Incremental heuristic search algorithms combine both incremental and heuristic search to speed up searches of sequences of similar search problems, which is important in domains that are only incompletely known or change dynamically. Incremental search has been studied at least since the late 1960s. Incremental search algorithms reuse information from previous searches to speed up the current search and solve search problems potentially much faster than solving them repeatedly from scratch. Similarly, heuristic search has also been studied at least since the late 1960s. Heuristic search algorithms, often based on A, use heuristic knowledge in the form of approximations of the goal distances to focus the search and solve search problems potentially much faster than uninformed search algorithms. The resulting search problems, sometimes called dynamic path planning problems, are graph search problems where paths have to be found repeatedly because the topology of the graph, its edge costs, the start vertex or the goal vertices change over time. So far, three main classes of incremental heuristic search algorithms have been developed: The first class restarts A at the point where its current search deviates from the previous one (example: Fringe Saving A). The second class updates the h-values (heuristic, i.e. approximate distance to goal) from the previous search during the current search to make them more informed (example: Generalized Adaptive A). The third class updates the g-values (distance from start) from the previous search during the current search to correct them when necessary, which can be interpreted as transforming the A search tree from the previous search into the A search tree for the current search (examples: Lifelong Planning A, D, D Lite). All three classes of incremental heuristic search algorithms are different from other replanning algorithms, such as planning by analogy, in that their plan quality does not deteriorate with the number of replanning episodes. == Applications == Incremental heuristic search has been extensively used in robotics, where a larger number of path planning systems are based on either D (typically earlier systems) or D Lite (current systems), two different incremental heuristic search algorithms.
The Best Free AI Presentation Maker for Beginners
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Ameca (robot)
Ameca is a robotic humanoid created in 2021 by Engineered Arts, headquarters in Falmouth, Cornwall, United Kingdom. The project commenced in February 2021, and the first public demonstration was at the CES 2022 show in Las Vegas. Ameca's appearance features grey rubber skin on the face and hands, and is specifically designed to appear genderless. In 2024, an Ameca unit was installed in Edinburgh in the UK to reside at the National Robotarium. Ameca generation 3 has been released and showcased at ICRA 2025 along with Ami. == History == The first generation of Ameca was developed at Engineered Arts headquarters in Falmouth, Cornwall, United Kingdom. The project started in February 2021, with the first video revealed publicly on 1 December 2021. Ameca gained widespread attention on Twitter and TikTok ahead of its first public demonstration at the Consumer Electronics Show 2022, where it was covered by CNET and other news outlets. In 2022, Ameca presented an Alternative Christmas message by British TV Channel 4 for Christmas Day. Ameca was associated with the Museum of the Future's robotic family, where it could interact with visitors. In 2024, an Ameca unit was installed in Edinburgh in the UK to reside at the National Robotarium. In January 2026, Ameca served as an ambassador for the European Space Agency (ESA) at the 18th European Space Conference. == Features == It is designed as a platform for further developing robotics technologies involving human-robot interaction. utilizes embedded microphones, binocular eye mounted cameras, a chest camera and facial recognition software to interact with the public. Interactions can be governed by either OpenAI's GPT-3 or human telepresence. It also features articulated motorized arms, fingers, neck and facial features. Ameca's appearance features grey rubber skin on the face and hands, and is specifically designed to appear genderless. == Public appearances == Computer History Museum, California Heinz Nixdorf MuseumsForum, Paderborn, Germany Copernicus Science Center, Warsaw, Poland Museum of the Future, Dubai Consumer Electronics Show 2022 Deutsches Museum Nuremberg OMR Festival 2022 Hosted by Vodafone GITEX 2022 International Conference on Robotics and Automation 2023 International Telecommunication Union AI for Good Global Summit 2023 Sphere (Not Ameca, Custom humanoid named Aura built on Ameca technology)
Argumentation framework
In artificial intelligence and related fields, an argumentation framework is a way to deal with contentious information and draw conclusions from it using formalized arguments. In an abstract argumentation framework, entry-level information is a set of abstract arguments that, for instance, represent data or a proposition. Conflicts between arguments are represented by a binary relation on the set of arguments. In concrete terms, an argumentation framework is represented with a directed graph such that the nodes are the arguments, and the arrows represent the attack relation. There exist some extensions of the Dung's framework, like the logic-based argumentation frameworks or the value-based argumentation frameworks. == Abstract argumentation frameworks == === Formal framework === Abstract argumentation frameworks, also called argumentation frameworks à la Dung, are defined formally as a pair: A set of abstract elements called arguments, denoted A {\displaystyle A} A binary relation on A {\displaystyle A} , called attack relation, denoted R {\displaystyle R} For instance, the argumentation system S = ⟨ A , R ⟩ {\displaystyle S=\langle A,R\rangle } with A = { a , b , c , d } {\displaystyle A=\{a,b,c,d\}} and R = { ( a , b ) , ( b , c ) , ( d , c ) } {\displaystyle R=\{(a,b),(b,c),(d,c)\}} contains four arguments ( a , b , c {\displaystyle a,b,c} and d {\displaystyle d} ) and three attacks ( a {\displaystyle a} attacks b {\displaystyle b} , b {\displaystyle b} attacks c {\displaystyle c} and d {\displaystyle d} attacks c {\displaystyle c} ). Dung defines some notions : an argument a ∈ A {\displaystyle a\in A} is acceptable with respect to E ⊆ A {\displaystyle E\subseteq A} if and only if E {\displaystyle E} defends a {\displaystyle a} , that is ∀ b ∈ A {\displaystyle \forall b\in A} such that ( b , a ) ∈ R , ∃ c ∈ E {\displaystyle (b,a)\in R,\exists c\in E} such that ( c , b ) ∈ R {\displaystyle (c,b)\in R} , a set of arguments E {\displaystyle E} is conflict-free if there is no attack between its arguments, formally : ∀ a , b ∈ E , ( a , b ) ∉ R {\displaystyle \forall a,b\in E,(a,b)\not \in R} , a set of arguments E {\displaystyle E} is admissible if and only if it is conflict-free and all its arguments are acceptable with respect to E {\displaystyle E} . === Different semantics of acceptance === ==== Extensions ==== To decide if an argument can be accepted or not, or if several arguments can be accepted together, Dung defines several semantics of acceptance that allows, given an argumentation system, sets of arguments (called extensions) to be computed. For instance, given S = ⟨ A , R ⟩ {\displaystyle S=\langle A,R\rangle } , E {\displaystyle E} is a complete extension of S {\displaystyle S} only if it is an admissible set and every acceptable argument with respect to E {\displaystyle E} belongs to E {\displaystyle E} , E {\displaystyle E} is a preferred extension of S {\displaystyle S} only if it is a maximal element (with respect to the set-theoretical inclusion) among the admissible sets with respect to S {\displaystyle S} , E {\displaystyle E} is a stable extension of S {\displaystyle S} only if it is a conflict-free set that attacks every argument that does not belong in E {\displaystyle E} (formally, ∀ a ∈ A ∖ E , ∃ b ∈ E {\displaystyle \forall a\in A\backslash E,\exists b\in E} such that ( b , a ) ∈ R {\displaystyle (b,a)\in R} , E {\displaystyle E} is the (unique) grounded extension of S {\displaystyle S} only if it is the smallest element (with respect to set inclusion) among the complete extensions of S {\displaystyle S} . There exists some inclusions between the sets of extensions built with these semantics : Every stable extension is preferred, Every preferred extension is complete, The grounded extension is complete, If the system is well-founded (there exists no infinite sequence a 0 , a 1 , … , a n , … {\displaystyle a_{0},a_{1},\dots ,a_{n},\dots } such that ∀ i > 0 , ( a i + 1 , a i ) ∈ R {\displaystyle \forall i>0,(a_{i+1},a_{i})\in R} ), all these semantics coincide—only one extension is grounded, stable, preferred, and complete. Some other semantics have been defined. One introduce the notation E x t σ ( S ) {\displaystyle Ext_{\sigma }(S)} to note the set of σ {\displaystyle \sigma } -extensions of the system S {\displaystyle S} . In the case of the system S {\displaystyle S} in the figure above, E x t σ ( S ) = { { a , d } } {\displaystyle Ext_{\sigma }(S)=\{\{a,d\}\}} for every Dung's semantic—the system is well-founded. That explains why the semantics coincide, and the accepted arguments are: a {\displaystyle a} and d {\displaystyle d} . ==== Labellings ==== Labellings are a more expressive way than extensions to express the acceptance of the arguments. Concretely, a labelling is a mapping that associates every argument with a label in (the argument is accepted), out (the argument is rejected), or undec (the argument is undefined—not accepted or refused). One can also note a labelling as a set of pairs ( a r g u m e n t , l a b e l ) {\displaystyle ({\mathit {argument}},{\mathit {label}})} . Such a mapping does not make sense without additional constraint. The notion of reinstatement labelling guarantees the sense of the mapping. L {\displaystyle L} is a reinstatement labelling on the system S = ⟨ A , R ⟩ {\displaystyle S=\langle A,R\rangle } if and only if : ∀ a ∈ A , L ( a ) = i n {\displaystyle \forall a\in A,L(a)={\mathit {in}}} if and only if ∀ b ∈ A {\displaystyle \forall b\in A} such that ( b , a ) ∈ R , L ( b ) = o u t {\displaystyle (b,a)\in R,L(b)={\mathit {out}}} ∀ a ∈ A , L ( a ) = o u t {\displaystyle \forall a\in A,L(a)={\mathit {out}}} if and only if ∃ b ∈ A {\displaystyle \exists b\in A} such that ( b , a ) ∈ R {\displaystyle (b,a)\in R} and L ( b ) = i n {\displaystyle L(b)={\mathit {in}}} ∀ a ∈ A , L ( a ) = u n d e c {\displaystyle \forall a\in A,L(a)={\mathit {undec}}} if and only if L ( a ) ≠ i n {\displaystyle L(a)\neq {\mathit {in}}} and L ( a ) ≠ o u t {\displaystyle L(a)\neq {\mathit {out}}} One can convert every extension into a reinstatement labelling: the arguments of the extension are in, those attacked by an argument of the extension are out, and the others are undec. Conversely, one can build an extension from a reinstatement labelling just by keeping the arguments in. Indeed, Caminada proved that the reinstatement labellings and the complete extensions can be mapped in a bijective way. Moreover, the other Datung's semantics can be associated to some particular sets of reinstatement labellings. Reinstatement labellings distinguish arguments not accepted because they are attacked by accepted arguments from undefined arguments—that is, those that are not defended cannot defend themselves. An argument is undec if it is attacked by at least another undec. If it is attacked only by arguments out, it must be in, and if it is attacked some argument in, then it is out. The unique reinstatement labelling that corresponds to the system S {\displaystyle S} above is L = { ( a , i n ) , ( b , o u t ) , ( c , o u t ) , ( d , i n ) } {\displaystyle L=\{(a,{\mathit {in}}),(b,{\mathit {out}}),(c,{\mathit {out}}),(d,{\mathit {in}})\}} . === Inference from an argumentation system === In the general case when several extensions are computed for a given semantic σ {\displaystyle \sigma } , the agent that reasons from the system can use several mechanisms to infer information: Credulous inference: the agent accepts an argument if it belongs to at least one of the σ {\displaystyle \sigma } -extensions—in which case, the agent risks accepting some arguments that are not acceptable together ( a {\displaystyle a} attacks b {\displaystyle b} , and a {\displaystyle a} and b {\displaystyle b} each belongs to an extension) Skeptical inference: the agent accepts an argument only if it belongs to every σ {\displaystyle \sigma } -extension. In this case, the agent risks deducing too little information (if the intersection of the extensions is empty or has a very small cardinal). For these two methods to infer information, one can identify the set of accepted arguments, respectively C r σ ( S ) {\displaystyle Cr_{\sigma }(S)} the set of the arguments credulously accepted under the semantic σ {\displaystyle \sigma } , and S c σ ( S ) {\displaystyle Sc_{\sigma }(S)} the set of arguments accepted skeptically under the semantic σ {\displaystyle \sigma } (the σ {\displaystyle \sigma } can be missed if there is no possible ambiguity about the semantic). Of course, when there is only one extension (for instance, when the system is well-founded), this problem is very simple: the agent accepts arguments of the unique extension and rejects others. The same reasoning can be done with labellings that correspond to the chosen semantic : an argument can be accepted if it is in for each labelling and refused if it is out for each labelling, the others being in an undecided state (the status of the arguments can remind the
Artificial consciousness
Artificial consciousness, also known as machine consciousness, synthetic consciousness, or digital consciousness, is consciousness hypothesized to be possible for artificial intelligence. It is also the corresponding field of study, which draws insights from philosophy of mind, philosophy of artificial intelligence, cognitive science and neuroscience. The term "sentience" can be used when specifically designating ethical considerations stemming from a form of phenomenal consciousness (P-consciousness, or the ability to feel qualia). Since sentience involves the ability to experience ethically positive or negative (i.e., valenced) mental states, it may justify welfare concerns and legal protection, as with non-human animals. Some scholars believe that consciousness is generated by the interoperation of various parts of the brain; these mechanisms are labeled the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). Some further believe that constructing a system (e.g., a computer system) that can emulate this NCC interoperation would result in a system that is conscious. Some scholars reject the possibility of non-biological conscious beings. == Philosophical views == As there are many hypothesized types of consciousness, there are many potential implementations of artificial consciousness. In the philosophical literature, perhaps the most common taxonomy of consciousness is into "access" and "phenomenal" variants. Access consciousness concerns those aspects of experience that can be apprehended, while phenomenal consciousness concerns those aspects of experience that seemingly cannot be apprehended, instead being characterized qualitatively in terms of "raw feels", "what it is like" or qualia. === Plausibility debate === Type-identity theorists and other skeptics hold the view that consciousness can be realized only in particular physical systems because consciousness has properties that necessarily depend on physical constitution. In his 2001 article "Artificial Consciousness: Utopia or Real Possibility," Giorgio Buttazzo says that a common objection to artificial consciousness is that, "Working in a fully automated mode, they [the computers] cannot exhibit creativity, unreprogrammation (which means can 'no longer be reprogrammed', from rethinking), emotions, or free will. A computer, like a washing machine, is a slave operated by its components." For other theorists (e.g., functionalists), who define mental states in terms of causal roles, any system that can instantiate the same pattern of causal roles, regardless of physical constitution, will instantiate the same mental states, including consciousness. ==== Thought experiments ==== David Chalmers proposed two thought experiments intending to demonstrate that "functionally isomorphic" systems (those with the same "fine-grained functional organization", i.e., the same information processing) will have qualitatively identical conscious experiences, regardless of whether they are based on biological neurons or digital hardware. The "fading qualia" is a reductio ad absurdum thought experiment. It involves replacing, one by one, the neurons of a brain with a functionally identical component, for example based on a silicon chip. Chalmers makes the hypothesis, knowing it in advance to be absurd, that "the qualia fade or disappear" when neurons are replaced one-by-one with identical silicon equivalents. Since the original neurons and their silicon counterparts are functionally identical, the brain's information processing should remain unchanged, and the subject's behaviour and introspective reports would stay exactly the same. Chalmers argues that this leads to an absurd conclusion: the subject would continue to report normal conscious experiences even as their actual qualia fade away. He concludes that the subject's qualia actually don't fade, and that the resulting robotic brain, once every neuron is replaced, would remain just as sentient as the original biological brain. Similarly, the "dancing qualia" thought experiment is another reductio ad absurdum argument. It supposes that two functionally isomorphic systems could have different perceptions (for instance, seeing the same object in different colors, like red and blue). It involves a switch that alternates between a chunk of brain that causes the perception of red, and a functionally isomorphic silicon chip, that causes the perception of blue. Since both perform the same function within the brain, the subject would not notice any change during the switch. Chalmers argues that this would be highly implausible if the qualia were truly switching between red and blue, hence the contradiction. Therefore, he concludes that the equivalent digital system would not only experience qualia, but it would perceive the same qualia as the biological system (e.g., seeing the same color). Greg Egan's short story Learning To Be Me (mentioned in §In fiction), illustrates how undetectable duplication of the brain and its functionality could be from a first-person perspective. Critics object that Chalmers' proposal begs the question in assuming that all mental properties and external connections are already sufficiently captured by abstract causal organization. Van Heuveln et al. argue that the dancing qualia argument contains an equivocation fallacy, conflating a "change in experience" between two systems with an "experience of change" within a single system. Mogensen argues that the fading qualia argument can be resisted by appealing to vagueness at the boundaries of consciousness and the holistic structure of conscious neural activity, which suggests consciousness may require specific biological substrates rather than being substrate-independent. Anil Seth argues that the complexity of brain neurons intrinsically matters in addition to their function and that it is not possible to replace any part of the brain with a perfect silicon equivalent. He points out that some of biological neurons exhibit activity aimed at cleaning up metabolic waste products, and writes that a perfect silicon replacement would require a silicon-based metabolism, but silicon is not suitable for creating such artificial metabolism. ==== In large language models ==== In 2022, Google engineer Blake Lemoine made a viral claim that Google's LaMDA chatbot was sentient. Lemoine supplied as evidence the chatbot's humanlike answers to many of his questions; however, the chatbot's behavior was judged by the scientific community as likely a consequence of mimicry, rather than machine sentience. Lemoine's claim was widely derided for being ridiculous. Moreover, attributing consciousness based solely on the basis of LLM outputs or the immersive experience created by an algorithm is considered a fallacy. However, while philosopher Nick Bostrom states that LaMDA is unlikely to be conscious, he additionally poses the question of "what grounds would a person have for being sure about it?" One would have to have access to unpublished information about LaMDA's architecture, and also would have to understand how consciousness works, and then figure out how to map the philosophy onto the machine: "(In the absence of these steps), it seems like one should be maybe a little bit uncertain. [...] there could well be other systems now, or in the relatively near future, that would start to satisfy the criteria." David Chalmers argued in 2023 that LLMs today display impressive conversational and general intelligence abilities, but are likely not conscious yet, as they lack some features that may be necessary, such as recurrent processing, a global workspace, and unified agency. Nonetheless, he considers that non-biological systems can be conscious, and suggested that future, extended models (LLM+s) incorporating these elements might eventually meet the criteria for consciousness, raising both profound scientific questions and significant ethical challenges. However, the view that consciousness can exist without biological phenomena is controversial and some reject it. Kristina Šekrst cautions that anthropomorphic terms such as "hallucination" can obscure important ontological differences between artificial and human cognition. While LLMs may produce human-like outputs, she argues that it does not justify ascribing mental states or consciousness to them. Instead, she advocates for an epistemological framework (such as reliabilism) that recognizes the distinct nature of AI knowledge production. She suggests that apparent understanding in LLMs may be a sophisticated form of AI hallucination. She also questions what would happen if an LLM were trained without any mention of consciousness. === Testing === Sentience is an inherently first-person phenomenon. Because of that, and due to the lack of an empirical definition of sentience, directly measuring it may be impossible. Although systems may display numerous behaviors correlated with sentience, determining whether a system is sentient is known as the hard pr
Wumpus world
Wumpus world is a simple world use in artificial intelligence for which to represent knowledge and to reason. Wumpus world was introduced by Michael Genesereth, and is discussed in the Russell-Norvig Artificial Intelligence book Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach. Wumpus World is loosely inspired by the 1972 video game Hunt the Wumpus. == Problem description == In Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach, the wumpus world features a 4x4 grid, containing a monster called a wumpus, multiple bottomless pits and hidden gold. The agent starts at (1,1) and has to find the gold and return to the starting position. The agent loses 1 point for every move and gains 1000 points for bringing the gold to the starting position. The agent can sense pits by a breeze, stench indicates a wumpus, and sparkle indicates gold. The wumpus can be killed by an arrow but costs 10 points.
And–or tree
An and–or tree is a graphical representation of the reduction of problems (or goals) to conjunctions and disjunctions of subproblems (or subgoals). == Example == The and–or tree: represents the search space for solving the problem P, using the goal-reduction methods: P if Q and R P if S Q if T Q if U == Definitions == Given an initial problem P0 and set of problem solving methods of the form: P if P1 and … and Pn the associated and–or tree is a set of labelled nodes such that: The root of the tree is a node labelled by P0. For every node N labelled by a problem or sub-problem P and for every method of the form P if P1 and ... and Pn, there exists a set of children nodes N1, ..., Nn of the node N, such that each node Ni is labelled by Pi. The nodes are conjoined by an arc, to distinguish them from children of N that might be associated with other methods. A node N, labelled by a problem P, is a success node if there is a method of the form P if nothing (i.e., P is a "fact"). The node is a failure node if there is no method for solving P. If all of the children of a node N, conjoined by the same arc, are success nodes, then the node N is also a success node. Otherwise the node is a failure node. == Search strategies == An and–or tree specifies only the search space for solving a problem. Different search strategies for searching the space are possible. These include searching the tree depth-first, breadth-first, or best-first using some measure of desirability of solutions. The search strategy can be sequential, searching or generating one node at a time, or parallel, searching or generating several nodes in parallel. == Relationship with logic programming == The methods used for generating and–or trees are propositional logic programs (without variables). In the case of logic programs containing variables, the solutions of conjoint sub-problems must be compatible. Subject to this complication, sequential and parallel search strategies for and–or trees provide a computational model for executing logic programs. == Relationship with two-player games == And–or trees can also be used to represent the search spaces for two-person games. The root node of such a tree represents the problem of one of the players winning the game, starting from the initial state of the game. Given a node N, labelled by the problem P of the player winning the game from a particular state of play, there exists a single set of conjoint children nodes, corresponding to all of the opponents responding moves. For each of these children nodes, there exists a set of non-conjoint children nodes, corresponding to all of the player's defending moves. For solving game trees with proof-number search family of algorithms, game trees are to be mapped to and–or trees. MAX-nodes (i.e. maximizing player to move) are represented as OR nodes, MIN-nodes map to AND nodes. The mapping is possible, when the search is done with only a binary goal, which usually is "player to move wins the game".