation. It is an idealized conception of human behavior which he used to drive his model of situational analysis. Cognitive scientist Allen Newell elaborated on the principle in his account of knowledge level modeling. == Popper == Popper called for social science to be grounded in what he called situational analysis or situational logic. This requires building models of social situations which include individual actors and their relationship to social institutions, e.g. markets, legal codes, bureaucracies, etc. These models attribute certain aims and information to the actors. This forms the 'logic of the situation', the result of reconstructing meticulously all circumstances of an historical event. The 'principle of rationality' is the assumption that people are instrumental in trying to reach their goals, and this is what drives the model. Popper believed that this model could be continuously refined to approach the objective truth. Popper called his principle of rationality nearly empty (a technical term meaning without empirical content) and strictly speaking false, but nonetheless tremendously useful. These remarks earned him a lot of criticism because seemingly he had swerved from his famous Logic of Scientific Discovery. Among the many philosophers having discussed Popper's principle of rationality from the 1960s up to now are Noretta Koertge, R. Nadeau, Viktor J. Vanberg, Hans Albert, E. Matzner, Ian C. Jarvie, Mark A. Notturno, John Wettersten, Ian C. Böhm. == Newell == In the context of knowledge-based systems, Newell (in 1982) proposed the following principle of rationality: "If an agent has knowledge that one of its actions will lead to one of its goals, then the agent will select that action." This principle is employed by agents at the knowledge level to move closer to a desired goal. An important philosophical difference between Newell and Popper is that Newell argued that the knowledge level is real in the sense that it exists in nature and is not made up. This allowed Newell to treat the rationality principle as a way of understanding nature and avoid the problems Popper ran into by treating knowledge as non physical and therefore non empirical.