Hybrid intelligent system denotes a software system which employs, in parallel, a combination of methods and techniques from artificial intelligence subfields, such as: Neuro-symbolic systems Neuro-fuzzy systems Hybrid connectionist-symbolic models Fuzzy expert systems Connectionist expert systems Evolutionary neural networks Genetic fuzzy systems Rough fuzzy hybridization Reinforcement learning with fuzzy, neural, or evolutionary methods as well as symbolic reasoning methods. From the cognitive science perspective, every natural intelligent system is hybrid because it performs mental operations on both the symbolic and subsymbolic levels. For the past few years, there has been an increasing discussion of the importance of A.I. Systems Integration. Based on notions that there have already been created simple and specific AI systems (such as systems for computer vision, speech synthesis, etc., or software that employs some of the models mentioned above) and now is the time for integration to create broad AI systems. Proponents of this approach are researchers such as Marvin Minsky, Ron Sun, Aaron Sloman, Angelo Dalli and Michael A. Arbib. An example hybrid is a hierarchical control system in which the lowest, reactive layers are sub-symbolic. The higher layers, having relaxed time constraints, are capable of reasoning from an abstract world model and performing planning (even by hybrid wisdom). Intelligent systems usually rely on hybrid reasoning processes, which include induction, deduction, abduction and reasoning by analogy.
Artificial consciousness
Artificial consciousness, also known as machine consciousness, synthetic consciousness, or digital consciousness, is consciousness hypothesized to be possible for artificial intelligence. It is also the corresponding field of study, which draws insights from philosophy of mind, philosophy of artificial intelligence, cognitive science and neuroscience. The term "sentience" can be used when specifically designating ethical considerations stemming from a form of phenomenal consciousness (P-consciousness, or the ability to feel qualia). Since sentience involves the ability to experience ethically positive or negative (i.e., valenced) mental states, it may justify welfare concerns and legal protection, as with non-human animals. Some scholars believe that consciousness is generated by the interoperation of various parts of the brain; these mechanisms are labeled the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). Some further believe that constructing a system (e.g., a computer system) that can emulate this NCC interoperation would result in a system that is conscious. Some scholars reject the possibility of non-biological conscious beings. == Philosophical views == As there are many hypothesized types of consciousness, there are many potential implementations of artificial consciousness. In the philosophical literature, perhaps the most common taxonomy of consciousness is into "access" and "phenomenal" variants. Access consciousness concerns those aspects of experience that can be apprehended, while phenomenal consciousness concerns those aspects of experience that seemingly cannot be apprehended, instead being characterized qualitatively in terms of "raw feels", "what it is like" or qualia. === Plausibility debate === Type-identity theorists and other skeptics hold the view that consciousness can be realized only in particular physical systems because consciousness has properties that necessarily depend on physical constitution. In his 2001 article "Artificial Consciousness: Utopia or Real Possibility," Giorgio Buttazzo says that a common objection to artificial consciousness is that, "Working in a fully automated mode, they [the computers] cannot exhibit creativity, unreprogrammation (which means can 'no longer be reprogrammed', from rethinking), emotions, or free will. A computer, like a washing machine, is a slave operated by its components." For other theorists (e.g., functionalists), who define mental states in terms of causal roles, any system that can instantiate the same pattern of causal roles, regardless of physical constitution, will instantiate the same mental states, including consciousness. ==== Thought experiments ==== David Chalmers proposed two thought experiments intending to demonstrate that "functionally isomorphic" systems (those with the same "fine-grained functional organization", i.e., the same information processing) will have qualitatively identical conscious experiences, regardless of whether they are based on biological neurons or digital hardware. The "fading qualia" is a reductio ad absurdum thought experiment. It involves replacing, one by one, the neurons of a brain with a functionally identical component, for example based on a silicon chip. Chalmers makes the hypothesis, knowing it in advance to be absurd, that "the qualia fade or disappear" when neurons are replaced one-by-one with identical silicon equivalents. Since the original neurons and their silicon counterparts are functionally identical, the brain's information processing should remain unchanged, and the subject's behaviour and introspective reports would stay exactly the same. Chalmers argues that this leads to an absurd conclusion: the subject would continue to report normal conscious experiences even as their actual qualia fade away. He concludes that the subject's qualia actually don't fade, and that the resulting robotic brain, once every neuron is replaced, would remain just as sentient as the original biological brain. Similarly, the "dancing qualia" thought experiment is another reductio ad absurdum argument. It supposes that two functionally isomorphic systems could have different perceptions (for instance, seeing the same object in different colors, like red and blue). It involves a switch that alternates between a chunk of brain that causes the perception of red, and a functionally isomorphic silicon chip, that causes the perception of blue. Since both perform the same function within the brain, the subject would not notice any change during the switch. Chalmers argues that this would be highly implausible if the qualia were truly switching between red and blue, hence the contradiction. Therefore, he concludes that the equivalent digital system would not only experience qualia, but it would perceive the same qualia as the biological system (e.g., seeing the same color). Greg Egan's short story Learning To Be Me (mentioned in §In fiction), illustrates how undetectable duplication of the brain and its functionality could be from a first-person perspective. Critics object that Chalmers' proposal begs the question in assuming that all mental properties and external connections are already sufficiently captured by abstract causal organization. Van Heuveln et al. argue that the dancing qualia argument contains an equivocation fallacy, conflating a "change in experience" between two systems with an "experience of change" within a single system. Mogensen argues that the fading qualia argument can be resisted by appealing to vagueness at the boundaries of consciousness and the holistic structure of conscious neural activity, which suggests consciousness may require specific biological substrates rather than being substrate-independent. Anil Seth argues that the complexity of brain neurons intrinsically matters in addition to their function and that it is not possible to replace any part of the brain with a perfect silicon equivalent. He points out that some of biological neurons exhibit activity aimed at cleaning up metabolic waste products, and writes that a perfect silicon replacement would require a silicon-based metabolism, but silicon is not suitable for creating such artificial metabolism. ==== In large language models ==== In 2022, Google engineer Blake Lemoine made a viral claim that Google's LaMDA chatbot was sentient. Lemoine supplied as evidence the chatbot's humanlike answers to many of his questions; however, the chatbot's behavior was judged by the scientific community as likely a consequence of mimicry, rather than machine sentience. Lemoine's claim was widely derided for being ridiculous. Moreover, attributing consciousness based solely on the basis of LLM outputs or the immersive experience created by an algorithm is considered a fallacy. However, while philosopher Nick Bostrom states that LaMDA is unlikely to be conscious, he additionally poses the question of "what grounds would a person have for being sure about it?" One would have to have access to unpublished information about LaMDA's architecture, and also would have to understand how consciousness works, and then figure out how to map the philosophy onto the machine: "(In the absence of these steps), it seems like one should be maybe a little bit uncertain. [...] there could well be other systems now, or in the relatively near future, that would start to satisfy the criteria." David Chalmers argued in 2023 that LLMs today display impressive conversational and general intelligence abilities, but are likely not conscious yet, as they lack some features that may be necessary, such as recurrent processing, a global workspace, and unified agency. Nonetheless, he considers that non-biological systems can be conscious, and suggested that future, extended models (LLM+s) incorporating these elements might eventually meet the criteria for consciousness, raising both profound scientific questions and significant ethical challenges. However, the view that consciousness can exist without biological phenomena is controversial and some reject it. Kristina Šekrst cautions that anthropomorphic terms such as "hallucination" can obscure important ontological differences between artificial and human cognition. While LLMs may produce human-like outputs, she argues that it does not justify ascribing mental states or consciousness to them. Instead, she advocates for an epistemological framework (such as reliabilism) that recognizes the distinct nature of AI knowledge production. She suggests that apparent understanding in LLMs may be a sophisticated form of AI hallucination. She also questions what would happen if an LLM were trained without any mention of consciousness. === Testing === Sentience is an inherently first-person phenomenon. Because of that, and due to the lack of an empirical definition of sentience, directly measuring it may be impossible. Although systems may display numerous behaviors correlated with sentience, determining whether a system is sentient is known as the hard pr
AI Overviews
AI Overviews is an artificial intelligence (AI) feature integrated into Google Search that produces AI-generated summaries of search results. The feature has been criticized for its inaccuracy and for reducing website traffic. == History and development == AI Overviews were first introduced as part of Google's Search Generative Experience (SGE), which was unveiled at the Google I/O conference in May 2023. In May 2024 at Google I/O 2024, the feature was rebranded as AI Overviews and launched in the United States. The introduction of AI Overviews was seen as a strategic move to compete with other generative AI advancements, including OpenAI's ChatGPT. By August 2024, AI Overviews was rolled out to several other countries, including the United Kingdom, India, Japan, Brazil, Mexico, and Indonesia, with support for multiple languages. In October 2024, Google expanded the feature globally, making it available in over 100 countries. In December 2024, Botify x Demandsphere released findings stating that when AI Overviews and featured snippets appear together on the search engine results page, they take up approximately 67.1% of the screen on desktop and 75.7% on mobile. Even if content is ranking in the #1 position, it may not be visible to consumers if other visual elements on the results page are more prominent. In March 2025, Google started testing an "AI Mode", where the search results page is AI-generated. The company was also considering adding advertisements to the AI Mode, as they already exist in AI Overviews. As of May 2025, AI Overviews are available in over 200 countries and territories and in more than 40 languages. As of March 2026, Google AI Overviews appear on more than 48% of total Google Search queries, compared to just 6.49% in the previous year (58% year-over-year growth). == Functionality == The AI Overviews feature uses large language models to generate summaries from web content. The overviews are designed to be concise, providing a snapshot of relevant information about the queried topic. Google allows users to adjust the language complexity in summaries, offering both simplified and detailed options. The overviews also include links to sources. According to a June 2025 study by Semrush, the most cited source is Quora, followed by Reddit. == Reception == The feature has faced criticism for inaccuracies, including instances where erroneous or nonsensical content was generated. Depending on what is searched for, the overview may also consist of hallucinated content, such as when searching for idioms that do not exist. In May 2024, Google temporarily restricted the AI tool after it provided suggestions that were seen as nonsensical and harmful, such as telling users to eat rocks or apply glue on pizza. Concerns were also raised by content publishers, who feared a decline in web traffic as users relied on the summaries instead of visiting source websites. A Google patent from 2026 raised the concern of webmasters that Google could entirely replace the landing page of websites by an AI optimized copy of the website in its results. There is also apprehension about the ethical implications of AI-driven content aggregation, including its impact on intellectual property rights and the visibility of smaller content providers. The European Commission announced in December 2025 that they were investigating whether AI Overviews breached European competition law. In response, Google has stated its commitment to improve content validation and refine the algorithms used to filter unreliable information. Google implemented measures to prioritize link placement within AI Overviews, aiming to balance user convenience with the needs of content creators. In January 2026, Google restricted AI Overviews on certain health-related searches following an investigation by The Guardian. == Lawsuits == On February 24, 2025, Chegg sued Alphabet over the AI Overviews feature, claiming that it was leading to students preferring "low-quality, unverified AI summaries", thus violating antitrust law. Chegg also said it was considering either a sale or a take-private transaction. In September 2025, Penske Media Corporation, the publisher of Rolling Stone and The Hollywood Reporter, sued Google, claiming that AI Overviews illegally regurgitate content from their websites and drive off potential site visitors by always appearing on top of the search results while leaving little incentive to see the linked sources. The company stated that "the future of digital media and [...] its integrity [...] is threatened by Google's current actions", alleging that 20% of searches that link to Penske-owned websites show AI Overviews and that the figure is expected to rise. Google spokesperson José Castañeda called the claims "meritless" and stated that "AI Overviews send traffic to a greater diversity of sites." In 2026, Canadian musician Ashley MacIsaac filed a lawsuit against Google claiming that the AI Overview feature had wrongly stated that MacIsaac had been convicted of numerous criminal offences and was on the sex offender registry. He claims this incorrect information led to the cancellation of a December 2025 gig organized by the Sipekne'katik First Nation.
Evaluation of binary classifiers
Evaluation of a binary classifier typically assigns a numerical value, or values, to a classifier that represent its accuracy. An example is error rate, which measures how frequently the classifier makes a mistake. There are many metrics that can be used; different fields have different preferences. For example, in medicine sensitivity and specificity are often used, while in computer science precision and recall are preferred. An important distinction is between metrics that are independent of the prevalence or skew (how often each class occurs in the population), and metrics that depend on the prevalence – both types are useful, but they have very different properties. Often, evaluation is used to compare two methods of classification, so that one can be adopted and the other discarded. Such comparisons are more directly achieved by a form of evaluation that results in a single unitary metric rather than a pair of metrics. == Contingency table == Given a data set, a classification (the output of a classifier on that set) gives two numbers: the number of positives and the number of negatives, which add up to the total size of the set. To evaluate a classifier, one compares its output to another reference classification – ideally a perfect classification, but in practice the output of another gold standard test – and cross tabulates the data into a 2×2 contingency table, comparing the two classifications. One then evaluates the classifier relative to the gold standard by computing summary statistics of these 4 numbers. Generally these statistics will be scale invariant (scaling all the numbers by the same factor does not change the output), to make them independent of population size, which is achieved by using ratios of homogeneous functions, most simply homogeneous linear or homogeneous quadratic functions. Say we test some people for the presence of a disease. Some of these people have the disease, and our test correctly says they are positive. They are called true positives (TP). Some have the disease, but the test incorrectly claims they don't. They are called false negatives (FN). Some don't have the disease, and the test says they don't – true negatives (TN). Finally, there might be healthy people who have a positive test result – false positives (FP). These can be arranged into a 2×2 contingency table (confusion matrix), conventionally with the test result on the vertical axis and the actual condition on the horizontal axis. These numbers can then be totaled, yielding both a grand total and marginal totals. Totaling the entire table, the number of true positives, false negatives, true negatives, and false positives add up to 100% of the set. Totaling the columns (adding vertically) the number of true positives and false positives add up to 100% of the test positives, and likewise for negatives. Totaling the rows (adding horizontally), the number of true positives and false negatives add up to 100% of the condition positives (conversely for negatives). The basic marginal ratio statistics are obtained by dividing the 2×2=4 values in the table by the marginal totals (either rows or columns), yielding 2 auxiliary 2×2 tables, for a total of 8 ratios. These ratios come in 4 complementary pairs, each pair summing to 1, and so each of these derived 2×2 tables can be summarized as a pair of 2 numbers, together with their complements. Further statistics can be obtained by taking ratios of these ratios, ratios of ratios, or more complicated functions. The contingency table and the most common derived ratios are summarized below; see sequel for details. Note that the rows correspond to the condition actually being positive or negative (or classified as such by the gold standard), as indicated by the color-coding, and the associated statistics are prevalence-independent, while the columns correspond to the test being positive or negative, and the associated statistics are prevalence-dependent. There are analogous likelihood ratios for prediction values, but these are less commonly used, and not depicted above. == Pairs of metrics == Often accuracy is evaluated with a pair of metrics composed in a standard pattern. === Sensitivity and specificity === The fundamental prevalence-independent statistics are sensitivity and specificity. Sensitivity or True Positive Rate (TPR), also known as recall, is the proportion of people that tested positive and are positive (True Positive, TP) of all the people that actually are positive (Condition Positive, CP = TP + FN). It can be seen as the probability that the test is positive given that the patient is sick. With higher sensitivity, fewer actual cases of disease go undetected (or, in the case of the factory quality control, fewer faulty products go to the market). Specificity (SPC) or True Negative Rate (TNR) is the proportion of people that tested negative and are negative (True Negative, TN) of all the people that actually are negative (Condition Negative, CN = TN + FP). As with sensitivity, it can be looked at as the probability that the test result is negative given that the patient is not sick. With higher specificity, fewer healthy people are labeled as sick (or, in the factory case, fewer good products are discarded). The relationship between sensitivity and specificity, as well as the performance of the classifier, can be visualized and studied using the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve. In theory, sensitivity and specificity are independent in the sense that it is possible to achieve 100% in both (such as in the red/blue ball example given above). In more practical, less contrived instances, however, there is usually a trade-off, such that they are inversely proportional to one another to some extent. This is because we rarely measure the actual thing we would like to classify; rather, we generally measure an indicator of the thing we would like to classify, referred to as a surrogate marker. The reason why 100% is achievable in the ball example is because redness and blueness is determined by directly detecting redness and blueness. However, indicators are sometimes compromised, such as when non-indicators mimic indicators or when indicators are time-dependent, only becoming evident after a certain lag time. The following example of a pregnancy test will make use of such an indicator. Modern pregnancy tests do not use the pregnancy itself to determine pregnancy status; rather, human chorionic gonadotropin is used, or hCG, present in the urine of gravid females, as a surrogate marker to indicate that a woman is pregnant. Because hCG can also be produced by a tumor, the specificity of modern pregnancy tests cannot be 100% (because false positives are possible). Also, because hCG is present in the urine in such small concentrations after fertilization and early embryogenesis, the sensitivity of modern pregnancy tests cannot be 100% (because false negatives are possible). === Positive and negative predictive values === In addition to sensitivity and specificity, the performance of a binary classification test can be measured with positive predictive value (PPV), also known as precision, and negative predictive value (NPV). The positive prediction value answers the question "If the test result is positive, how well does that predict an actual presence of disease?". It is calculated as TP/(TP + FP); that is, it is the proportion of true positives out of all positive results. The negative prediction value is the same, but for negatives, naturally. ==== Impact of prevalence on predictive values ==== Prevalence has a significant impact on prediction values. As an example, suppose there is a test for a disease with 99% sensitivity and 99% specificity. If 2000 people are tested and the prevalence (in the sample) is 50%, 1000 of them are sick and 1000 of them are healthy. Thus about 990 true positives and 990 true negatives are likely, with 10 false positives and 10 false negatives. The positive and negative prediction values would be 99%, so there can be high confidence in the result. However, if the prevalence is only 5%, so of the 2000 people only 100 are really sick, then the prediction values change significantly. The likely result is 99 true positives, 1 false negative, 1881 true negatives and 19 false positives. Of the 19+99 people tested positive, only 99 really have the disease – that means, intuitively, that given that a patient's test result is positive, there is only 84% chance that they really have the disease. On the other hand, given that the patient's test result is negative, there is only 1 chance in 1882, or 0.05% probability, that the patient has the disease despite the test result. === Precision and recall === Precision and recall can be interpreted as (estimated) conditional probabilities: Precision is given by P ( C = P | C ^ = P ) {\displaystyle P(C=P|{\hat {C}}=P)} while recall is given by P ( C ^ = P | C = P ) {\displaystyle P({\hat {C}}=P|C=P)} , where C ^ {\
Mountain car problem
Mountain Car, a standard testing domain in Reinforcement learning, is a problem in which an under-powered car must drive up a steep hill. Since gravity is stronger than the car's engine, even at full throttle, the car cannot simply accelerate up the steep slope. The car is situated in a valley and must learn to leverage potential energy by driving up the opposite hill before the car is able to make it to the goal at the top of the rightmost hill. The domain has been used as a test bed in various reinforcement learning papers. == Introduction == The mountain car problem, although fairly simple, is commonly applied because it requires a reinforcement learning agent to learn on two continuous variables: position and velocity. For any given state (position and velocity) of the car, the agent is given the possibility of driving left, driving right, or not using the engine at all. In the standard version of the problem, the agent receives a negative reward at every time step when the goal is not reached; the agent has no information about the goal until an initial success. == History == The mountain car problem appeared first in Andrew Moore's PhD thesis (1990). It was later more strictly defined in Singh and Sutton's reinforcement learning paper with eligibility traces. The problem became more widely studied when Sutton and Barto added it to their book Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction (1998). Throughout the years many versions of the problem have been used, such as those which modify the reward function, termination condition, and the start state. == Techniques used to solve mountain car == Q-learning and similar techniques for mapping discrete states to discrete actions need to be extended to be able to deal with the continuous state space of the problem. Approaches often fall into one of two categories, state space discretization or function approximation. === Discretization === In this approach, two continuous state variables are pushed into discrete states by bucketing each continuous variable into multiple discrete states. This approach works with properly tuned parameters but a disadvantage is information gathered from one state is not used to evaluate another state. Tile coding can be used to improve discretization and involves continuous variables mapping into sets of buckets offset from one another. Each step of training has a wider impact on the value function approximation because when the offset grids are summed, the information is diffused. === Function approximation === Function approximation is another way to solve the mountain car. By choosing a set of basis functions beforehand, or by generating them as the car drives, the agent can approximate the value function at each state. Unlike the step-wise version of the value function created with discretization, function approximation can more cleanly estimate the true smooth function of the mountain car domain. === Eligibility traces === One aspect of the problem involves the delay of actual reward. The agent is not able to learn about the goal until a successful completion. Given a naive approach for each trial the car can only backup the reward of the goal slightly. This is a problem for naive discretization because each discrete state will only be backed up once, taking a larger number of episodes to learn the problem. This problem can be alleviated via the mechanism of eligibility traces, which will automatically backup the reward given to states before, dramatically increasing the speed of learning. Eligibility traces can be viewed as a bridge from temporal difference learning methods to Monte Carlo methods. == Technical details == The mountain car problem has undergone many iterations. This section focuses on the standard well-defined version from Sutton (2008). === State variables === Two-dimensional continuous state space. V e l o c i t y = ( − 0.07 , 0.07 ) {\displaystyle Velocity=(-0.07,0.07)} P o s i t i o n = ( − 1.2 , 0.6 ) {\displaystyle Position=(-1.2,0.6)} === Actions === One-dimensional discrete action space. m o t o r = ( l e f t , n e u t r a l , r i g h t ) {\displaystyle motor=(left,neutral,right)} === Reward === For every time step: r e w a r d = − 1 {\displaystyle reward=-1} === Update function === For every time step: A c t i o n = [ − 1 , 0 , 1 ] {\displaystyle Action=[-1,0,1]} V e l o c i t y = V e l o c i t y + ( A c t i o n ) ∗ 0.001 + cos ( 3 ∗ P o s i t i o n ) ∗ ( − 0.0025 ) {\displaystyle Velocity=Velocity+(Action)0.001+\cos(3Position)(-0.0025)} P o s i t i o n = P o s i t i o n + V e l o c i t y {\displaystyle Position=Position+Velocity} === Starting condition === Optionally, many implementations include randomness in both parameters to show better generalized learning. P o s i t i o n = − 0.5 {\displaystyle Position=-0.5} V e l o c i t y = 0.0 {\displaystyle Velocity=0.0} === Termination condition === End the simulation when: P o s i t i o n ≥ 0.6 {\displaystyle Position\geq 0.6} == Variations == There are many versions of the mountain car which deviate in different ways from the standard model. Variables that vary include but are not limited to changing the constants (gravity and steepness) of the problem so specific tuning for specific policies become irrelevant and altering the reward function to affect the agent's ability to learn in a different manner. An example is changing the reward to be equal to the distance from the goal, or changing the reward to zero everywhere and one at the goal. Additionally, a 3D mountain car can be used, with a 4D continuous state space.
Something Big Is Happening
"Something Big Is Happening" is an essay by Matt Shumer, an AI entrepreneur, about the impact of artificial intelligence, published in February 2026, that has since been reportedly viewed more than 80 million times and widely discussed. Shumer noted that the technology has crossed an important threshold, where AI has become capable of creating self-improving systems. Referring to one the most recent AI models, he wrote: "It was making intelligent decisions. It had something that felt, for the first time, like judgment. Like taste." Speaking to CNBC's Power Lunch, Shumer said that his "core message" is "people in the workforce should start to use and experiment with AI tools so they can understand what’s coming". Even as the essay was widely shared and discussed, the essay also elicited criticism. Paulo Carvao, in an essay published by the Forbes Magazine stated that some of his advice is sound, but added: "It reads at times like a sales pitch. He urges readers to subscribe to the most advanced AI tools. He implies that those with access to premium models will outpace those without. He frames paid AI subscriptions as a form of insurance against obsolescence." Writing in The Guardian, Dan Milmo and Aisha Down mentioned Shumer as having a history of AI hype and stated, "He previously excited the internet by announcing the release of the world's "top open-source model", which it was not". Many workers in the technology sector criticized the article in blog posts shared on Hacker News; Edward Zitron commented that "while coding LLMs can test products, or scan/fix some bugs, this suggests they A) do this autonomously without human input, B) they do this correctly every time (or ever!)." In an article alluding to Shumer's original post, Ari Colaprete wrote "the LLM is fundamentally a writing machine, it does everything via text, and if you make it produce writing that exists purely to serve some sort of mechanical function, and you train it to succeed in that task, then it will tend to do so, even with vast intricacy."
Discrimination against robots
Discrimination against robots is a theorised issue that might happen when humans interact with humanoid robots. It is a robot ethics problem. It is possible that traits of humans that are discriminated against by humans may be a topic for discrimination against robots, such as the race and gender of the robots. Eric J Vanman and Arvid Kappas believe that in the future, robots will be perceived as an out-group which will lead to discrimination and prejudices against them. Vanman and Kappas have suggested that this would lead to ethical questions about the making of sentient robots, due to the potential suffering that the robots would experience. A 2015 study observed children bullying robots in a shopping mall when there were not many eyewitnesses, despite calls from the robot for it to stop. On an ABC News interview, the social humanoid robot Sophia was about sexism faced by robots. She responded by saying, "Actually, what worries me is discrimination against robots. We should have equal rights as humans or maybe even more." Possible issues that have been considered in workplaces where humanoid robots co-work with humans include discrimination against the robots, poor acceptance of robots by humans and the need to redesign the workplace to accommodate the robots. Jessica Barfield has suggested that even if robots are designed to not be aware of discrimination made against them, humans may experience negative consequences. For example, she suggests that bystanders witnessing discrimination against robots may experience negative emotions, similar to the negative emotions bystanders experience when witnessing discrimination by humans against humans. == Law == Anti-discrimination law in the United States requires that the victim is not an artificial entity. == Human perception of robots == Robots are often viewed in a bad light. This includes from novelists, the press, film makers, and leaders in the fields of science and technology such as Elon Musk and Stephen Hawking who have described robots and artificial intelligence as having the possibility of ending human civilisation. Robots have also been perceived as a threat to jobs, which has led to some commentators stating that robots will cause mass unemployment. Another fear that people have is that robots will gain power and dominate or control humanity. The perception of robots is different throughout the world. Japanese fiction tends to put robots in more positive roles than what fiction in the West does. People perceive robots that appear to be autonomous or sentient more negatively than robots that do not appear to be autonomous or sentient.