In artificial intelligence, an intelligent agent is an entity that perceives its environment, takes actions autonomously to achieve goals, and may improve its performance through machine learning or by acquiring knowledge. AI textbooks define artificial intelligence as the "study and design of intelligent agents," emphasizing that goal-directed behavior is central to intelligence. A specialized subset of intelligent agents, agentic AI (also known as an AI agent or simply agent), expands this concept by proactively pursuing goals, making decisions, and taking actions over extended periods. Intelligent agents can range from simple to highly complex. A basic thermostat or control system is considered an intelligent agent, as is a human being, or any other system that meets the same criteria—such as a firm, a state, or a biome. Intelligent agents operate based on an objective function, which encapsulates their goals. They are designed to create and execute plans that maximize the expected value of this function upon completion. For example, a reinforcement learning agent has a reward function, which allows programmers to shape its desired behavior. Similarly, an evolutionary algorithm's behavior is guided by a fitness function. Intelligent agents in artificial intelligence are closely related to agents in economics, and versions of the intelligent agent paradigm are studied in cognitive science, ethics, and the philosophy of practical reason, as well as in many interdisciplinary socio-cognitive modeling and computer social simulations. Intelligent agents are often described schematically as abstract functional systems similar to computer programs . To distinguish theoretical models from real-world implementations, abstract descriptions of intelligent agents are called abstract intelligent agents. Intelligent agents are also closely related to software agents—autonomous computer programs that carry out tasks on behalf of users. They are also referred to using a term borrowed from economics: a "rational agent". == Intelligent agents as the foundation of AI == The concept of intelligent agents provides a foundational lens through which to define and understand artificial intelligence. For instance, the influential textbook Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (Russell & Norvig) describes: Agent: Anything that perceives its environment (using sensors) and acts upon it (using actuators). E.g., a robot with cameras and wheels, or a software program that reads data and makes recommendations. Rational Agent: An agent that strives to achieve the best possible outcome based on its knowledge and past experiences. "Best" is defined by a performance measure – a way of evaluating how well the agent is doing. Artificial Intelligence (as a field): The study and creation of these rational agents. Other researchers and definitions build upon this foundation. Padgham & Winikoff emphasize that intelligent agents should react to changes in their environment in a timely way, proactively pursue goals, and be flexible and robust (able to handle unexpected situations). Some also suggest that ideal agents should be "rational" in the economic sense (making optimal choices) and capable of complex reasoning, like having beliefs, desires, and intentions (BDI model). Kaplan and Haenlein offer a similar definition, focusing on a system's ability to understand external data, learn from that data, and use what is learned to achieve goals through flexible adaptation. Defining AI in terms of intelligent agents offers several key advantages: Avoids Philosophical Debates: It sidesteps arguments about whether AI is "truly" intelligent or conscious, like those raised by the Turing test or Searle's Chinese Room. It focuses on behavior and goal achievement, not on replicating human thought. Objective Testing: It provides a clear, scientific way to evaluate AI systems. Researchers can compare different approaches by measuring how well they maximize a specific "goal function" (or objective function). This allows for direct comparison and combination of techniques. Interdisciplinary Communication: It creates a common language for AI researchers to collaborate with other fields like mathematical optimization and economics, which also use concepts like "goals" and "rational agents." == Objective function == An objective function (or goal function) specifies the goals of an intelligent agent. An agent is deemed more intelligent if it consistently selects actions that yield outcomes better aligned with its objective function. In effect, the objective function serves as a measure of success. The objective function may be: Simple: For example, in a game of Go, the objective function might assign a value of 1 for a win and 0 for a loss. Complex: It might require the agent to evaluate and learn from past actions, adapting its behavior based on patterns that have proven effective. The objective function encapsulates all of the goals the agent is designed to achieve. For rational agents, it also incorporates the trade-offs between potentially conflicting goals. For instance, a self-driving car's objective function might balance factors such as safety, speed, and passenger comfort. Different terms are used to describe this concept, depending on the context. These include: Utility function: Often used in economics and decision theory, representing the desirability of a state. Objective function: A general term used in optimization. Loss function: Typically used in machine learning, where the goal is to minimize the loss (error). Reward Function: Used in reinforcement learning. Fitness Function: Used in evolutionary systems. Goals, and therefore the objective function, can be: Explicitly defined: Programmed directly into the agent. Induced: Learned or evolved over time. In reinforcement learning, a "reward function" provides feedback, encouraging desired behaviors and discouraging undesirable ones. The agent learns to maximize its cumulative reward. In evolutionary systems, a "fitness function" determines which agents are more likely to reproduce. This is analogous to natural selection, where organisms evolve to maximize their chances of survival and reproduction. Some AI systems, such as nearest-neighbor, reason by analogy rather than being explicitly goal-driven. However, even these systems can have goals implicitly defined within their training data. Such systems can still be benchmarked by framing the non-goal system as one whose "goal" is to accomplish its narrow classification task. Systems not traditionally considered agents, like knowledge-representation systems, are sometimes included in the paradigm by framing them as agents with a goal of, for example, answering questions accurately. Here, the concept of an "action" is extended to encompass the "act" of providing an answer. As a further extension, mimicry-driven systems can be framed as agents optimizing a "goal function" based on how closely the agent mimics the desired behavior. In generative adversarial networks (GANs) of the 2010s, an "encoder"/"generator" component attempts to mimic and improvise human text composition. The generator tries to maximize a function representing how well it can fool an antagonistic "predictor"/"discriminator" component. While symbolic AI systems often use an explicit goal function, the paradigm also applies to neural networks and evolutionary computing. Reinforcement learning can generate intelligent agents that appear to act in ways intended to maximize a "reward function". Sometimes, instead of setting the reward function directly equal to the desired benchmark evaluation function, machine learning programmers use reward shaping to initially give the machine rewards for incremental progress. Yann LeCun stated in 2018, "Most of the learning algorithms that people have come up with essentially consist of minimizing some objective function." AlphaZero chess had a simple objective function: +1 point for each win, and -1 point for each loss. A self-driving car's objective function would be more complex. Evolutionary computing can evolve intelligent agents that appear to act in ways intended to maximize a "fitness function" influencing how many descendants each agent is allowed to leave. The mathematical formalism of AIXI was proposed as a maximally intelligent agent in this paradigm. However, AIXI is uncomputable. In the real world, an intelligent agent is constrained by finite time and hardware resources, and scientists compete to produce algorithms that achieve progressively higher scores on benchmark tests with existing hardware. == Agent function == An intelligent agent's behavior can be described mathematically by an agent function. This function determines what the agent does based on what it has seen. A percept refers to the agent's sensory inputs at a single point in time. For example, a self-driving car's percepts might include camera images, lidar data, GPS coordinates, and speed r
Resisting AI
Resisting AI: An Anti-fascist Approach to Artificial Intelligence is a book on artificial intelligence (AI) by Dan McQuillan, published in 2022 by Bristol University Press. == Content == Resisting AI takes the form of an extended essay, which contrasts optimistic visions about AI's potential by arguing that AI may best be seen as a continuation and reinforcement of bureaucratic forms of discrimination and violence, ultimately fostering authoritarian outcomes. For McQuillan, AI's promise of objective calculability is antithetical to an egalitarian and just society. McQuillan uses the expression "AI violence" to describe how – based on opaque algorithms – various actors can discriminate against categories of people in accessing jobs, loans, medical care, and other benefits. The book suggests that AI has a political resonance with soft eugenic approaches to the valuation of life by modern welfare states, and that AI exhibits eugenic features in its underlying logic, as well as in its technical operations. The parallel is with historical eugenicists achieving saving to the state by sterilizing defectives so the state would not have to care for their offspring. The analysis of McQuillan goes beyond the known critique of AI systems fostering precarious labour markets, addressing "necropolitics", the politics of who is entitled to live, and who to die. Although McQuillan offers a brief history of machine learning at the beginning of the book – with its need for "hidden and undercompensated labour", he is concerned more with the social impacts of AI rather than with its technical aspects. McQuillan sees AI as the continuation of existing bureaucratic systems that already marginalize vulnerable groups – aggravated by the fact that AI systems trained on existing data are likely to reinforce existing discriminations, e.g. in attempting to optimize welfare distribution based on existing data patterns, ultimately creating a system of "self-reinforcing social profiling". In elaborating on the continuation between existing bureaucratic violence and AI, McQuillan connects to Hannah Arendt's concept of the thoughtless bureaucrat in Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, which now becomes the algorithm that, lacking intent, cannot be accountable, and is thus endowed with an "algorithmic thoughtlessness". McQuillan defends the "fascist" in the title of the work by arguing that while not all AI is fascist, this emerging technology of control may end up being deployed by fascist or authoritarian regimes. For McQuillan, AI can support the diffusion of states of exception, as a technology impossible to properly regulate and a mechanism for multiplying exceptions more widely. An example of a scenario where AI systems of surveillance could bring discrimination to a new high is the initiative to create LGBT-free zones in Poland. Skeptical of ethical regulations to control the technology, McQuillan suggests people's councils and workers' councils, and other forms of citizens' agency to resist AI. A chapter titled "Post-Machine Learning" makes an appeal for resistance via currents of thought from feminist science (standpoint theory), post-normal science (extended peer communities), and new materialism; McQuillan encourages the reader to question the meaning of "objectivity" and calls for the necessity of alternative ways of knowing. Among the virtuous examples of resistance – possibly to be adopted by the AI workers themselves – McQuillan notes the Lucas Plan of the workers of Lucas Aerospace Corporation, in which a workforce declared redundant took control, reorienting the enterprise toward useful products. McQuillan advocates for what he calls decomputing, an opposition to the sweeping application and expansion of artificial intelligence. Similar to degrowth, the approach criticizes AI as an outgrowth of the systemic issues within capitalist systems. McQuillan argues that a different future is possible, in which distance between people is reduced rather than increased through AI intermediaries. The work of McQuillan warns against "watered-down forms of engagement" with AI, such as citizen juries, which superficially look like democratic deliberation but may actually obscure important decisions about AI that are outside the purview of the engagement situation (McQuillan 2022, 128). In an interview about the book, McQuillan describes himself as an "AI abolitionist". == Reception == The book has been praised for how it "masterfully disassembles AI as an epistemological, social, and political paradigm". On the critical side, a review in the academic journal Justice, Power and Resistance took exception to the "nightmarish visions of Big Brother" offered by McQuillan, and argued that while many elements of AI may pose concern, a critique should not be based on a caricature of what AI is, concluding that McQuillan's work is "less of a theory and more of a Manifesto". Another review notes "a disconnect between the technical aspects of AI and the socio-political analysis McQuillan provides." Although the book was published before the ChatGPT and large language model debate heated up, the book has not lost relevance to the AI discussion. It is noted for suggesting a link between beliefs in artificial intelligence and beliefs in a racialised and gendered visions of intelligence overall, whereby a certain type of rational, measurable intelligence is privileged, leading to "historical notions of hierarchies of being". The blog Reboot praised McQuillan for offering a theory of harm of AI (why AI could end up hurting people and society) that does not just encourage tackling in isolation specific predicted problems with AI-centric systems: bias, non-inclusiveness, exploitativeness, environmental destructiveness, opacity, and non-contestability. For educational policies could also look at AI following the reading of McQuillan: In his book Resisting AI, Dan McQuillan argues that "When we're thinking about the actuality of AI, we can't separate the calculations in the code from the social context of its application" .... McQuillan's particular concern is how many contemporary applications of AI are amplifying existing inequalities and injustices as well as deepening social divisions and instabilities. His book makes a powerful case for anticipating these effects and actively resisting them for the good of societies. Videos and podcasts with an interest in AI and emerging technology have discussed the book.
AI literacy
AI literacy or artificial intelligence literacy is "a set of competencies that enables individuals to critically evaluate AI technologies; communicate and collaborate effectively with AI; and use AI as a tool online, at home, and in the workplace." AI is employed in a variety of applications, including self-driving automobiles, virtual assistants and text generation by generative AI models. Users of these tools should be able to make informed decisions. AI literacy may have an impact on students' future employment prospects. With the rise of generative AI platforms, AI literacy has become a topic of conversation in the field of education. Some think AI literacy is essential for school and college students, while others restrict or prohibit the use of AI in assignments, viewing it as a form of academic dishonesty. However, many researchers and educational institutions promote a more nuanced approach, encouraging critical engagement with AI while developing policies that balance academic integrity with opportunities for learning. == Definitions == Other definitions of AI literacy include the ability to understand, use, monitor, and critically reflect on AI applications. That use of the term usually refers to teaching skills and knowledge to the general public, particularly those who are not adept in AI and the ability to understand, use, evaluate, and ethically navigate AI. As research into AI literacy is still emerging and focused on developing context-specific skills, there is not yet a single, broadly agreed-upon definition. AI literacy is linked to other forms of literacy. AI literacy requires digital literacy, whereas scientific and computational literacy may inform it. Data literacy also significantly overlaps with it. == Categories == AI literacy encompasses multiple categories, including a theoretical understanding of how artificial intelligence works, the usage of artificial intelligence technologies, and the critical appraisal of artificial intelligence, and its ethics. === Know and understand AI === Knowledge and understanding of AI refers to a basic understanding of what artificial intelligence is and how it works. This includes familiarity with machine learning algorithms and the limitations and biases present in AI systems. Users who know and understand AI should be familiar with various technologies that use artificial intelligence, including cognitive systems, robotics and machine learning. This includes recognizing that large language models (LLMs) are machine learning models trained on extensive datasets which generate new text rather than retrieving pre-written responses. === Use and apply AI === Using and applying AI refers to the ability to use AI tools to solve problems and perform tasks such as programming and analyzing big data. Some consider prompt engineering, the practice of designing effective prompts to guide generative AI platforms more effectively, as another competency within AI literacy. === Evaluate and create AI === Evaluation and creation refers to the ability to critically evaluate the quality and reliability of AI systems. It also refers to designing and building fair and ethical AI systems. To evaluate correctly, users should also learn in which areas AI is strong, and in which areas it is weak. === AI ethics === AI ethics refers to understanding the moral implications of AI, and the making informed decisions regarding the use of AI tools. This area includes considerations such as: Accountability: Hold AI actors accountable for the operation of AI systems and adherence to ethical ideals. Accuracy: Identify and report sources of error and uncertainty in algorithms and data. Auditability: Enable other parties to audit and assess algorithm behavior via transparent information sharing. Explainability: Make sure that algorithmic judgments and the underlying data can be presented in simple language. Fairness: Prevent biases and consider varied viewpoints. To do so, increase the diversity of researchers in the field. Human Centricity and Well-being: Prioritize human well-being in AI development and deployment. Human rights Alignment: Ensure that technology do not infringe internationally recognized human rights. Inclusivity: Make AI accessible to everyone. Progress: Choose high value initiatives. Responsibility, accountability, and transparency: Foster trust via responsibility, accountability, and fairness. Robustness and Security: Make AI systems safe, secure, and resistant to manipulation or data breach. Sustainability: Choose implementations that generate long-term, useful benefits. Environmental Implications: How this tool impacts the environment, any restrictions or laws, if this impact is worth the effects or not. === Enabling AI === Support AI by developing associated knowledge and skills such as programming and statistics. == Promoting AI literacy == Several governments have recognized the need to promote AI literacy, including among adults. Such programs have been published in the United States, China, Germany and Finland. Programs intended for the general public usually consist of short and easy to understand online study units. Programs intended for children are usually project-based. Programs for students at colleges and universities often address the specific professional needs of the student, depending on their field of study. Beyond the education system, AI literacy can also be developed in the community, for example in museums. === Schools === Schools use diverse pedagogies to promote AI literacy. These include: Performing a Turing test with an intelligent agent Creating chatbots Building apps using Blockly-based programming Project-based learning Building robots Data visualization Training AI models Artificial intelligence curricula can improve students' understanding of topics such as machine learning, neural networks, and deep learning. === Higher education === Before the second decade of the 21st century, artificial intelligence was studied mainly in STEM courses. Later, projects emerged to increase artificial intelligence education, specifically to promote AI literacy. Most courses start with one or more study units that deal with basic questions such as what artificial intelligence is, where it comes from, what it can do and what it can't do. Most courses also refer to machine learning and deep learning. Some of the courses deal with moral issues in artificial intelligence. In Ireland, the Higher Education Authority published Generative AI in Higher Education Teaching & Learning: Policy Framework in December 2025, which encouraged higher education institutions to embed AI literacy across programmes as a core graduate attribute. ==== Disciplinary policy ==== As a response to the increase of generative AI use in education, several disciplines formed committees or task forces to examine context-specific approaches toward AI literacy. In spring 2025, the Modern Language Association and Conference on College Composition and Communication Joint Task Force finished development of three working papers, a guide on AI literacy for students, and a collection of resources addressing AI use in writing. The task force emphasized the need for "a culture of critical AI literacy" and included guidelines not only for students but also educators and institutions, highlighting the need for modeling ethical AI use in planning processes. Similarly, a committee formed by the American Historical Association Council published "Guiding Principles for Artificial Intelligence in History Education" which encouraged "clear and transparent engagement with generative AI." The guidelines demonstrate the value of criticality when working with generative AI in thinking and research.
CrewAI
CrewAI is an open-source software framework and platform for building AI agents and multi-agent systems. Written primarily in Python, it is used to define artificial-intelligence agents, assign tasks to them, and coordinate their work through agent teams and workflows. The framework is associated with CrewAI Inc., a startup developing enterprise tools for automating business workflows with large language model-based agents. == History == CrewAI was first released on the Python Package Index in December 2023. The project was created by João Moura and later developed by CrewAI Inc. and open-source contributors. In October 2024, TechCrunch reported that CrewAI had raised $18 million across seed and Series A funding rounds from investors including Boldstart Ventures, Craft Ventures, Earl Grey Capital, and Insight Partners. The report also stated that Andrew Ng and HubSpot co-founder Dharmesh Shah had invested in the company. SiliconANGLE described the company as the developer of an open-source framework for building artificial-intelligence agents and reported that the funding consisted of a seed round led by Boldstart Ventures and a Series A led by Insight Partners. By late 2024, CrewAI had introduced commercial enterprise products built on top of its open-source components. TechCrunch reported that the company's enterprise offering added access controls, analytics, support, and templates for workflow automation. == Features == CrewAI is designed around groups of agents, sometimes called "crews", that can be assigned roles, goals, and tasks. The framework supports agent collaboration, task delegation, tool use, memory, and knowledge sources for retrieval-augmented generation workflows. The project describes two main building blocks: "Crews", which are used for autonomous agent collaboration, and "Flows", which are used for more controlled event-driven workflows. The framework is independent of LangChain and is released under the MIT License. It can be installed as a Python package and is commonly used with external large language model APIs or local models, depending on the developer's configuration. == Business model == CrewAI combines an open-source framework with commercial enterprise products. Its enterprise products are intended for organizations that need to build, monitor, and manage agent-based automations with additional security, observability, and administrative controls.
AI nationalism
AI nationalism is the idea that nations should develop and control their own artificial intelligence technologies to advance their own interests and ensure technological sovereignty. This concept is gaining traction globally, leading countries to implement new laws, form strategic alliances, and invest significantly in domestic AI capabilities. == Global trends and national strategies == In 2018, British technology investor Ian Hogarth published an influential essay titled AI Nationalism. He argued that as AI gains more power and its economic and military significance expands, governments will take measures to bolster their own domestic AI industries, and predicted that the advancement of machine learning systems would lead to what he termed "AI nationalism." He anticipated that this rise in AI would accelerate a global arms race, resulting in more closed economies, restrictions on foreign acquisitions, and limitations on the movement of talent. Hogarth predicted that AI policy would become a central focus of government agendas. He also criticized Britain’s approach to AI strategy, citing the sale of London-based DeepMind—one of the leading AI laboratories, acquired by Google for a relatively modest £400 million in 2014—as a significant misstep. AI nationalism is chiefly reflected in the escalating rhetoric of an artificial intelligence arms race, portraying AI development as a zero-sum game where the winner gains significant economic, political, and military advantages. This mindset, as highlighted in a 2017 Pentagon report, warns that sharing AI technology could erode technological supremacy and enhance rivals' capabilities. The winner-takes-all mentality of AI nationalism poses risks including unsafe AI development, increased geopolitical tension, and potential military aggression (such as cyberattacks or targeting AI professionals). Several countries, including Canada, France, and India, have formulated national strategies to advance their positions in AI. In the United States, a leading player in the global AI arena, trade policies have been enacted to restrict China's access to critical microchips, reflecting a strategic effort to maintain a technological edge. The United States’ National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) frames AI development as a critical aspect of a broader technology competition crucial for national success. It emphasizes the need to outpace China in AI to maintain strategic advantage, reflecting AI nationalism by linking geopolitical power directly to advancements in AI. France has seen notable governmental support for local AI startups, particularly those specializing in language technologies that cater to French and other non-English languages. In Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is investing billions in AI research and development. The country has actively collaborated with major technology firms such as Amazon, IBM, and Microsoft to establish itself as a prominent AI hub. == Historical and cultural context == AI nationalism is seen as deeply connected to historical racism and imperialism. It is viewed not merely as a technological competition but as a contest over racial and civilizational superiority. Historically, technological achievements were often used to justify colonialism and racial hierarchies, with Western societies perceiving their advancements as evidence of superiority. In the context of AI, this historical context continues to shape views on intelligence and development. Some argue that AI nationalism reinforces the idea of fundamental civilizational divides, especially between the Western world and China. This perspective often frames China's progress in AI as a direct challenge to Western values, presenting the AI competition as a struggle over values. AI nationalism is said to draw from long-standing anti-Asian stereotypes, such as the "Yellow Peril," which portray Asian nations as threats to Western civilization. This viewpoint links Asian technological advances with dehumanization and artificiality, reflecting persistent anxieties about China's growing role in the global tech landscape. == Implications == AI nationalism is seen as a component of a broader trend towards the fragmentation of the internet, where digital services are increasingly influenced by local regulations and national interests. This shift is creating a new technological landscape in which the impact of artificial intelligence on individuals' lives can vary significantly depending on their geographic location. J. Paul Goode argues that AI nationalism may exacerbate existing societal divisions by promoting the development of systems that embed cultural biases, thereby privileging certain groups while disadvantaging others.
Inductive probability
Inductive probability attempts to give the probability of future events based on past events. It is the basis for inductive reasoning, and gives the mathematical basis for learning and the perception of patterns. It is a source of knowledge about the world. There are three sources of knowledge: inference, communication, and deduction. Communication relays information found using other methods. Deduction establishes new facts based on existing facts. Inference establishes new facts from data. Its basis is Bayes' theorem. Information describing the world is written in a language. For example, a simple mathematical language of propositions may be chosen. Sentences may be written down in this language as strings of characters. But in the computer it is possible to encode these sentences as strings of bits (1s and 0s). Then the language may be encoded so that the most commonly used sentences are the shortest. This internal language implicitly represents probabilities of statements. Occam's razor says the "simplest theory, consistent with the data is most likely to be correct". The "simplest theory" is interpreted as the representation of the theory written in this internal language. The theory with the shortest encoding in this internal language is most likely to be correct. == History == Probability and statistics was focused on probability distributions and tests of significance. Probability was formal, well defined, but limited in scope. In particular its application was limited to situations that could be defined as an experiment or trial, with a well defined population. Bayes's theorem is named after Rev. Thomas Bayes 1701–1761. Bayesian inference broadened the application of probability to many situations where a population was not well defined. But Bayes' theorem always depended on prior probabilities, to generate new probabilities. It was unclear where these prior probabilities should come from. Ray Solomonoff developed algorithmic probability which gave an explanation for what randomness is and how patterns in the data may be represented by computer programs, that give shorter representations of the data circa 1964. Chris Wallace and D. M. Boulton developed minimum message length circa 1968. Later Jorma Rissanen developed the minimum description length circa 1978. These methods allow information theory to be related to probability, in a way that can be compared to the application of Bayes' theorem, but which give a source and explanation for the role of prior probabilities. Marcus Hutter combined decision theory with the work of Ray Solomonoff and Andrey Kolmogorov to give a theory for the Pareto optimal behavior for an Intelligent agent, circa 1998. === Minimum description/message length === The program with the shortest length that matches the data is the most likely to predict future data. This is the thesis behind the minimum message length and minimum description length methods. At first sight Bayes' theorem appears different from the minimimum message/description length principle. At closer inspection it turns out to be the same. Bayes' theorem is about conditional probabilities, and states the probability that event B happens if firstly event A happens: P ( A ∧ B ) = P ( B ) ⋅ P ( A | B ) = P ( A ) ⋅ P ( B | A ) {\displaystyle P(A\land B)=P(B)\cdot P(A|B)=P(A)\cdot P(B|A)} becomes in terms of message length L, L ( A ∧ B ) = L ( B ) + L ( A | B ) = L ( A ) + L ( B | A ) . {\displaystyle L(A\land B)=L(B)+L(A|B)=L(A)+L(B|A).} This means that if all the information is given describing an event then the length of the information may be used to give the raw probability of the event. So if the information describing the occurrence of A is given, along with the information describing B given A, then all the information describing A and B has been given. ==== Overfitting ==== Overfitting occurs when the model matches the random noise and not the pattern in the data. For example, take the situation where a curve is fitted to a set of points. If a polynomial with many terms is fitted then it can more closely represent the data. Then the fit will be better, and the information needed to describe the deviations from the fitted curve will be smaller. Smaller information length means higher probability. However, the information needed to describe the curve must also be considered. The total information for a curve with many terms may be greater than for a curve with fewer terms, that has not as good a fit, but needs less information to describe the polynomial. === Inference based on program complexity === Solomonoff's theory of inductive inference is also inductive inference. A bit string x is observed. Then consider all programs that generate strings starting with x. Cast in the form of inductive inference, the programs are theories that imply the observation of the bit string x. The method used here to give probabilities for inductive inference is based on Solomonoff's theory of inductive inference. ==== Detecting patterns in the data ==== If all the bits are 1, then people infer that there is a bias in the coin and that it is more likely also that the next bit is 1 also. This is described as learning from, or detecting a pattern in the data. Such a pattern may be represented by a computer program. A short computer program may be written that produces a series of bits which are all 1. If the length of the program K is L ( K ) {\displaystyle L(K)} bits then its prior probability is, P ( K ) = 2 − L ( K ) {\displaystyle P(K)=2^{-L(K)}} The length of the shortest program that represents the string of bits is called the Kolmogorov complexity. Kolmogorov complexity is not computable. This is related to the halting problem. When searching for the shortest program some programs may go into an infinite loop. ==== Considering all theories ==== The Greek philosopher Epicurus is quoted as saying "If more than one theory is consistent with the observations, keep all theories". As in a crime novel all theories must be considered in determining the likely murderer, so with inductive probability all programs must be considered in determining the likely future bits arising from the stream of bits. Programs that are already longer than n have no predictive power. The raw (or prior) probability that the pattern of bits is random (has no pattern) is 2 − n {\displaystyle 2^{-n}} . Each program that produces the sequence of bits, but is shorter than the n is a theory/pattern about the bits with a probability of 2 − k {\displaystyle 2^{-k}} where k is the length of the program. The probability of receiving a sequence of bits y after receiving a series of bits x is then the conditional probability of receiving y given x, which is the probability of x with y appended, divided by the probability of x. ==== Universal priors ==== The programming language affects the predictions of the next bit in the string. The language acts as a prior probability. This is particularly a problem where the programming language codes for numbers and other data types. Intuitively we think that 0 and 1 are simple numbers, and that prime numbers are somehow more complex than numbers that may be composite. Using the Kolmogorov complexity gives an unbiased estimate (a universal prior) of the prior probability of a number. As a thought experiment an intelligent agent may be fitted with a data input device giving a series of numbers, after applying some transformation function to the raw numbers. Another agent might have the same input device with a different transformation function. The agents do not see or know about these transformation functions. Then there appears no rational basis for preferring one function over another. A universal prior insures that although two agents may have different initial probability distributions for the data input, the difference will be bounded by a constant. So universal priors do not eliminate an initial bias, but they reduce and limit it. Whenever we describe an event in a language, either using a natural language or other, the language has encoded in it our prior expectations. So some reliance on prior probabilities are inevitable. A problem arises where an intelligent agent's prior expectations interact with the environment to form a self reinforcing feed back loop. This is the problem of bias or prejudice. Universal priors reduce but do not eliminate this problem. === Universal artificial intelligence === The theory of universal artificial intelligence applies decision theory to inductive probabilities. The theory shows how the best actions to optimize a reward function may be chosen. The result is a theoretical model of intelligence. It is a fundamental theory of intelligence, which optimizes the agents behavior in, Exploring the environment; performing actions to get responses that broaden the agents knowledge. Competing or co-operating with another agent; games. Balancing short and long term rewards. In general no agent will always provi
World model (artificial intelligence)
A world model in artificial intelligence is a machine learning system that builds an internal representation of an environment. The model predicts how that environment changes over time in response to actions. Researchers design world models to help agents plan, reason, and act without constant real-world trial and error. World models differ from systems that merely classify or generate outputs. They simulate dynamics such as physics, object interactions, and causality. Early ideas date to the 1990s. Modern versions power robots, autonomous driving, and interactive video generation. == History == Jürgen Schmidhuber introduced the term world model in machine learning in 1990. He proposed recurrent neural networks that predict future states from observations and use those predictions to train agents. David Ha and Schmidhuber revived the concept in a 2018 paper. Their agents learned to drive virtual cars and play video games inside self-generated simulations. Yann LeCun advanced the idea in a 2022 position paper titled "A Path Towards Autonomous Machine Intelligence". He argued that intelligence requires predictive models of the world rather than pure pattern matching. LeCun proposed the joint embedding predictive architecture (JEPA) as a practical foundation. LeCun and collaborators developed several JEPA variants. V-JEPA 2 reached state-of-the-art performance on video understanding and physical reasoning at the time. It supports zero-shot robot control in unfamiliar environments. Introduced in March 2026, LeWorldModel trains stably end-to-end from raw pixels and uses two loss terms and avoids hand-crafted heuristics. LeCun founded Advanced Machine Intelligence Labs in 2026 to further develop world models. Google DeepMind introduced Genie in 2024. The model learned interactive environments from unlabeled internet videos. Genie 2 followed in late 2024 and added three-dimensional generation. The Genie series set benchmarks for general-purpose simulation. Genie 3 was introduced in August 2025. It produces photorealistic, real-time interactive worlds from text prompts which are displayed at 24 frames per second and explored in real time with text or image prompts. The model supports persistent three-dimensional worlds and real-time interaction. Waymo adopted Genie 3 in February 2026 and used it to create a specialized world model for autonomous driving simulation, called the Waymo World Model. It produces synchronized camera and lidar outputs and creates edge cases that real robotaxis rarely encounter. The edge cases were reported to be unusual by PCMag. General Intuition announced a $133.7 million seed round. World Labs raised $1 billion. AMI raised $1.03 billion. In April 2026, Alibaba announced Happy Oyster, its world model designed for real-time and “flowy” world model. It includes a directing mode for world building based on text and image prompts and a wandering mode for exploring the resulting world. It can generate 3-minute in-world video clips. Also in April, World Labs, co-founded by Li Fei Fei, unveiled Spark 2.0, an open-source 3D Gaussian splatting rendering engine that targets smartphone-class devices. In June 2026, Nvidia released Cosmos 3, a family of open-weight models. It combines previously independent physical reasoning, world simulation, and action generation. Cosmos 3 integrates can process and generate text, image, video, audio, and action sequences. The model employs a Mixture-of-Transformers" (MoT) approach. An autoregressive (AR) transformer handles reasoning and next-token prediction, while a diffusion transformer (DT) does multimodal generation. Encoders (ViT for vision, VAE for visual/audio, and domain-specific for actions) and generate a shared representation space using 3D multi-dimensional rotary position embedding (mRoPE) for spatial and temporal information. The family includes Cosmos3-Nano (16B parameters) for workstations; Cosmos3-Super (64B parameters) for research. == Architecture == World models process raw sensory data such as video frames or lidar scans. They compress this input into compact latent representations. The system then predicts future representations rather than pixel-by-pixel reconstructions. Many modern world models use joint embedding predictive architecture (JEPA). An encoder turns observations into embeddings. A predictor estimates one or a suite of embeddings from the current one and an action. In some cases a critic chooses one embedding as the best result. A regularizer keeps embeddings well-behaved. The model trains by minimizing prediction error in embedding space. This approach avoids the high cost of generating every detail. Some architectures add explicit components. A fast reactive path handles immediate responses. A slower deliberative path performs longer-horizon planning. Video prediction accuracy or robot success rates are key metrics, but do not always predict real-world performance. Generative world models such as Genie 3 combine these with a simulator. They accept text prompts or layouts and output consistent video, lidar, or three-dimensional scenes. World models often train with self-supervised learning. They use large unlabeled datasets of video or robot interactions. Self-supervised learning can speed learning. Reinforcement learning can fine-tune a model for specific tasks. == Applications == World models support robot learning. Agents train inside simulations and transfer skills to the physical world. This reduces the need for dangerous or expensive real-world trials. Autonomous vehicles use world models to test rare events. Waymo's system simulates tornadoes or unusual pedestrian behavior. Companies train planners without putting vehicles on public roads. Interactive entertainment benefits from world models. Genie 3 lets users generate playable environments from simple descriptions. Game studios prototype levels faster. Scientific simulation gains from these models. Researchers model physical systems or biological processes at scale. Planners in logistics or urban design test strategies inside accurate digital twins. == Comparison with large language models == Both world models and large language models (LLMs) use inferencing on their inputs to make predictions. LLMs operate on textual inputs. They predict the next token in text sequences. They excel at language-oriented tasks such as translation or summarization. However, they lack understanding of physics. World models operate on sensor inputs such as pixels. They predict state changes in that data in latent space. This design supports planning and causal reasoning. LLMs generate fluent text but often fail at consistent physical predictions. Their architecture employs transformers with refinements such as mixture of experts. World models divide an inferencing task into work performed by encoders, predictors, simulators, and other pieces. They typically handle multimodal inputs such as video, lidar, radar, and audio, guided by textual prompting. LLMs power chatbots and code assistants. World models drive embodied agents that act in dynamic environments, such as autonomous driving. The two may be combined in hybrid systems. For example, a LLM handles instructions, while a world model manages low-level control. World model proponents such as LeCun claim that because LLMs are trained only on text, they have no ability to predict anything beyond text, such as real-world events. == Benchmarks == World model benchmarks test physical understanding, long-term consistency, planning, and generalization from sensor data. Meta introduced three benchmarks for V-JEPA 2. IntPhys 2 measures a model's ability to detect physics violations. It presents pairs of videos that diverge when one breaks physical rules. Humans score near 100% accuracy. V-JEPA 2 achieves little better than random chance on many conditions. Minimal Video Pairs (MVPBench) tests physical understanding through multiple-choice questions based on short video clips. It probes object interactions and causality. Something-Something tests action recognition. Epic-Kitchens-100 tests human action anticipation. DeepMind benchmark: Interactive evaluation measures consistency over minutes of interaction, memory of off-screen objects, and response to user actions or text prompts. Waymo benchmark: Output generation quality: Metrics include realism, controllability (via text prompts), and usefulness for training planners in simulated worlds. However, pixel reconstruction error rate with episodic rewards often fails. Other: Epic-Kitchens-100 (often measured with Recall@5) Ego4D 50 Salads, Breakfast, etc. Potential benchmarks: Zero-shot transfer to robots Long-horizon planning Implausible prediction rate